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Abstract
Resource allocation is an extensively investigated problem in several market domains,
not restricted to cloud computing platforms, supply chains, government procurement, etc.
This dissertation primarily focuses on addressing challenges associated with resource allocation in open market settings. The open markets are characterised based on the behaviour of the participants, i.e., resource vendors and resource buyers. In such markets,
participants have varying resource requirements, wherein they can enter or withdraw from
the market dynamically. This leads to uncertainty in the resource availability and resource
requirement in the market. But to ensure competitiveness and higher participation rate of
the participants, the trade-off between and supply/demand in the market is crucial. Also,
different participants have different sets of conflicting preferences. For instance, resource
vendors aim to maximise their revenue, whereas resource buyers aim to minimise their
costs. Thus, concurrently addressing such conflicting objectives increases the complexity
of the resource allocation problem. Therefore, there is a need to design a resource allocation technique, popularly called a resource allocation mechanism (RAM), to address
these challenges.
This dissertation focuses on designing such RAMs for open markets in a preview of
game theory. In this context, an efficient RAM depends on two basic rules, i.e., allocation rule and pricing rule. In doing so, this dissertation presents several RAMs adopting
different pairs of custom-designed rules, called policies for resource allocation in open
market settings. Although various RAMs for the open market setting have been discussed
in the literature, very few effectively addresses all challenges. Briefly, existing RAMs
were designed for unrealistic market settings, having little or no budget or resource availability constraints. Therefore, existing RAMs failed to perform efficiently in real-world
market settings. Also, existing RAMs were either vendor-centric or buyer-centric. Such
one-sided RAMs suffer from uncontrolled competition and participation drop in the market.
In this regard, this dissertation presents a couple of RAMs. To begin with, Chapters 3
and 4 introduces learning-based broker aided RAMs for the open-cloud market. Herein,
the broker is designed to safeguard the conflicting objectives of both participants (vendors and buyers) to implement dual-centric policies. In specific, the broker allocates the
requested resource on behalf of the participants. Also, it is the broker’s responsibility
iv
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to observe the stability and social welfare in the market. In this paradigm, the RAM implement reinforcement-learning techniques to model efficient pricing policies and optimal
allocation policies. The objective is to build an adaptive policies for a dynamically changing market. In addition, these RAMs implement novel profiling techniques to catalogue
the unique participants to train the learning algorithms. Besides, to ensure truthfulness in
the market, monotonic policies and critical values are adopted. Towards the end, RAM
implements priority-based fairness mechanisms to boost the participation rate in the market. Also, these custom-designed mechanisms outperformed the existing sophisticated
mechanisms. The experimental results show that novel mechanisms were superior in
terms of overall participants profit and resource utilisation in the market.
Then, Chapters 5 and 6 presents information diffusion based decentralised RAMs for
resource allocation in open economic networks. The objective is to examine the purpose
of the diffusion mechanism in encouraging collaboration among the competing participants. Specifically, to improve the participation of the vendors, they are given rewards
to invite distant potential vendors through a novel diffusion mechanism. Also, such
diffusion-based RAM supports resource sharing amongst the vendors to boost resource
availability in the market. In this regard, these RAMs improve overall participation and
resource availability. Besides, it would reduce the resource allocation cost and underutilisation of the resources. Towards the end, the efficiency and the stability of these novel
diffusion mechanisms is comparatively better than the Vickery & Clarke mechanism.
Briefly, the range of novel RAMs presented in this dissertation addresses different
challenges in various market settings for the resources to get allocated. Chapters 3 to
6 presents four different mechanisms, to gradually address the limitations of its predecessor. The broader objective of this dissertation is to design adaptive mechanisms, to
automate resource allocation decisions in different real-world market settings with the
least possible errors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Optimal and efficient allocation of resources in different market domains is a widely studied problem. Few market domains wherein this problem is prominent are cloud computing platforms [104], e-commerce business, government procurement [98], fog computing
[126], etc. This dissertation aims to design an efficient resource allocation mechanism
for open market settings. Generally, an open market setting is distinguished as a market
setting wherein there is no restriction on arrival and dispatch of the participants (the vendors and the buyers). Naturally, this leads to uncertainty in the resource requirements and
resource availability in such markets. Also, the trade-off between supply and demand is
essential to ensure competitiveness and higher participation of participants. Besides, in
this multi-party market setting, markets should be able to address the conflicting preferences of the vendors and buyers. For instance, resource vendors aim to maximise their
revenue, whereas resource buyers aim to minimise their costs. Thus, concurrently addressing such conflicting objectives is not always feasible. Therefore, there is a need to
design an optimal mechanism that would efficiently address these challenges.
In the literature, various mechanisms [54, 108, 118] for the open market has been discussed. However, very few effectively address all challenges. Briefly, existing resource
allocation mechanism (RAM) was designed for unrealistic market settings, having little
or no budget or resource availability constraints. Therefore, these RAMs failed to perform
efficiently in real-world market settings. Also, existing RAMs were either vendor-centric
or buyer-centric. Such one-sided RAMs suffer from uncontrolled competition [46] which
leads to participation drop [11] in the market.
In this regard, this dissertation presents couple of mechanisms particularly for open
markets in a preview of game theory a . In this context, an adequate mechanism depends on
two important rules, called policies, i.e., allocation policy and pricing policy. Throughout
this dissertation, it introduces couple of different custom-designed policies for resource
allocation in different open market setting.
a ”game

theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among rational decisionmakers [144]”
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Specifically, this dissertation presents mechanisms for two different open market settings, namely open cloud markets and open economic networks. An open cloud market
is the classical open market setting, wherein cloud resources (storage, computation, etc.)
are allocated. On the other hand, an open economic network [63] is a network like market, that connects vendors and buyers, which have a similar set of resources to sell or
purchase. In this regard, the dissertation virtually has two parts. Chapters 3 and 4 introduces learning-based broker aided RAMs for the open cloud market. Then, Chapters 5
and 6 presents information diffusion based decentralised RAMs for resource allocation in
economic networks. This series of novel RAMs introduced in this dissertation addresses
several challenges as discussed further.

1.1

Research Background

In recent years, infrastructure for on-demand availability of resources (services) extensively implemented in different market domains. Such market paradigms are not only
easily accessible to distant buyers but also are economically efficient. However, such
market settings have a set of challenges such as resource matching, load balancing, resource scalability, resource pricing, resource availability, etc. These problems are directly
or indirectly related to the adopted resource allocation methodology.
In this regard, the adopted resource allocation methodology is optimal when it is advantageous for every participant and the overall social welfare of the market. In this context,
the social welfare of the market resembles the extent of the satisfaction of both parties,
i.e., vendors and buyers. To negotiate the preferences of both the participants in such a
multi-party market setting, auction paradigms [55] are widely adopted. In this paradigm,
participants communicate through a token called as bid. These bid values from the participants are collected, and then a mediator allocates the resources based on the adopted
mechanism. This mediator termed as a broker, is an independent entity that makes unbiased decisions. The broker functions as the owner of the RAM. In this regard, it is responsible for taking two decisions (policies) on behalf of the participants, namely ”whom to
allocate the resources?” that is, resource allocation policy on behalf of vendors. Then on
behalf of buyers, the broker decides, ”what will be the cost of the allocated resources?”
called as pricing policy.
Further, the choice of these policies is as per the behaviour of the participants in the
market settings. For instance, presence of multiple resource vendors, allocation of several
types of resources, multi-units of resources, etc. These resource allocation mechanisms
are distinguishable depending on the implemented allocation and pricing policy and can
be broadly classified as: rule-based policies, heuristic policies and approximation policies. In rule-based policies, [108], allocation and pricing policies rely on a pre-decided
rule, such as the first-price auction [55], wherein the highest bidder is the winner and cost
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is the bid value. Then, in heuristic policies [6, 2], policies implements heuristic algorithms
such as dynamic programming [156] or static statistical models [54]. Finally, in the approximation based policies [85, 126], optimal policies usually implement learning-based
algorithms.
Most of the existing different types of mechanisms have traditionally focused on closed
markets in an offline setting. However, with the advent of learning algorithms, many studies [16, 47] have attempted to adapt to the dynamics of the online market setting. However, these mechanisms could not guarantee economic stability and resource equilibrium
in the market. In particular, the implemented mechanism must qualify the concepts of
algorithmic game theory [99, 96] to ensure the following properties:
• Strategy-proof : This property [93] ensures that strategic participants do not benefit
from misreporting their bid values. In this regard, the mechanism should encourage
the truthful behaviour of the participants.
• Participation Fairness: This property [92] ensures that all the participants get a fair
chance to participate in the market. Lack of participation fairness would lead to
the monopoly of a smaller number of participants. This leads to instability in the
supply or demand of the resources and higher resource prices.
• Controlled Competition: This property controls the competition to avoid unrealistic competition in the market. Such a super-competitive market leads to fewer
participants and lesser availability of resources. Therefore, the mechanism should
maintain the balance between competition and cooperation in the market. It would
improve the overall resource availability in the open market.
Definition 1.1.1. Participation Fairness is a property which is required in a continuous
auction mechanism to ensures that all the participants accomplish their goal to same degree. In a short term, fairness techniques might hamper the efficiency of certain participants. However, in along term social welfare of the market is enhanced and all the
participants accomplishes their goal based on their priority schemes.
To summarise, existing approaches could not address all the challenges in a single
policy. In this regard, the current researches are inadequate for real-world open markets
in which the objectives of all the participants to be considered are dynamically evolving.

1.2

Research Objectives

This section summarises the objectives of this dissertation to fill in the existing research
gaps discussed above. In this regard, this dissertation presents a couple of RAMs for
conceptually two different open market domains, namely, open cloud market and open
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economic network. These two markets are distinguishable based on the communication
between the participants. In the classical open cloud market (Figure 1.1), all the cloud
vendors can directly communicate with all the cloud buyers through brokers. On the
other hand, in an open economic network (Figure 1.2), participants can communicate in a
hierarchy, from top to bottom or vice-versa.

Figure 1.1: Open Cloud Market
Figure 1.2: Open Economic Network

For such open markets, the focus is to design adaptive policies based on machine learning techniques [10, 14, 28]. Also, adopted policies must be unbiased to avoid the dominance of any particular group of participants. Then, for an open economic network,
the aim is to design information diffusion [63] based policies to encourage collaborative
behaviour in the market.
In particular, the primary objectives of this dissertation are as follows:
• Dual-centric Adaptive Policy: To implement adaptive policies that protect the preferences of both parties. Also, to identify the scope of learning based policies for
cloud resource allocation in open cloud markets.
• Dynamic Resource Allocation: To design and evaluate policies suitable for the dynamic open cloud market setting. In such a market, impatient resource buyers need
to get allocated without any delay.
• Information Diffusion: To implement an information diffusion-based mechanism to
promote resource sharing and participation in a network like market. The objective
is to encourage collaboration in a decentralised manner among the participants.
Also, the above-listed objectives should qualify different game-theoretic challenges. To
begin with, while designing adaptive policies, the uncertainty of the market would make
the policies unsteady and thus make the market unstable. Therefore, to assure steadiness,
policies must ensure honesty among the participants, i.e. truthfulness. Similarly, while
designing dual centric policies, participants usually have conflicting preferences, so the
mechanism should make a trade-off between them. Further, to maintain the smooth functioning of the resource allocation policies, specifically pricing policies, there should be a
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trade-off between the resource demand and the resource supply in the market. Therefore,
the mechanism should encourage participation through fairness strategies.

1.3

Research Motivation

The primary objective of this dissertation is to design an optimal resource allocation
mechanism that qualifies different game-theoretic properties. Following that, this dissertation aims to consider several multi-dimensional objectives of the participants. Also, to
ensure fairness while allocating requested resources such that every participant is encouraged to participate [92] in the market, there need for an adaptive but stable mechanism to
suit such a market setting.
In the literature, many studies have implemented machine learning techniques to achieve
game-theoretical properties, for instance, [10, 14, 28] proposed machine learning-based
strategy-proof auction. However, these mechanisms do not consider the complex dynamics of online resource allocations. However, with the recent advent of reinforcement
learning (RL), it is also adopted to solve several resource allocation problems [84, 20, 17,
72].
Further, information diffusion-based mechanism designs are also getting recognition
for resource allocation in social networks. These mechanisms address the issue of resource availability through collaboration in the market. In such a network like market,
the objective is to reach out to distant potential participants at minimal brokerage fees.
It would maintain a steadiness in the resource requirements and resource availability in
the market, which is crucial for the stability of the open market [92] because a limited
number of resource vendors would either lead to the monopoly of a certain group of owners or would lead to resource scarcity, particularly in government procurement schemes,
which aims at boosting the small local vendors [137, 98], through bulk procurement of
crops, milk, transportation, etc. Similarly, present-day, e-commerce retail giant platforms,
such as Amazon.com b , FlipKart.com c , etc. are dominating the buyer’s market. Such a
business model might boost sales of some small businesses, while businesses with negligible or no sales may end up paying a hefty commission. These platforms are usually
super-competitive for small vendors as they have to compete against distributors and manufacturers. Owing to this, the dissertation focuses on designing adaptive mechanisms that
promote fair opportunity for all the participants in such a competitive market. In addition,
uniform competition and collaboration among the participants would maintain market
stability.
b https://www.amazon.com/
c https://www.flipkart.com/
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Research Limitations

This dissertation aims to address several challenges associated with designing a mechanism in the different open market settings. In this regard, due to time and resource
constraints, the research has few limitations and scope for further investigation.
Firstly, this research does not consider the scope of resource demand sharing among
the consumers. It might optimise the resource utilisation of the resource vendors and reduce the overall social welfare of the market. Further, this research does not effectively
study the allocation of multiple unit resources in a collaborative setting such that, multiple resource providers collaborate to fulfil resource demands. Finally, this dissertation
encourages the interested researcher to explore selective bidding in an online resource
allocation setting.

1.5

Dissertation Outline

Most of the contributions presented in this dissertation are published. In this regard, the
structure of the dissertation is as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces the reader to necessary preliminaries and existing famous resource allocation mechanisms. It categorises the existing resource allocation mechanisms into five different types based on their implementation. Also, the merits and
demerits of these mechanisms get discussed.
• Chapter 3 presents the proposed mechanism suitable for open cloud markets. It
addresses the first objective of this research, that is, to design dual-centric adaptive
policies. Specifically, it introduces RL based mechanism for resource allocation
open cloud markets.
• Chapter 4 extends the methodology discussed in the previous chapter to modify the
mechanism to adapt to an online open cloud market setting, addressing the second
objective of the dissertation.
• Chapter 5 presents an empirical study of information diffusion based resource allocation mechanism to encourage cooperative behaviour in a competitive market.
This novel diffusion-based mechanism allocates multi-units of homogeneous resources in an open economic network.
• Chapter 6 presents the extension of the previous chapter to design a diffusion mechanism for heterogeneous resources. Besides, this chapter presents experimental results to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed diffusion mechanism.
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• Chapter 7 is the conclusion of this dissertation. It also lists the shortcomings and
the scope of future research directions.

Chapter 2
Research Background
This chapter gives an introduction to a different class of resource allocation mechanisms
for open markets. Before that, it discusses different open market settings and various
resource allocations paradigms. This chapter has three parts; the first part presents the
different types of open markets distinguished based on their characteristics. Then, it
discusses different resource allocation paradigms which play a crucial role in choosing
resource allocation mechanisms. Further, it presents several state-of-the-art resource allocation mechanisms for different open market settings. Towards the end, it discusses
the scope of machine learning-based and information diffusion-based in designing mechanisms.

2.1

Open Markets

Open markets are the distributed market setting that is the most commonly adopted infrastructure paradigm. In such market settings, a resource allocation mechanism efficiently
allocates the on-demand resource requests. In this setting, there is a set of geographically
remote resource providers and dynamically arriving buyers. In this regard, open markets
are specifically distinguished based on the dynamic joining and leaving of the vendors and
the buyers. There are various classes of open markets, which varies based on the characteristics of participants and markets, as discussed below. Note that, in this dissertation,
market and open market are used interchangeably, unless explicitly mentioned.

2.1.1

Dynamics of the Market

Open markets can be vividly categorised based on the dynamics of the participants, i.e.,
the arrival and leaving of the participants. In this regard, there are two types of market
settings: (1) static markets and (2) dynamic markets. In a static market setting, the arrival
and departure of resource buyers and resource vendors is a sequential process. Firstly,
the resource request from all the buyers is collected. Then, based on resource availability,
8

2.1. OPEN MARKETS

9

requested resources are allocated. These independent sequential steps lead to inefficient
utilisation of the available resources. Also, until the execution finishes, the size of the
allocated resources is constant. It leads to the wastage of resources in the open market.
Thus, the static market setting is not flexible and needs prior information to make allocation decisions.
Further, in a dynamic market setting, resource requests and resource allocation take
place simultaneously. It improves the overall resource utilisation with a higher allocation
success rate. In this regard, a dynamic market setting makes the market more flexible by
tracking real-time supply and demand of resources to make optimal allocations. However, designing an optimal resource allocation methodology for such a dynamic market is
a challenging problem [31]. This research aims to design resource allocation methodologies for real-world dynamic market setting. Therefore, most of the discussed research is
implemented in dynamic market setting [85, 54] and fewer resource allocation methodologies [93, 27] for static market setting.

2.1.2

Architecture of the Market

The architecture the open markets also affects the overall performance of the market. In
this context, there are two types of market architecture; centralised markets and decentralised markets. In a centralised market setting, a central broker controls all the resource
allocation transactions between the vendor and the buyer. The implementation of the centralised markets are comparatively simpler, wherein it is controlled by a centralised controller. However, this centralised controller is vulnerable to a single point of failure. On
the other hand, in a decentralised architecture, multiple autonomous intermediators independently control different transactions, which its implementation complicated. However,
it addresses the problem of a single point of failure. In this regard, decentralised markets
are robust which lowers the execution times. In the literature, many centralised marketbased resource allocation methodologies exist. For instance, Samimi et al. [108] proposed
a double auction-based mechanism in a centralised market setting. However, very few decentralised market-based resource allocation methodologies exist. For instance, Khethan
et al. [52] proposed a resource allocation methodology for decentralised market setting
based on the concept of Nash equilibrium.

2.1.3

Objectives of the Market

The open market can also be categorised based on the desired objectives of the market
setting. In this context, there is a single objective market setting and a multi-objective
setting. The objectives are associated with different quality parameters related to different
participants, listed as follows:
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• request turn-around time: total time from resource request to execution of the
resources
• vendor’s revenue: total revenue earned by the resource vendor by selling its available resources
• buyer’s cost: total payment made by the buyer for the requested resources
• energy consumption: total energy consumed while the allocation of resources
• resource utilisation: percentage of resource utilised at the end of resource allocation cycle; the cycle length is usually a single day.
In the literature, multiple objective markets are more popular as compared to a single
objective. For instance, Kuribayashi et al. [87] proposed a resource allocation methodology focused on power consumption, computation and bandwidth usage. Further, Midya
et al. [82] proposed a three-layer architecture for connecting vehicles through cloud computing. This research considered the different quality of service parameters for scheduling
vehicle fleet demands. Similarly, Gong et al. [39] proposed resource allocation methodology focusing on the allocation of different types of resources and vendors’ revenue.

2.1.4

Domain of the Market

A market domain represents resource sharing jurisdiction in the open market setting. In
this context, the open market is either an intra-domain market or an inter-domain market.
An intra-domain market denotes the classical market structure, wherein resources are not
shared or shared among resource clusters within a single resource provider. For instance,
Prasad et al. [104] proposed a combinatorial auction-based allocation policy for intradomain markets. Similarly, Mei et al., [81] presented quality of services oriented vendor’s
revenue maximisation within a single cloud vendor. Further, in an inter-domain market,
resources are shared among independent resource providers. For instance, Farokhi [34]
proposed a SaaS framework for an inter-domain market setting. In this work, multiple
resource vendors share their resources through a service level agreement to control the
quality of their preferences.

2.2

Resource Allocation Paradigm

Allocation of resources in a dynamic market setting having multiple objectives is a challenging problem. In addition, a market with several heterogeneous resources leads to
strict constraints over resource availability and successful allocations. In this regard, resource allocation mechanisms have to record all the past allocations to make future allocations. Otherwise, it would lead to incomplete allocation of resources or interruption of
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the allocated requests. Therefore, auction paradigms [55] are widely adopted for resource
allocation in such market settings with multiple participants. The primary objective of
an auction paradigm is to safeguard the privacy and preferences of both parties (vendors
and buyers). Besides, auction paradigms have the potential to facilitate fair participation
to all the participants. Finally, auction paradigms are also adopted to improve the overall
performance of the market and the participants.
Further, based on the type of communication between the parties, auction paradigms
are of three types: (1) one-sided auction paradigm, (2) double-sided auction paradigm,
and (3) combinatorial auction paradigm.
Note that all the auction mechanisms discussed in this dissertation are seal-bid, wherein
bids submitted by the bidders at a given time are not known by the other bidders in the
market.

Figure 2.1: Auction Paradigms

2.2.1

One-Sided Auction Paradigm

In the one-side auction paradigm, [69] either resource buyers submit their bid values
(maximum budget) or resource vendors submit their offered bid values (minimum selling
price). Further, the one-sided auction paradigms are of two types, as follows: (1) forward
auction paradigm [7]: if the resource buyer is the bidder bidding its maximum possible
payment capacity, and (2) reverse auction paradigm [142]: if resource owner is the bidder
bidding its minimum selling price against the request from the resource buyer.
These two one-sided auction paradigms also have different winner determination strategy. In forwarding auction paradigms, the highest bidders are the winners, whereas, lowest bidders are the winners in the reverse auction paradigm since there is only one-way
communication in this paradigm. So, one-sided paradigms fail to address the objectives
of both types of participants.
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Double-Sided Auction Paradigm

Double-sided auction paradigms are adopted to establish two-way communication in the
open market. In this paradigm, resource vendors and resource buyers both submit their
bids to reveal their objectives. In this regard, the double-auction paradigm creates a neutral ground to give a fair opportunity to vendors as well as buyers to negotiate and conduct dual-centric resource allocation transactions [108]. Further, to suit the continuous
and real-time negotiation between the vendors’ and the buyers’ preferences, the continuous double auction paradigm [121] is adopted. In this paradigm, buyers and vendors
could continuously submit their bids during a fixed time interval. These continuous multiple rounds of double auction paradigms are adopted in a market with several types of
resources. In each round, bidding for different resource types is made and continues until all the resources are allocated. For instance, Bo et al. [4], proposed a decentralised
approach for multi-resource allocation. In this research, buyers buy each resource type
separately in series of auctions instead of a single auction. Naturally, the complexity of
such paradigms increases with the increase in the number of different resources.

2.2.3

Combinatorial Auction Paradigm

Combinatorial auction paradigms [108, 104] are implemented to allocate multiple types
of resources in a one-sided or double-sided auction paradigm. It is an extended form of
the auction paradigm wherein a bundle of resources are requested. In this context, as a
bundle of resources are auctioned, so it is beneficial to both resource owner as well as
resource buyer [37]. Also, unlike the continuous auction paradigm, this auction paradigm
allocates all the resources in a single step. Similarly, Schwind et al. [114] proposed a
single-side combinatorial auction paradigm for resource allocation in grids. However,
this mechanism improved the resource utilisation of the grid, but at the cost of providers’
utility. Then, Pourebrahimi et al. [103] proposed a popular continuous double-sided
auction paradigm for resource allocation in stock markets. Briefly, combinatorial auction improves the total revenue of the resource vendor and also increases the allocation
efficiency [56, 117].
Further sections discusses different resource allocation mechanisms (RAM) implemented in different auction paradigms.

2.3

Resource Allocation Mechanisms

As discussed in Section 2.2, this dissertation implements an auction paradigm for resource
allocation in the open market setting. In this auction paradigm, a RAM is implemented
for the optimal allocation of resources, called an auction-based mechanism. In this context, RAM adopts two types of decision-making policies, namely allocation policies and
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pricing policies. The winner is decided based on the adopted allocation policy. Then, the
allocation cost depends on the adopted pricing policy. There exist several auction-based
mechanisms in the literature, such as first-price auction mechanism [90], second-price
auction [44, 9], etc. For instance, in the classic first-price auction-based mechanism, resources are allocated to the highest bidder in the allocation policy and the allocation cost
is the highest bid value.
In 1981 Myserson [93] put forward necessary conditions for designing an optimal
auction-based mechanism. In this context, different properties associated with an optimal auction-based mechanism are incentive compatibility, competitiveness, fairness, etc.
In this regard, a popular auction-based Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism [136,
125], attempts to achieve incentive compatibility. In this mechanism, bidders submit their
bids, and then the resources are allocated to the highest bidder, whereas the cost of the
allocation is the second-highest bid. Then based on this VCG mechanism, Teo et al. [131]
proposed a dominant strategy to reveal the true valuation to ensure stability and allocation
efficiency. However, later Rothkopf [107] listed the proofs to show that VCG mechanism
is practically impossible to implement without any strict assumptions. Towards the end,
to facilitate fair allocation of resources, such auction-based mechanisms are mediated by a
broker. It is the responsibility of the broker to design unbiased policies, i.e., allocation and
pricing policies. In this regard, there are three types of participants in an auction-based
mechanism or simply RAM, namely vendors, buyers, and a broker. Note that, in this
dissertation, mechanism and RAM are used interchangeably, unless explicitly mentioned.

2.3.1

Non-Adaptive Mechanisms

Non-adaptive mechanisms are usually rule-based auction mechanisms. It is the classical implementation of the auction mechanism. In such a mechanism, buyers(s) with the
highest bid is the winner [93], and resources are allocated to the winning buyer whereas,
pricing rule could be based on the first-price or second-price auction mechanism. For
instance, Prasad et al. [104] proposed combinatorial auction-based resource allocation
approaches in cloud computing. This mechanism aims to maximise the utilities of both
the participants using the first-price auction mechanism. Further, VCG [136] mechanism
is widely adopted, wherein the highest bidder is the winner, but the winner has to pay
the second-highest bid value. This mechanism aims to encourage the bidders to submit
their bids truthfully, without misreporting their bids to gain more profit. This mechanism
ensured uniformity in designing the resource allocation mechanism to some extent. However, it was biased towards the bidders and failed to address different challenges such as
fairness and the bidder drop problem in the market. In specific, few lowest bidding bidders keep winning, which leads to a drop in the participation of other participants. The
drop in participation leads to a very serious problem of a monolithic market, wherein
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prices and supply/demand are controlled by a limited number of participants. Owing to
this difference, scheduling schemes were adopted for a fair opportunity to all the potential participants. For instance, Angelelli et al. [5] introduced an interval-based scheduling
algorithm to fairly allocate the resources. In this approach, n out of m available resources
were allocated at any given time and based on column generations methodology optimal
resource allocation decisions were made. Then, Tseng et al. [135] proposed a priority
based allocation policy, wherein non-perishable resources were considered, such that resources could be reused. In this research, high priority allocation requests were executed
first and lower priority requests were stalled until enough resources are available.
In the literature, there have been different ways adopted to decide the priority of the resource requests. To begin with, Saraswathi et al., [110] proposed a simple rule for attaching the priority label to each request based on the size of the resource request, such that
resource request with a larger amount of CPU was given higher priority. In this mechanism, all the requests were classified in three labels, high, medium, and low priority, using
the K-means algorithm. The pricing policy was a linear function of the volume of available resources in the market. However, these priority-based approaches did not efficiently
handle the time-critical resource requests, which was to be allocated within a specific
timeline. Owing to this, Kumar et al. [124] proposed a preemption allocation policy. In
specific, allocated low priority requests could be preempted for high priority requests if
enough resources are unavailable. In doing so, this research maintains a list of all the
requests as per their priority, to reserve resources for higher priority requests. Similarly,
many different solutions have been proposed [13, 101], which assumed that consumer
arrives randomly from the set of the known distribution of consumers. However, these
approaches are based on the static allocation rule, so they failed to address the challenges
in an online setting. Briefly, all the above research presents the classical resource allocation mechanism, which is usually non-adaptive rule-based approaches and fixed pricing
policy. Besides, fixed-pricing leads to less competition because of monopoly [67] of a
set of bidding vendors, which has the lowest possible prices, as those vendors keep winning in consecutive auctions. Therefore, to maintain competitiveness [74] by avoiding
monopoly in the environment, vendors should be able to adjust their prices based on the
market situation. So, these mechanisms proved to perform efficiently in open-market with
uniform supply and demand of resources. However, it fails to address the risk associated
with the uncertain market and lead to a drop in social welfare in the market.

2.3.2

Risk Aware Resource Allocation Mechanisms

The reliability of resource allocation in an open market setting depends on the robustness
and uniformity of the adopted RAM. In this context, Klein et al. [53] ensured reliability in the open cloud markets by checking the supply-demand at regular intervals called
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risk-interval. Similarly, Jonas et al. [30] presented a load management-based approach
to improve the allocation of requests. These mechanisms did not have any systematic
and flexible approach to handle reliability. Therefore, they fail to ensure reliability in
a market setting with dynamically changing risk-interval. Later in 2014, Maggio et al.
[75] presented an adaptive mechanism to forecast the request load in the market. Similar to this, Nikolov et al. [95] established a concept of flexible resource cloud owners
to achieve service-oriented resource allocations. However, these approaches failed to address the issue of resource overbooking in case of higher resource demands. To address
this issue, Thomas et al. [133] proposed optimisation of resource allocation to reduce
the request failure. Then to automate this mechanism, Desmerurus et al. [26] presented
an event-driven mechanism. It aimed at maintaining a trade-off between the resource allocation and the response time of the resource requests in an automated sense. Briefly,
several mechanisms are proposed to address the reliability of resource allocation in an
open market setting.

2.3.3

Resource Utilisation driven Resource Allocation Mechanism

Optimal utilisation of limited available resources in an open market is very crucial for the
overall performance of the market. In this regard, optimal utilisation approaches would
optimise the distribution of the resources in the market, which ensures higher successful
allocation. In general, resource utilisation oriented mechanisms are not static or rulebased approaches but adapt themselves in run-time to some extent [105]. It boosts the
allocation success rate, as well as maximises the revenue of the resource owners. In the
literature, several resource utilisation oriented mechanisms [25, 88] have been proposed.
For instance, in 2013, Mohapatra et al. [88] presented a heuristic load balancing algorithm, which assists cloud providers to handle dynamically arriving resource requests. In
specific, as soon as cloud requests arrive, the load balancing algorithm assigns the requests to a particular group of virtual machines. However, the existing load balancing
mechanism creates a delay in the execution of the resource requests.

2.3.4

Adaptive Mechanisms

In dynamically changing open market settings, robust and adaptive resource allocation
mechanisms are more suitable. It improves the reliability of resource allocation by adapting to the dynamics of supply and demand of the resources in the market. In the past,
different statistical model-based dynamic pricing policies [138, 54, 67] were proposed.
However, these models fail to adapt to the dynamically changing supply and demand in
the open market. In this regard, several adaptive pricing policies based on adaptive RAMs
have been proposed [85, 32]. Similarly, Zhou et al. [163] proposed a branch-and-bound
based heuristic RAM. Also, Nejad et al. [94], and Zhang et al. [156] introduced an integer
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programming based heuristic RAM for truthful allocation of resources. Then, Jixian et
al. [157] presented a truthful heuristic RAM to shorten the location time through different
reallocation strategies. Also, the payment policy satisfied the critical value to ensure the
truthfulness of the mechanism. Further, in 2018 Baranwal et al. [12] proposed a negotiation based heuristic mechanism for dynamic pricing based on the based on actions of
the resource vendors and the resource buyers. It modelled a unique interdependent utility function for all the participants depended on the opinion of other participants, thus,
encouraging all the participants to report their valuation truthfully.
In this regard, several heuristic RAMs were proposed in the literature. These RAMs
were well suited for static market settings. Since the complexity of such algorithms increases with the number of constraints, such heuristic RAMs faces issues related to scalability, higher execution time, and lower social welfare in the dynamic open market. To
address these challenges several approximation based RAMs [163, 147] were introduced.
To begin with, Mashayekhy et al. [78] and Liu et al. [70] presented approximation algorithms for the allocation of heterogeneous resources. These RAMs mainly focused on
allocating the requested resources on multiple independent virtual machines in each vendor. Similarly, machine learning-based approximation RAMs were widely adopted [85,
111], as discussed in the next section.

2.4

Machine Learning in Auction based Mechanisms

This section presents several machine learning-based adaptive RAMs. To begin with, in
2018, Cheng et al. [20] proposed a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based RAM to
address multiple objectives in a dynamic open market setting. It aimed to minimise energy
consumption costs and maximise the successful allocations. Similarly, in 2019, Du et al.
[29] proposed a DRL based RAM for resource provisioning in an open market setting.
It implements an RL-based non-linear approximation pricing function to maximise the
social welfare of the resource vendors. However, these mechanisms were vendor-centric
and did not address buyers’ preferences, such as resource quality, completion deadline,
etc.
Further, several online market paradigms [100] are being implemented in different open
market domains, such as display advertisement, flight ticket, etc. Online market problem is similar to famous secretary problem [15, 48], wherein optimal secretary is to be
appointed. In such paradigms, resource requests get allocated in real-time without any
delay. In the literature, many different solutions have been proposed [13, 101], which
assume random arrival of buyers from the set of the known distribution. However, these
non-adaptive RAMs fail to address all the challenges in the online paradigm.
Recently, reinforcement learning-based online mechanisms have been introduced [77,
16, 146, 47] to make real-time decisions. For instance, Cai et al. [17] proposed RL based
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mechanism to allocate resources in an online cloud computing market. In this mechanism,
a stream of cloud buyers submit their resource requests, and it is immediately accepted
or rejected. However, these online mechanisms mainly focused only on the dynamics
of the buyers (i.e., demand), and did not address the dynamics of vendors (i.e., supply).
Also, they largely focused on maximising the revenue and did not handle the strategic behaviour of the participants. In the view of the game-theory [97], considering the strategic
behaviour of the participants is crucial for the stability of the RAM. Owing to this, several
RL techniques [31, 118, 130] attempted to address this challenge. However, these mechanisms considered the complex state space representing the correlation between the future
and the current allocation decisions. Later, Stein et al. [126] proposed a strategy-proof
online mechanism, which partially represented the complex state space. However, state
representation becomes complicated with the increase in the number of agents. Table 2.1
compares popular auction mechanism for resource allocation.
Table 2.1: Comparison of different types of resource allocation mechanism

# Mechanism
TV OL/OF Type HT IR S
Angelelli et al.[5]
✗
OF
HU
✗
✗ ✗
Zhou et al. [163]
✗
OF
AP
✗
✗ ✗
Wu et al.[147]
✗
OF
AP
✗
✓ ✓
Nejad et al.[94]
✗
OF
HU
✗
✗ ✓
Liu et al. [70]
✗
OF
AP
✗
✓ ✓
Zhang et al. [157]
✗
OL
HU
✓ ✓ ✓
Mashayekhy et al. [78] ✗
OF
AP
✗
✗ ✓
Parkes et al. [100]
✗
OF
AP
✗
✓ ✓
Cheng et al. [20]
✗
OF
LR
✓
✗ ✗
Mao et al. [77]
✗
OF
LR
✓
✗ ✗
Cai et al. [17]
✗
OF
LR
✓
✗ ✗
Du et al. [29]
✗
OF
LR
✗
✗ ✗
Jixian et al. [156]
✓
OL
HU
✓ ✓ ✓
Stein et al. [126]
✓
OL
LR
✓ ✓ ✓
TV: time-varying; OL: online; OF: offline; HU: heuristic; AP:approximation; LR:
Learning; HT: heterogeneous resource IR: individual rationality; S:strategyproof;

2.5

Diffusion Mechanism in Auction based Mechanisms

Traditionally, auction paradigms [55] are adopted for resource allocation in a self-sufficient
market setting. Then, various auction paradigms are adopted in different market domains
[85, 143, 104, 153, 32], to maximise the revenue of the resource vendors or reduce the
buyer’s cost. In this regard, almost all the deployed mechanisms assumed that the targeted market has enough resource supply or demand to satisfy the participants within
the limited scope of the market. However, in the real-world setting, it is not guaranteed
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that participant would get their requested resources. Therefore, such mechanisms fail to
address two crucial problems simultaneously; as follows: (1) demand: the scarcity of
buyers; and (2) supply: availability of commodities in the market, because for any market domain to sustain, the equilibrium between demand and the supply is very crucial
[132]. In this context, concepts of information diffusion techniques are implemented in
several auction paradigms. For decades, these information diffusion techniques are used
as tools for advertisements. In this regard, there are several [35, 116, 89] studies relating
to web-based advertisement to improve sales. Recently, information diffusion techniques
extended to social networks for selling resources. In specific, it attempts to optimally enhance the participation and resource availability in the open market setting. In this regard,
an open market is modelled as an open economic network. In such a market, each participant has limited knowledge of the existence of other participants. From the literature,
the diffusion-based mechanisms in the economic network can be single-unit diffusion
mechanisms or multi-unit diffusion mechanisms.

2.5.1

Single-Unit Diffusion Mechanism

This subsection presents the existing single-unit diffusion-based mechanisms in an open
economic network. In this regard, there are two types of network designs, namely unweighted graph and weighted graph. The unweighted graph represents a diffusion-based
mechanism wherein diffusion cost is zero. Otherwise, the weights of the weighted graph
represent the diffusion cost.
In the literature, several unweighted graph-based diffusion mechanisms exist. In 2017,
Li et al. [66] presented the very first diffusion enabled auction mechanism for sales in
social networks, called as information diffusion mechanism (IDM). IDM incentivised
the buyers to invite other neighbouring buyers and the incentives are calculated using
concept of cut-points. Towards this end, it showed the possibility of negative revenue
by using the VCG mechanism diffusion-based mechanism. However, later, Zhang et al.
[160] showed that incentive mechanism based on cut-point fails to assure higher revenue
in a well-connected network as discussed in small-world networks [3]. Then, Lee [60]
proposed another diffusion mechanism MLM, which could generate the same revenue as
IDM. However, this mechanism fails to ensure truthfulness.
Furthermore, inspired by the existing redistribution mechanisms [18], Zhang et al.
[160] proposed a fair diffusion mechanism (FDM) which focused on distributing rewards
to a broader range of nodes in the network unlike IDM, which gives the reward only to
nodes within a cut set. Later, Zhang et al. [159] introduced a redistribution based strategyproof mechanism, called a network-based redistribution mechanism (NRM). Then, again
Zhang et al. [158] presented a diffusion mechanism for single unit resource allocation
based on fixed pricing rule called a fixed price diffusion mechanism (FPDM), which en-
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sured at least 1/2 of the optimal revenue.
On the other hand, several diffusion mechanisms for weighted graph-based were proposed. Leduc et al. [58] proposed a referral payment based diffusion mechanism. Similarly, Condorelli et al. [21] discussed a network setting, wherein vendors sell their available resources through a broker. Further, in 2018, Li et al. [63] presented a customer sharing mechanism (CSM), which extended the IDM for economic networks in the weighted
graph paradigm. In CSM, vendors could act as brokers and diffuse customer information
to their respective neighbours. In this regard, buyers, as well as vendors, were rewarded
for diffusing the information. Later, in 2020, Li et al. [65] extended the CSM to a more
general setting, wherein vendors as the broker could also diffuse information directly to
the buyers along with other resource owners. In this context, there were two mechanisms,
namely, single-level diffusion mechanism (SLDM) and multi-level diffusion mechanism
(MLDM). In SLDM, all the brokers are connected directly to the resource owner, whereas,
in MLDM, in a tree structure.
In all the above mechanisms, the information is diffused in a single direction, i.e., from
resource vendors to brokers then to buyers. It means that buyers cannot diffuse in such
mechanisms. Owing to this, Li et al. [64] investigated a class of diffusion mechanisms
for social networks called critical diffusion mechanisms (CDM). It is a generalised mechanism for an economic network called a weighted diffusion mechanism (WDM). WDM
allowed all the participants to diffuse the information. To summarise, a weighted graph
based mechanism considers diffusion cost, unlike unweighted graph-based. The consideration of diffusion cost affects the efficiency of the allocation, revenue off the vendors
and list off winning buyers, which depends on the chosen critical path.

2.5.2

Multi-Unit Diffusion Mechanism

This subsection presents the diffusion-based auction mechanism for multi-unit of resource
allocation mechanisms, which allocate multi-units of homogeneous resources. Most of
the real-world market [23, 24] setting deals with the multi-unit resource allocation problem. In an open economic network, parent bidders have control over their children bidders, thus can influence their children. Therefore, designing a truthful multi-unit resource
allocation auction mechanism for economic networks is a complex problem. In this regard, Zhao et al. [161] proposed a general information diffusion mechanism (GIDM)
to address the challenges associated with designing multi-unit diffusion auctions with
single-unit demand. GIDM was IDM’s extension for a multi-unit market setting. Later,
Takanashi et al. [128] proposed a generalised aligned path graph mechanism (GAPG) for
multi-unit resource allocation. To strategy-proof and budget balance, GAPG implements
decreasing marginal utility. Further, a distance-based network auction mechanism (DNAMU) was proposed by Kawasaki et al., [50]. This mechanism allocates the requested
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items as per the distance from the resource vendors to the resource buyers.
To summarise, researches on multi-unit diffusion auctions are undergoing. To date, no
stable mechanism has been proposed which addresses all the challenges. Specifically, it is
challenging to identify monotonic allocations in for truthful diffusion-based mechanism.
Further, in the literature, there is no diffusion-based auction mechanism for multi-unit
multi-item resource allocation.

Chapter 3
Real-Time Pricing Policy Driven Fair
Resource Allocation
This chapter focuses on designing RAM for open cloud markets. In these open cloud markets, participants (vendors and buyers) can dynamically leave or participate in the market.
It leads to uncertainties in the supply and demand of the resources in the markets. In
such uncertain markets, vendors aim to maximise their revenue by dynamically changing
their selling prices according to the market demand. Therefore, an optimal mechanism
becomes immensely needed for such markets such that, the adopted resource allocation
policy protects the preferences of the buyers. This chapter presents a novel real-time
pricing policy and novel multi-preference allocation policy for such dynamic markets.
Besides, this chapter discusses a custom priority-based fairness mechanism to allocate
the available resources in a reverse-auction paradigm. Towards the end, the performance
of the participants is compared with two other complex mechanisms. Then, the experimental results confirm the improvement in the vendors’ revenue and participation fairness
among all the participants.

3.1

Introduction

This chapter focuses on designing an adaptive and fair RAM for open cloud markets
(OCM) similar to work discussed in [84, 83]. Generally, like every other market, there
are two types of participants involved in an OCM, namely vendors and buyers. These
participants have a set of objectives, which are usually conflicting in nature such as, vendors focus on maximising their revenue by selling most of their available resources at the
highest possible price. On the other hand, buyers focus on maximising their utility by minimising their costs for the maximum possible quality of resources. Thus, it is challenging
to design an optimal RAM. Also, the dynamically changing participation of the participants leads to uncertain supply and demand in the market. In this regard, an adaptive
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RAM becomes immensely required for such markets. In the literature, auction paradigms
[55] are widely adopted for resource allocation in such multi-party settings [151, 139,
104]. In addition, to design uniform allocation and pricing policies, a mechanism should
be robust against the strategic behaviour of the participants [93, 55].
Designing an optimal RAM is an extensively studied problem, i.e., designing allocation
policy and pricing policy. This chapter mainly focuses on designing an adaptive pricing
policy based on learning algorithms since, in such competitive market resources, prices
influence the supply or demand of resources in the OCM. Also, this chapter discusses a
novel fair-participation based allocation policy.
The literature presents various RAMs with different allocation and pricing policies. For
instance, the authors in [108, 153] implement a classical combinatorial auction paradigm,
wherein resource requests of the highest bidders get allocated and pay their bid values. It
is an example of a rule-based allocation and pricing policy. Similarly, RAMs based on
statistical dynamic pricing policies [54, 149, 12] have been discussed. These mechanisms
adapt themselves based on supply or demand in the market to some extent. However,
they fail to adapt to highly uncertain open cloud markets. Recently, machine-learningbased adaptive RAMs [29, 85] have been studied. However, these approaches focused on
maximising the revenue of the vendors. Such vendor-centric mechanisms could lead to
uncontrolled competition and monopoly in the competitive markets. Also, existing machine learning mechanisms fail to incorporate undisclosed preferences of the participants,
which they do not reveal to each other while resource allocation [93]. Also, existing
machine learning-based mechanisms [134, 92] fail to foster fair participation and competitiveness. These two factors maintain the stability of the market and keep a check on
monopoly and bidder drop problem [11]. Briefly, this chapter addresses the following
challenges associated with designing RAMs:
• adaptive pricing policy: designing adaptive pricing policy for optimal resource allocation maximising the cumulative revenue of the vendors.
• participation fairness: fair participation opportunity to all the participants, which
would boost the participation as well as improve the resource utilisation in the market.
• conflicting preferences: addressing the conflicting preferences of all the participants
and making optimal allocation decisions.
To the best of my judgement, not all the challenges were effectively addressed by a
single mechanism. Therefore, this chapter presents an efficient RAM for OCMs. In
particular, the proposed approach implements a learning model to optimise the pricing
policy. Then, it allocates the requested resources based on a novel priority mechanism
to ensure fairness. Moreover, in such dynamic OCMs, the behaviour of the participants
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loosely depends on the pre-existing data sets. In such a setting, it depends on real-time
updates in the open market. Therefore, supervised learning or unsupervised learning is
not suitable. So, for real-time pricing, a reinforcement learning (RL) technique [127]
based algorithm is implemented. The contributions made through this chapter are listed
as follows:
• First, a novel real-time pricing algorithm is proposed, which implements RL techniques to optimise the selling prices of the requested resources on behalf of vendors.
• Then, a preference labelling scheme is introduced, which categorises all the dynamically arriving buyers based on their past behaviour. Also, it helps the real-time
pricing algorithm to learn the undisclosed choices of different buyers.
• Finally, a priority label based strategy is introduced to give fair chances to all vendors.
The remaining chapter is organised as follows: the modelling of resource allocation
problems in an open market setting is discussed in Section 3.2. Then in Section 3.3 the
dynamic pricing problem is modelled as a stochastic process. In Section 3.4 and 3.5,
the proposed real-time bidding algorithm and vendor elicitation strategy are discussed,
respectively. In Section 3.6, the experimental setup and evaluation of the results are discussed. Finally, the chapter is summarised in Section 3.7.

3.2

Resource Allocation Problem in Open Cloud Market

This section presents the modelling of resource allocation problem in reverse-auction
paradigm as a common-value [109] problem. In this context, the owner of the RAM
is an unbiased broker. The broker intermediates all the resource allocations and resource
requests on behalf of vendors and buyers, respectively. In this setting, vendors are represented as autonomous agents. Then the requested bundle of resources from dynamically
arriving buyers are allocated in an episodic manner. In this context, the episode represents the maximum time after which the market closes and resets to its initial setting, i.e.,
total available resources, potential vendors and requesting buyers, except for the trained
agents. In this regard, the length of an episode is denoted as tmax , which consists of multiple independent auctions.
Further, the modelling of three key stakeholders of this market setting is presented,
namely the resource buyers, the resource vendors, and the broker.
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Modelling of Resource Buyer

This chapter considers an OCM with set of buyers B, and profile of buyer b ∈ B is denoted as ϑb ≡ {qqb , lb , db }, where q b is the set of non-perishable a resources denoted as
q b = {q1b , q2b , . . . , qkb } for set K of k different types of resources, where qib represents the
quantity of resource type i ∈ K; whereas lb is length of request for which resource is being requested, and db is the deadline within which the request is to be satisfied, ∀b ∈ B.
Similarly, ϑ ≡ {ϑ1 , ϑ2 , . . . } denotes the set of all the profiles. In addition, each buyer is
also characterised by their undisclosed preferences, which are the private values [93] and
not known by the vendors. In this context, buyers focus on acquiring the resources at the
minimum possible price.

3.2.2

Modelling of Resource Vendor

Further, the considered OCM has a set of n vendors denoted as V . Every bidder vendor
v ∈ V has set of maximum capacity of k types of resources, denoted as c v = {c1v , . . . , ckv }.
Similarly, set of maximum capacity of all the n vendors is denoted as C = {cc1 , . . . , c n }.
Further, the base prices of the resources for the vendor v ∈ V is denoted as bpiv , ∀i ∈ [1, k].
Also, it should be noted that, in order to lower the complexity, we assume that vendors do
not join or leave the OCM in the middle of an auction.

3.2.3

Modelling of Resource Broker

The job of a broker is to intermediate the allocation of resources in the OCM. Figure
3.1 depicts the proposed architecture of the broker, which consists of three key modules
namely, the Real-Time Pricing module; the Vendor Elicitation module and the Transaction Database. Firstly, dynamically arriving pool of buyers B submit their resource
requests to pool of vendors through a broker. Then, for every resource request, all the
potential vendors submit their base prices to the broker. Hereafter, vendors authorise the
brokers to bid on their behalf. Upon receiving all these base prices, the broker generates
vendor agents to bid on behalf of all the potential vendors. Then, it computes optimal bid
values using Real Time Pricing module. This Real Time Pricing module implements a
custom RL Algorithm, which takes historical auction data from the Transaction Database
as input. Finally, based on these optimised base prices, the broker determines allocation
policy α(v, b) and pricing policy ρ(v, b) ∀v ∈ V, b ∈ B using Vendor Elicitation module.
This Vendor Elicitation module implements a novel fairness technique and winner determination strategy. In this way, the novel broker performs the resource allocation in a
reverse auction paradigm. In this context, note that α(v, b) must make feasible allocations only. Such that, allocated resources cannot be more the total available resources and
a resources

can be re-used once released by a buyer
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allocate the requests before the start of tmax , as shown in Equation 3.1.
tmax

∑ α(v, b) × 1(t + lb ≤ tmax ) × 1(t ≤ db) × 1(qqb ≤ c v)∀v, b,

(3.1)

t∈1

where, 1(.) is the indicator function, such that 1(.) = 1 if condition inside is true or
else 1(.) = 0. In this manner, broker plays the crucial role in whole RAM of ensuring the
stability in the OCM i.e competitiveness [134], fairness [92], truthfulness [22], etc.
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of the Broker in Novel RTRA Mechanism

In this regard, all three stakeholders in the proposed revers-auction paradigm based
RAM interacts with each other. The next section presents a novel learning-based realtime pricing policy.

3.3

Real-Time Pricing as Multi-Agent Markov Decision
Process

This section discusses the modelling of dynamic pricing problems as a multi-agent Markov
decision process (MMDP) and vendors represented as autonomous vendor agents b . In
this regard, for a set N of n agents, MMDP is defined as joint state-space s , which represents all possible states of the agents, where N ∈ V . Similarly, the set of action space for
all the agents is Ai , ∀i ∈ N. In this MMDP, firstly agents performs certain action ai ∈ Ai ,
∀i ∈ N, which is based on their decision policy πi : s × Ai 7→ [0, 1]. Then, after execution
b vendor

agents and agents used interchangeably
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of action ai , agents get transferred to the next state s ′ . This transition is based on joint
transition function τ : s × A1 × · · · × An 7→ s ′ . Towards this end, every agent receives a
reward ri , s.t. ri ∈ Ri . Again the choice of the reward is based on the current state and
action performed by the agents, s.t., that, ri : s × Ai −→ R . Also, the private observation
of each agent changes, such that, si : s ′ −→ s′i , where si is the state space of agent i. In this
setting, the initial state-space of all the agents are determined by a predefined distribution;
in this case, it is the initial available resources. In the dynamic pricing problem, the goal is
to compute the optimal action value for all the agents, which optimises their base-prices.
In order to achieve that, agent i ∈ N focuses on updating its policy πi , that maximises
max t t
the total expected long term reward Ri in each episode of length tmax , i.e., Ri = ∑tt=0
λ ri ,
c
where λ is the discount factor.
Following subsections introduces a novel profiling scheme to label the dynamics of the
market; and models three states, actions and rewards with respect to the the proposed
MMDP-based model.

3.3.1

Profiling Scheme

One of the primary roles of the broker is to adapt their pricing policy based on the arriving
buyers. In doing so, the broker should guide the agents to optimise the selling price of the
resources. In this regard, agents attempt to learn buyers’ demand and available resources
in the market and accordingly optimise their bid values. However, in this market settings,
agents are not aware of all the other potential agents in the market. Also, buyers with
different profiles arrive dynamically in the markets. In such an uncertain market with
limited information, it becomes difficult to train learning-based algorithms to optimise
the bid values. Owing to this constructing a correlation based on the previously arrived
participants becomes necessary for agents. So, a novel profiling scheme is proposed,
which categorises the records stored in Transaction Database T , such as a set of requested
resources, the winning agent, the payment received by the agent, etc.
Specifically, these stored records are used in categorising past the participants into different profiles, using the K-means clustering algorithm [42]. Let VT and BT be all the past
profiles of vendors and buyers stored in T . Then, vendor agents ∀u ∈ VT are categorised
based on their available resources Cu into a set of profiles denoted as V ′ ∈ VT . Similarly,
buyers ∀w ∈ BT are categorised into a set of profiles based on their requested resource qw ,
denoted as B′ ∈ BT .
Further, for each pair of vendor profiles v′ ∈ V ′ and buyer profiles b′ ∈ B′ , different
auction parameters are stored in the T , for instance, revenue for pair of vendor and buyer
denoted as revenue(v′ , b′ ). Similarly, other auction parameters are also stored in the Transc It

is commonly used in reinforcement learning algorithms, originally used in economics to represent
the relevance of delayed returns.
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action Database after every auction. Then based on this past auction info, the welfare of
allocation for every pair of vendor and buyer profiles represented, called as quality feature
vector. In specific, a quality feature vector F(v′ , b′ ) representing the welfare for buyer profile b′ and vendor profile v′ . This is denoted as, F(v′ , b′ ) ≡ [rmean (v′ , b′ ), pmean (v′ , b′ ), umean (v′ , b′ )],
where rmean (v′ , b′ ), pmean (v′ , b′ ) and umean (v′ , b′ ) denotes the quality parameters; mean
revenue, mean penalty and mean utility (profit) respectively. Intuitively, higher values
of mean revenue and mean profit and lower values of mean penalty suggest allocation is
optimal, and these parameters are computed using Equations 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
rmean (v′ , b′ ) =

revenue(v′ , b′ )
total allocated(v′ , b′ )

(3.2)

where, revenue(v′ , b′ ) and total allocated(v′ , b′ ) denotes the average revenue and total
potential buyers’ requests allocated for a pair of vendor and buyer, respectively.
pmean (v′ , b′ ) =

penalty(v′ , b′ )
total re jected(v′ , b′ )

(3.3)

where, penalty(v′ , b′ ) and total re jected(v′ , b′ ) denotes the average penalty imposed
and total potential buyers’ request rejected for a pair of vendor and buyer, respectively.
umean (v′ , b′ ) =

revenue(v′ , b′ ) − penalty(v′ , b′ )
total request(v′ , b′ )

(3.4)

Apart from above quality parameters, the transaction database tuples are used in computing the acceptance ratio (ϒ(.)), such that 0 ≤ ϒ(.) ≤ 1 as denoted by Equation 3.5.
ϒ(v, b) =

acceptance rate(v, b′ )
acceptance rate(v′ , b′ )

(3.5)

where, v ∈ V , b ∈ B and v′ ∈ V ′ , b′ ∈ B′ are the corresponding profiles of vendor v and b
respectively. whereas, acceptance rate is the ratio of number of times a buyer is allocated
to total number of times requested. So, acceptance rate(v, b′ ) denotes the acceptance
rate of buyer profile b′ ∈ B′ by vendor v ∈ V , whereas, acceptance rate(v′ , b′ ) denotes
the acceptance rate of buyer profile b′ ∈ B′ by vendor profile v′ . Intuitively, acceptance
ratio ϒ(b′ ) resembles ratio of past acceptance decisions made by vendor v for similar kind
of buyer b, which aid the broker in modelling the pricing rule for the vendors (see sub
section 3.3.3).

3.3.2

State in MMDP

In the proposed MMDP, a state-space represents the custom-designed state of all the
agents. In specific, the state-space of an agent in MMDP denotes the supply/demand of
the resources in the dynamically changing market, considering buyer’s preferences. Also,
since multiple buyers get allocated simultaneously, so the combination of all interactions
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within an episode are used to represent the state-space. In this regard, the state-space
is denoted as s = [H, F], where vector F represents the buyers’ profile (see subsection
3.3.1), and vector H represents status vector of agents, within the episode. In this regard,
vector H is obtained by concatenating the status vector of all the agents within an episode,
wherein, status vector of an agent v is represented as η(v) ≡ [availablev , requestedv ,
revenuev , penaltyv ]; where, availablev , requestedv , revenuev and penaltyv represent the
available resources, total requested resources by all the buyers, total revenue earned and
total penalty imposed, respectively.

3.3.3

Action in MMDP

In the considered setting, initially, all the vendors independently set their base prices
bpkv , ∀k ∈ K for every resource request q b from buyer b ∈ B, and submit it to the broker.
Then, the broker attempt to optimise these base prices by modelling a set of exclusive
adjustment multipliers av for all the pair of potential vendors and potential buyers in the
OCM, using Equation 3.6.
bid(v, b) =

∑ (bpkv ∗ qkb) × (1 + av × ϒ(v, b))

(3.6)

∀k∈K

Further, in order to control the minimum and maximum values, the range of action
value is set as, av ∈ [−0.2, 0.8]. Also, recall that ϒ(v, b) ∈ [0, 1], so, the optimal bid values
for the vendors would range in the range, bid(.) ≈ [bpkv × 0.8, bpkv × 1.8], ∀k ∈ K

3.3.4

Reward in MMDP

In the considered competitive OCM, vendors are competing amongst each other to maximise their revenues. In this setting, the payments from buyers are the reward values for
the winning vendor. On the other hand, losing vendors have to bear negative rewards
(penalty) for being less competitive and losing in the auction. Intuitively, this penalty
resembles the cost incurred on losing vendors for reserving the requested resources. In
this context, vendors’ revenue could improve in two ways: (1) selling their resources at
the maximum possible rate; or (2) selling the resources to more buyers at an optimal
price. In this research, the focus is on maximising the revenue by serving the maximum
possible buyers. Therefore, a reward function is modelled based on a difference-reward
technique [76], which takes, the number of times a vendor won, lose and was out d ,
within a single episode. In this regard, the reward function for vendor v is represented
as rv ≡ (Ivwin × win(v), Ivlose × lose(v), Ivout × out(v)), wherein win(v), lose(v) and out(v)
denote the number of times vendor v won, lose and was out of auction for all the auctions within a single episode, whereas, Ivwin , Ivlose and Ivout represent the impact of each of
d did

not participate in the auction by choice, possibly due to less available resources or lesser utility
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these three variables, which are private values of the vendors. Briefly, in each episode,
the m potential buyers lodge their requests for different bundles of resources, denoted as
q 1 , . . . , q m . In turn, all the available vendor agents offer their optimised bids to all the
potential buyers. In this context, soon after a certain buyer selects a winning vendor, then
the reward is computed for each vendor based on the reward function. Finally, the sum of
all the rewards gained within an episode represents the episodic reward.
The following section introduces a real-time pricing algorithm for dynamic pricing in
the OCM.

3.4

Real-Time Pricing Algorithm

In a competitive setting like OCM, every potential vendor has a limited volume of resources for sale/lease. In this context, vendors aim to maximise the cumulative revenue
by selling their resources optimally and efficiently. In this regard, the vendor profits
only when it wins in the auction and its resources are allocated. Considering these constraints and the dynamism of the OCMs, an optimal dynamic pricing policy is required.
Therefore, this section introduces a learning learning-based adaptive real-time pricing algorithm. The objective of this algorithm is to optimise the base prices to model optimal
bid values on behalf of every vendor.
Given the real-time changing characteristics of the considered market and advent of
RL-algorithms for different real-time domains [85, 47], RL based algorithms would be an
appropriate choice. So the proposed real-time pricing algorithm implements the multiagent actor-critic RL architecture [71]. Also, to aid the agents to adapt to the dynamics
of the market. The participants in the market are labelled as per their profiles using a
novel profiling scheme. Then, using this profiling scheme vendor agents are trained in the
market. Finally, optimal bids are generated for every requested bundle of resources using
RL based real-time pricing algorithm. In this regard, the action space in this market setting
is assumed to be continuous. Therefore, novel real-time pricing implements deterministic
policy gradient [71] for learning the optimal bid values. Therefore for the considered
multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) setting, the Q function for the vendor agent
i is denoted by Equation 3.7.
T

Qπi (ss, a ) = Eπ,τ [ ∑ γ t rit |s0 = s , a ]

(3.7)

t=0

where π ≡ {π1 , . . . , πn } is the set of joint-policies of all the vendors and a ≡ [a1 , . . . , an ]
denotes the joint action of all the vendors. Further, the next state s ′ and the next joint
action A are computed using Bellman equation as shown in Equation 3.8:
′

′

Qπi (ss, a ) = Er ,ss′ [rr (ss, a ) + γEa ′ ∼π [Qπi (ss , a )].

(3.8)
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On the other hand, the mapping function µi () maps each state s to action ai based on
Equation 3.9, where µi () is known as actor in the actor-critic architecture.
ai = µi (ss) = µi ([H, F])

(3.9)

Further, from Equations 3.8 and 3.9, Equation 3.10.

µ
Qi (ss, a1 , . . . , an ) = Er ,ss′ [rr (ss, a1 , . . . , an )+
µ
γQi (ss′ , µ1 (ss′ , . . . , µn (ss′ ))]

(3.10)

where, µ = {µ1 , . . . , µn } is the joint deterministic policy space of all the vendor agents.
In this regard, the goal of the proposed algorithm becomes to learn an optimal policy
for each vendor agent to attain the Nash equilibrium [45]. In addition, in this multiagent stochastic environment, each vendor agent learns to behave optimally by learning
an optimal policy of µi , which is also based on the optimal policies of the other co-existing
agents.
Further, this equilibrium is achieved by gradually reducing the loss function L(θiQ ) of
µ
the critic Qi with the parameter θiQ as denoted in Equations 3.11 and 3.12.
2

µ
L(θiQ ) = Es ,aa,rr ,ss′ [(Qi (ss, a1 , . . . , an ) − y) ]

′

′

′

′

µ
y = ri + γQi (ss , µ1 (ss′ ), . . . , µn (ss′ )),
′

(3.11)

(3.12)

′

In Equations 3.11 and 3.12, µ ′ = {µ1 , . . . , µn } represents the set of target actors; each
µ′
µ′
of these actors has a delayed parameter θi . Meanwhile, Qi represents the target critic,
′
which also has a set of delayed parameters θiQ for each actor, and (ss, a1 , . . . , an , ri , s ′ )
represents the transition tuple that is pushed into a replay memory D. In this regard, each
µ
vendor’s policy µi , with parameters θi , is trained based on Equation 3.13. In the next
section, we present a proposed vendor selection algorithm.
∇θ µ J ≈ Es [∑ ∇θ µ µi (ss)∇ai Qi (ss, a1 , . . . , an )|ai =µi (ss) ]
i

w

i

(3.13)

The novel real-time pricing (RTP) algorithm is demonstrated in Algorithm 1, which
takes the concatenated status of the set of all vendors H, tuples from the transaction
database, and the revenue of all the vendors, as input. Then, the algorithm provides the
adjustment multipliers av of pair of vendor v, ∀v ∈ V as output. Algorithm 1 trains each
vendor agent to select and leverage a certain adjustment multiplier (action), to maximise
its total expected future revenues Rv . These future revenues are discounted by the factor γ
per each time-step. In this regard, the future revenue at each time-step t ∈ tmax for vendor
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max t t
v is denoted as Rv = ∑tt=0
γ rv , where tmax is the episode length, i.e., time-step at which
the bidding ends.

Algorithm 1: Real-Time Pricing (RTP)

3

Initialise: Qi (ss, a1 , . . . , an )|θiQ ) ;
Initialise: replay memory D ;
′
Initialise: actor µi , target actor µi ;

4

Initialise: target network Q with θiQ ← θiQ , θi ← θi for each agent ;

1
2

′

′

µ

′

µ

/* iterate over all episodes
5
6

*/

for episode = 1 to e do
Initialise: s0 for all the vendors ;
/* length of each episode

*/

for t = 0 to tmax do
for each buyer within tmax do
Select av using Equation 3.9 for all vendor v and buyer b ;
Compute ϒ(v, b) using Equation 3.5 ;
Execute actions a = {a1 , . . . , an } ;
Record reward R new state s ′ ;
Compute reward rvt , and update distribution F ;
Update distribution F(v, b) for each buyer and vendor pair ;
end

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

/* merge the reward of all vendors for each buyer
max t
Merge Rv = ∑ni=1 ∑tt=0
rv rewards within tmax
′
Push (ss, av , rv , s ) into D, ∀v ∈ N ;

16
17

*/

;
// s ′ is the next state

′

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

s ←s ;
for agent i = 1 to n do
′
POP mini batch (ss, a1 , . . . , an , rv , s ) from D ;
Update critic by minimising the loss with Equation 3.11, 3.12 ;
Update actor using Equation 3.13 ;
′
Update target network: θ ← τθ + (1 − τ)θ ;
end
end
end

3.5

Resource Vendor Elicitation

This section introduces a novel vendor elicitation method to determine a single winning
agent for every resource request based on their multi-preferences. This method also implements priority labels based fairness techniques to improve participation fairness in the
market. Improved participation fairness in the market would in turn reduce the bidder
drop problem [92] in the market. In this regard, the elicitation of the vendor is a two-step
process. Firstly, all the agents get labelled as per their priority. Then, all the conflicting
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preferences of the buyers are scaled to determine the winning vendor agent and allocation
cost.

3.5.1

Priority Labelling

In a competitive market, vendors usually lose because of their in-competitive (too low)
bidding strategy. Such repeatedly loss of the same set of participants would lead to a
classical bidder drop problem [57]. In this phenomenon, the bidders (vendors or buyers)
quits because of repeatedly losing in the auctions. It also leads to the monopoly of certain
groups of participants due to scarcity of resources. Therefore, it becomes crucial to handle
the bidder drop problem, to maintain the resource supply/demand equilibrium [134]. In
this regard, a priority-label based technique is well-suited for fair resource allocation. The
priority label pri is computed, ∀i ∈ N based on Equation 3.14 as follows:
L

pri = (1 + ζ (i))/(1 + ∑ BRoi )

(3.14)

o=1

where ζ denotes the total number of times a vendor loses in the last L rounds of auctions. Whereas, BRoi represents bid ratio for agent i in oth round. It denotes and the ratio
of each vendor’s bid to the maximum bid in an auction, calculated using Equation 3.15:
BRi = bid(i, b)/maxBid(b)

(3.15)

where maxBid(b) is the maximum bid offered for the resource request q b . In this
regard, a priority label gets attached to the bidding vendor agents, such that 0 ≤ pr ≤ 1, 0
being the highest priority, and 1 being the lowest priority.

3.5.2

Resource Allocation

This subsection presents the computation of allocation policy α(.) and pricing policy ρ(.)
in the OCM setting. To begin with, upon receiving buyers profile ϑ , the broker computes
the bids for all the bidding vendors based on Equation 3.6 and their corresponding priority
labels pr using Equation 3.14. Then, the appropriate preference of the buyer is modelled
based on a novel multi preference factor. Specifically, the multi-preference factor considers different quality preferences for the buyers while matching their requests with an
appropriate vendor. In this context, the set of e quality preference parameters of vendor
v
v ∈ V is denoted as κ p ≡ (κ1v , κ2v , . . . κev ), for example: κutilisation
represents the value of
the quality preference parameter utilisation. Further, based on these values, preference
factor υ(p, b) ∀p ∈ P and ∀b ∈ θ t is computed using Equation 3.16 as follows:
υ(v, b) =

e
v
1 ∑ p=1 N(κ p )
p
κ | bid(v, b)
|κ

(3.16)
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Algorithm 2: Real-Time Resource-Allocation (RTRA)
1 Initialise: V = {1, . . . , n} ;
c1 , . . . , c n } ;
2 Initialise: C = {c
b p1, . . . , b pn} ;
3 Initialise: {b

// potential vendors
// available resources

/* queue of waiting buyers, & list of participating vendors, respectively
*/
4 Initialise: LB , LW LV Initialise: tmax ;
// maximum time-step in one episode
5

for t = 1 to tmax do
/* Update List of Participating Vendors

6

*/

Push all the requesting buyers in LB ;
/* check for participating vendors

7
8
9
10
11

*/

if participating then
Push set of participating vendor(s) in LV ;
else
penalty on non-participating vendor(s) ;
end
/* First Allocate the Waiting Buyers

12
13
14
15
16

*/

if LW not empty then
POP a single buyer b from LW ;
else
POP a single buyer b from LB ;
end
/* CANSHEDULE() checks for vendor v ∈ LV , s.t.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

cv ≥ r b

*/

if not CANSCHEDULE(b) and db ≤ t then
PUSH b to LW ;
end
if CANSCHEDULE(b) then
Compute bid(v, b) ∀v ∈ LV using Algorithm 1 ;
Compute allocation and payment using Equation 3.18, 3.19 ;
end
end

κ | denotes the total number of quality preference parameters, and denotes
where, |κ
v
N(κe ) is the normalised value of the quality parameter e, computed using simple additive
weighting mechanism [154] as follows:
 re f v
 (κe −κe )×ψ , if κ max − κ min ̸= 0.
e
e
κemax −κemin
N(v, e) =
1,
if κ max − κ min = 0.
e

(3.17)

e

wherein, ψ = 1, if the higher value of the quality parameter is favourable for the buyer
or else ψ = −1. For example, ψ = 1 for utilisation of the vendor, whereas ψ = −1 for
offered selling price. In this regard, the preference factor υ(.) for all the pairs buyer and
vendors. Intuitively, the preference parameter determines the quality of service as per the
offered selling prices. Then, the allocation policy α(.) get computed based on priority
label and preference factor using Equation 3.18, as follows:
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v
α(v, b) =
0, otherwise.
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(3.18)

In this regard, the winning vendor denoted vb for buyer b ∈ B, s.t., α(vb , b) = 1. Further,
the payment is computed using Equation 3.19. Also, to observe truthfulness [93], payment
is computed based on general second price [33].
ρ(vb , b) ≡ ∑ qkb ∗ bpkvb

(3.19)

∀k

In this regard, all the dynamically buyers’ requests in θ t are matched with the appropriate available vendors.
Algorithm 2 depicts the complete working of the proposed real-time resource-allocation
(RTRA) algorithm. The algorithm takes dynamically arriving resource requests from B
buyers as input in OCM initialised with a set of potential vendors and their respective
base prices. Then, it computes the selling prices and priority labels for all the available
potential vendors or waits until the vendors are available. Finally, based on the computed
selling price and the priority labels, the allocation policy α(.) and payment policy ρ(.) is
the output. Then the requested resources get allocated as per the allocation policy α(.).
And allocation cost is computed using payment policy ρ(.).
The following section presents the results and discussion of the extensive experiments,
to evaluate the proposed resource allocation approach in a simulated open market environment and Table 4.3 summarises the lists of symbols.

3.6

Experimental Settings and Evaluation

This section presents the results of the extensive simulation experiments performed to
investigate the performance of the novel RTRA algorithm. Throughout the experiment,
following hyper-parameters are using in RTRA: (discount factor) λ = 0.9; learning-rate
= 3e−4 ; as these hyper-parameters gave good results. Towards this end, the novel RTRA
algorithm compared with the following benchmarks.
• the combinatorial double auction resource allocation (CDARA) [108] - this mechanism implements a fixed pricing strategy, wherein the vendor with the lowest bid
is the winner.
• the indicator-based combinatorial auction-based (ICAA) [54] - this mechanism
implements a demand-based dynamic pricing strategy. Again, the vendor with the
lowest bid is the winner.
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Table 3.1: List of Symbols in RTRA Mechanism

# Symbol
B&V
b pv ≡ {bp1v , . . . , bpm
v}
bid(v, b)
C ≡ {cc1 , c 2 , . . . , c n }
K ≡ {1, 2, . . . , k}
c v ≡ {c1v , c2v , . . . , ckv }
ϑb ≡ {qqb , lb , db }
ϑ ≡ {ϑ1 , ϑ2 , . . . }
q b ≡ {q1b , q2b , . . . , qkb }
G ≡ (α(v, b), ρ(v, b))
{VT , BT } ⊆ T
B′ & V ′
F(.)
H(.)
rmean (v′ , b′ )
pmean (v′ , b′ )
umean (v′ , b′ )
Ivwin , Ivlose , Ivout
pri
BR
κ p ≡ (κ1v , κ2v , . . . κev )

# Definitions
set of buyers and vendors
set of base price for m resources
offered selling price by v ∈ V to request b ∈ B
resource capacity of all vendors
k types of resources in the market
maximum available resources with the vendor
q b : set of resources; l j : request size; d j : request deadline
set of all the buyer profiles
bundle of requested resources by buyer b ∈ B, k ∈ K
G : RAM; α(.) : allocation rule; ρ(.) : pricing rule
T is the transaction database, VT & BT are set of vendors in
the database
set of buyers profile from BT ; set of vendors profile from VT
feature vector of pair of vendor and buyer profile
status vector of pair of vendor and buyer profile
quality parameter: mean revenue
quality parameter: mean penalty
quality parameter: mean utility
impact of winning, impact of losing, impact of nonparticipation
priority label
bid ratio
set off quality preference parameter
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Table 3.2: Types of Vendors in Simulation Setting

# Type Processing(MIPS)
v1
6950
v2
3450
v3
4700
v4
7500
v5
6100
v6
4900
v7
3700

3.6.1

Memory (MBs)
12032
6144
7168
3840
10752
8704
6144

Storage(MBs)
26000
84000
48000
30000
60000
47000
36000

Bandwidth
8000
2650
1750
4000
4700
3600
3200

Experimental Setting

The experimental setting is conducted in a simulated open-market cloud environment with
multiple cloud vendors. In this context, a pool of cloud vendors are sampled amongst
seven types of cloud vendors, characterised based on their total available resources. Table
3.2 lists configuration of the vendors v1 , . . . , v7 , as per the four types of resources.
Further, similar to [108], the base prices (bp) for one unit of cloud resources were
sampled from preset range of values. In particular, $[10, 20], $[5, 10], $[1, 5] and $[15, 25]
for MIPS, Memory, Storage and Bandwidth, respectively. Further, the resource request of
the buyers were extracted from the Google Cluster Trace [145], in which the quantities
of the requested resources are the re-scaled values, as discussed in [145]. Therefore, the
maximum value is re-scaled to value as one unit for each resource type and then scaled
all the requested units by it. Also, since, the arrival-time, execution-length and deadline
for each resource request is not publicly available in the dataset (i.e., Task Events Tables).
Therefore, similar to [156], arrival-time, execution-length and deadline were simulated
using three random generator which takes values [1, 24] time-steps, [0, 12] time-steps and
[1, 12] time-steps, respectively.
In this setting, the RTRA mechanims is trained for 10, 000 training episodes, each of
length tmax = 2000 time-steps. Then, the performance of the RTRA is evaluated in four
different experimental settings concerning the number of available vendors (|V |), i.e., with
four, six, eight and twelve cloud-vendors. For all the above four experimental settings, the
performance is evaluated based on average performance in 150 cycles of 1000 episodes
each. Finally, all the mechanisms are implemented in Python 3 based framework SimPy
[80] and the experiments are performed on Intel Xeon 3.6GHz 6 core processor with 32
GB RAM.
The objective of this experiment is to evaluate the performance of the vendors and the
buyers. And also to observe the participation fairness in the market.

3.6.2

Performance of Vendors

The performance of the cloud vendors are evaluated based on five parameters, as follows:
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• average revenue: it is the average revenues earned by each vendor during the 150
evaluation cycles.
• average penalty: it is the average penalties imposed on each vendor during the 150
evaluation cycles.
• the participation rate of vendors: it is the total number of buyers to whom the
vendor has offered its resources.
• the Non-participation rate of vendors: it is the total number of buyers to whom
the vendor could not offer its resources because of not having enough available
resources.
• the losing rate of vendors: it is the total number of buyers to whom the vendor has
offered its resources but loose in the auction.
From Figure 3.2, it is visible that the cumulative revenue of the vendors rises with the
number of available potential vendors. Overall, for all four cases, it is seen maximum
in the RTRA mechanism. In particular, when the number for |V | = 12, then the revenue
in RTRA is twice as compared to revenue in ICAA. An interesting observation here is,
although in CDARA and ICAA the prices are fixed, revenue for both the mechanisms are
different for all the cases, except when |V | = 8. It seems to suggest adopted allocation
policy plays an important role in such a dynamic environment.

Figure 3.2: Cloud Vendor Revenue

Further, Figure 3.3 represents the average penalty imposed on the cloud vendors. It is
observed that the penalty rises with the rise in the number of cloud vendors. It suggests
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that the novel pricing policy improves the competition in the market. However, in all three
algorithms, there is no significant difference in their average penalty.

Figure 3.3: Cloud Vendor Penalty

Furthermore, to provide evidence of optimal resource utilisation, the participation/nonparticipation of |V | = 12 cloud vendors is evaluated. From Figures 3.4 and 3.5, it is can be
observed that participation and non-participation of the vendors are fluctuating in all the
mechanisms. However, the behaviour of a particular vendor is observed similarly in all
three mechanisms. For instance, vendor v2 and v3 are the least participating and maximum
non-participation, whereas participation of vendor v1 , v8 and v12 are higher (least nonparticipation) in all the three mechanisms. It could be possible because certain vendors
have higher available resources as compared to other vendors. Overall, the participation
of cloud vendors in RTRA mechanism is improved comparatively.

Figure 3.4: Rate of Participation

Figure 3.5: Rate of Non-Participation

Finally, from Figure 3.6, cloud vendors in RTRA have a lower rate of loss comparatively. It suggests that RTRA effectively models the allocation rule and pricing rule for
the cloud vendors, such that they participate selectively when it increases their chances
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of winning. Also, an interesting observation is, vendors v9 and v11 which has worst performance in ICAA, performs brilliantly in RTRA. Therefore, from the above results, it
becomes clear that the proposed RTRA is capable of boosting the performance of cloud
vendors in the OCMs.

Figure 3.6: Rate of Losing

3.6.3

Performance of Buyers

This subsection evaluates the performance of all potential buyers based on three parameters, as follow:
• paid to max-bid (PMB): it is the ratio of the average prices paid by the buyers to the
maximum bidding price.
• average waiting time: it is the average waiting time of the buyers before their resource requests get allocated.
• the Success Rate: it is the ratio of the average number of buyer’s requests completed
to total buyers rejected.
The PMB parameter denotes the margin between buyer’s cost with and without the
mechanism. This research considers a free market, wherein buyers do not have any resource valuation. So buyers’ focus is to buy resources at the minimum possible price.
In this regard, the computation of the buyer’s utility is not straightforward. Therefore, it
is indicated based on this ratio. This parameter is significant, especially for RTRA like
mechanisms. As in such a mechanism, the final selling prices gets optimised through the
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broker. Therefore, vendors cannot manipulate their ultimate selling prices (i.e., bids), and
it purely depends on RL-based Equation 3.6.
From Figure 3.7, it becomes evident that the potential buyers in RTRA pay marginally
lesser prices. The PMB ratio drops with the rise in the number of cloud vendors, except
in the ICAA, wherein there is a sinusoidal like pattern. Overall, this highlights prices paid
by the buyers are not affected in the RTRA since the base price was the same for all the
mechanisms.

Figure 3.7: Paid Per Max Bid Ratio

On the contrary, from Figure 3.8, the waiting time for the potential providers drops with
the rise in the number of cloud vendors. Overall, it is visible from Figure 3.8 that waiting
time is least in the RTRA as compared to other mechanisms.
Finally, from Figure 3.9, the rejection ratio drops with a rise in the number of cloud
vendors. It suggests that the gap between the finished and rejected buyers decreases as
the number of vendors increases. An interesting observation at |V | = 8, the ratio reaches
its lowest level before becoming steady. It suggests that the gap between the finished and
rejected remains steady and do not fall below 0.1, and there is no effect of change in the
number of cloud vendors. In this context, except for the threshold point, the ratio remains
higher in the RTRA comparatively. It demonstrates the capability of the RTRA approach
to achieve a lower success rate, thus higher resource reliability in the OCM. Also, note
that having a higher success rate does not show the effectiveness of the mechanisms. It
only denotes the reliability of the OCM.
Thus, the proposed mechanism is capable of boosting the performance of buyers in an
OCM. However, from the experimental results, it is observed that in the RTRA algorithm,
the revenue of the vendors is higher, so one might conclude that buyers in RTRA algorithm
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Figure 3.8: Average Waiting Time

Figure 3.9: Rejection Rate: Ratio of Buyers’ Resource Request Rejected to Finished

have to bear the extra cost. However, this is not always true, as the success rate in the
RTRA is also higher, i.e., the number of allocated buyers are more, which would also lead
to higher revenue.
In the end, even if prices in RTRA proven to be marginally higher, comparatively. But
it benefited with lower waiting time and higher reliability, as compared to other mechanisms. Also, practically it is not possible to achieve these conflicting objectives at the
same time. Therefore, the experiment results showed that the cost for the buyers in RTRA
is comparatively lower.
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Participation Fairness

To exclusively evaluate the impact of fairness technique on winning of the vendors in the
market in RTRA mechanism, the RTRA is evaluated with and without fairness technique.
Figure 3.10 shows the episodic median of the cumulative sum of the number of allocations
in 2000 episodes, with 7 unique vendors. From the figure, it is evident unlike RTRA,
providers in RTRA-Fairness wins at least once in the episode. In specific, vendor D4 has
zero wins in RTRA. It shows that the fairness technique ensures the fairness amount the
provider’s winning. Some providers have comparatively fewer wins in RTRA-Fairness.
However, this ensures social welfare in the market by allowing a fair chance to nonperforming lesser competitive providers.

Figure 3.10: Impact of Fairness on Winning Vendors

Further, the extent of the existence of the bidder drop phenomenon in the market is
analysed. Similar to [43], buyer’s drops are indicated by the number of times a particular
buyer loses in each episode. Specifically, in this experiment, the buyer is said to be dropping from the market if it loses five times in consecutive auction episodes. In this regard,
the total number of buyers dropped in RTRA and RTRA-Fairness. Figure 3.11 illustrates
the average cumulative sum of the number of buyers drops. Overall, from Figure 3.11,
one can conclude that number of drops gradually increases with the number of episodes.
However, drop-in RTRA is exponential more as compared to RTRA-Fairness. It means
that the fairness mechanism improves resource utilisation in the market.
Furthermore, participation fairness is evaluated based on the fairness ratio in varying
the number of vendors. In this regard, the fairness ratio is the total number of never-won
vendors to the total number of vendors. This ratio indicates the active participation of
vendors in the auction, and its lower value depicts the existence of the bidder drop issue.
From Figure 3.12, it is evident that fairness ratio is highest for RTRA in all the four
cases. It suggests that the available resources in RTRA are allocated optimally by giving
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Figure 3.11: Impact of Fairness on Bidder Drop

non-partisan chances to all the cloud vendors. It increases the availability of resources
with the cloud vendors. Also, with the rise in the number of cloud vendors, fairness
ratio in RTRA rises rapidly as compared to the other two benchmarks. In particular, for
|V | = 12, the fairness ratio value is significantly (60%) higher as compared to the other
two algorithms.

Figure 3.12: Fairness among Cloud Vendors

Overall, it highlights that the proposed mechanism demonstrates its ability to address
both the real-time pricing and fair vendor elicitation problems while boosting the overall
performance of the open market cloud environment.
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Summary

This chapter presents a novel RAM for open cloud markets. In specific, this mechanism
adopts a real-time pricing based pricing policy. This pricing policy implements a customdesigned RL algorithm to optimise the selling prices of the potential vendors. Further, the
chapter also introduces a novel profiling scheme, which aids the RL algorithm to precisely
learn the dynamics of the markets based on the nature of the participants. Then it allocates
the requested resources in the market based on a novel multi-preference allocation policy.
Also, this adopted allocation policy implements a priority-based fairness strategy, which
guarantees participation fairness and lesser bidder drop problem in the market. Towards
this end, the performance of the novel real-time resource allocation RTRA mechanism
gets compared with the existing established mechanisms. From the experimental results,
the overall performance of the market is improved and has lower bidder drops.
However, this mechanism has some limitations, such as (1) Stategyproofness: RTRA
does not guarantee truthfulness in the market; (2) Scalability: investigating the performance of the real-time pricing algorithm and impact on learning model (i.e., convergence)
with the increase in the number of participants; and (3) Inpatient Participants: Designing
RAM to allocate buyers in online resource allocation setting. The next chapter discusses
and presents a novel mechanism to address these limitations.

Chapter 4
Monotonic Allocation Policy Driven
Resource Allocation
This chapter primarily focuses on designing strategyproof RAM in open cloud markets.
Also, it targets a specific market paradigm, wherein buyers requests have to be allocated
immediately without any delay. Such markets are known as online open market settings,
and their corresponding mechanism is called an online mechanism. In the online resource
allocation (ORA) paradigm, buyers arrive with their resource requests sequentially in an
arbitrary manner. Their demands need to be satisfied immediately without knowing the
resource demand shortly. So, designing policies for online mechanisms is different as
well as more challenging as compared to classical OCM. This chapter introduces a novel
policy optimisation based RL algorithm to design a strategyproof mechanism for ORA.
First, it implements a custom-designed monotonic reward shaping based allocation policy.
Then, it adopts a custom dominant resource parameter based classification technique to
design a critical value-based pricing policy. Towards this end, this mechanism proved to
be strategyproof empirically. Also, this novel mechanism performs efficiently against the
existing sophisticated online mechanisms.

4.1

Introduction

Online mechanism design is the extension of classical mechanism design for resource
allocation in ORA paradigms. In such ORA paradigms, the buyers submit their resource
requests sequentially but in an arbitrary manner to vendors with resource constraints [96].
Therefore in such a setting, the allocation policy for resource requests of a particular
buyer purely depends on the knowledge of previously arrived buyers. In this regard,
there is uncertainty about the future resource demand in the ORA paradigm. Therefore,
designing a mechanism in an online paradigm is fundamentally different from designing
it for offline paradigms. Like in an offline (classical) setting, the decision is made after all
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the participants submit their requests.
There are many real-world applications wherein such online paradigms are required,
such as selling air-plane tickets, cloud resource allocation [2, 85], real-time bidding in
display advertisement [47, 140, 16], sponsored search [162], dynamic fleet management
[68], fog computing [13], real-time ride-sharing [120], etc. However, this research primarily targets ORA in open-cloud markets. In specific, focus on building a strategyproof
resource allocation mechanism for online paradigms.
In general, there are various challenges associated with designing an online mechanism
for ORA, which makes it a complex task. For instance, the details of the future resource
demands are not known. So, online mechanisms should trade off the immediate profits
of the vendors with future potential gains. In specific it should allocate resources optimally to potentially high paying buyers. Then, since the buyer’s arrival is arbitrary, which
leads to uncertainty of future allocation decisions. Therefore, it has to learn and adapt
itself based on previously arrived buyers. Finally, in a competitive market with timesensitive resource requests, self-interested buyers behave strategically and misrepresent
the requested information for their benefit. Therefore, the online mechanism should be
strategy-proof [93], such that buyers get rewarded for being truthful.
ORA problems are closely related to classical secretary selection problem [48]. In
the literature, much research related to online mechanisms [36, 120, 129] has been proposed with different approaches and objectives. For instance, different online variant of
VCG mechanisms were proposed by [38, 101, 41], which implements Bayesian Nash for
truthfulness. However, these approaches assumed that the distribution of future resource
demand is known in advance by the mechanism. A couple of posted-price based online
mechanisms [120, 129] were put forward, which dynamically computes reserve prices
for each allocation. These mechanisms relied on a static statistical model which failed to
adapt to the dynamics of the environment. Then, several monotonic policies-based [102,
8]. online mechanisms are also studied. However, existing monotonic policies did not
consider any constraints over the availability of resources.
Similarly, several other online mechanisms were designed to achieve different resource
allocation characteristics in the market. For instance, [79, 19] focused on building a
bid-density based pricing function in cloud computing. Then, [148] focused on scaling
problems in cloud computing. They proposed an algorithm to make allocation decisions
based on load distribution. However, all the above online mechanisms are based on underlying static distribution. However, [73] proposed an adaptive online mechanism based
on dynamic programming. However, this mechanism ignored the strategic behaviour of
the arriving buyers and assumed that they would not misreport their type.
Recently, research combining machine learning and mechanism design is being proposed. For instance, [10, 14, 28] proposed machine learning-based strategyproof auction.
However, it fails to consider the trade-off between the current and future rewards. In such

4.2. PRELIMINARIES

47

resource allocation environment, reinforcement learning (RL) [127] has been successfully applied [84, 20, 17, 72]. However, these resource allocation algorithms only focus
on adapting the dynamics of the environment and did not guarantee strategyproofness.
Recently, Stein et al. [126] proposed a RL based strategyproof adaptive online mechanism. However, since the RL algorithm implemented linear function approximation, so
it was difficult for the mechanism to adapt to complex state dependencies. Briefly, all
the above-mentioned online mechanisms are either based on static models or assume that
the mechanism is aware of the future arrival of buyers. Also, none of the existing online
mechanisms could effectively guarantee strategyproofness in the online markets.
To address these limitations chapter introduces an online mechanism based on Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO) algorithm [112]. This mechanism attempts to guarantees
strategyproofness based on the monotonic allocation policy [152] and critical value pricing policy. In specific, it presents a novel reward-shaping technique to implement a monotonic allocation policy. Then, it implements an adaptive critical payment based pricing
technique using the PPO algorithm. In this regard, the contributions of this research are
as follows:
• First, a novel PPO-based allocation policy, which adapts to the online environment
and maintains the strategyproofness in the environment.
• Second, a novel reward shaping technique based on multi-class profiling technique
to label the previously arrived buyers.
• Third, a critical-payment based pricing rule for online mechanism using the multiclass clustered data of previously arrived buyers
The remaining chapter is organised as follows: the preliminaries for modelling the
ORA problem is presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the proposed learningbased real-time pricing algorithm. In Section 4.4, the properties of the novel MP-ORA
mechanism is proved. Further, in Section 4.5, the experimental results are presented for
evaluating the proposed approach. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 4.6.

4.2

Preliminaries

This section presents the ORA paradigm and challenges associated with online mechanism design. In particular ORA problem is modelled. Then possible methods to design
allocation and pricing policy are discussed, and their corresponding challenges.

4.2.1

System Model

In ORA paradigm, there are two types of participants, namely the vendor who is the
decision-maker (accept or reject the resource request). And the other is the buyer, which
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is sequentially requesting resources. This work considers an online market setting with a
single vendor with limited available resources. On the other hand, a set of buyers arrive
sequentially but at random to submit their resource request in each time step. Besides,
buyers arrive in an episodic manner, wherein each episode is represented as the finite and
discrete-time horizon of length tmax . In this setting, vendor is denoted as v, whereas, set
of all the buyers arriving until time step tmax is denoted as B, s.t., |B| = tmax . The vendor v
has r different types of resources (for example: CPU, Bandwidth, Memory, etc.,) that are
being requested by the buyers sequentially at each time-step. For each resource type in
set R, vendor v has limited capacity of resources, s.t., ct ∈ {ct1 , ct2 , . . . , ctm }, s.t., ctx = 100
denotes 100 units of resource type x ∈ R at time-step t. Then, buyer t ∈ B arrive at time step
t ∈ T , therefore they are represented with respect to it arrival time-step. In specific, buyer
arriving at t ∈ T , its profile is denoted as ϑt . The type ϑt of buyer represents the resource
request information denoted as ϑt = (vt , qt , dt ), where vt ∈ R+ is the buyer’s valuation
of vector for requested resources qt ≡ [qt1 , qt2 , . . . , qtm ] ∈ Nr of duration size dt ∈ N timesteps. To lower the complexity, it is assumed that if resource request from buyer t ∈ B is
allocated at time-step t ∈ T , then it is completed at t + dt . Also, let ϑ = (ϑ1 , ϑ2 , . . . , ϑtmax )
denote the type profile space for all the buyers. Recall that, in ORA setting, vendor v
at time-step t ∈ T is aware of current buyer with type ϑt and all the buyers which have
arrived before that denoted as ϑ<t .

4.2.2

Online Mechanism Design

Online mechanism for every buyer t ∈ T is denoted as G = (α(ϑt , ϑ<t ), |rho(ϑt ), where
al pha(ϑt , ϑ<t ) ∈ {0, 1} represents the allocation policy and ρ(ϑt ) ∈ N denotes the pricing
rule. Specifically, al pha(ϑt , ϑ<t ) = 0 when mechanism G rejects the buyer at time-step
t, and al pha(ϑt , ϑ<t ) = 1 when buyer’s resource request is allocated. Then, finally based
on the pricing policy ρ(ϑt ), payment for the buyer is computed, such that, if pay(ϑt ) > 0,
then buyer pay to the vendor and if pay(ϑt ) < 0 then buyer receives same amount of
payment from the vendor through the mechanism. It should be noted mechanism G makes
feasible allocations only, i.e., sum of all the units of allocated resources would be less or
equal to total available resources ct . Also, for buyer t ∈ T , it would be allocated only if
dt ≤ tmax − t. Further, similar to [126], the online mechanism constraints is represented
using Equation 4.1 and 4.2.
tmax

∑ α(ϑt , ϑ<t )1(t + dt < tmax ).qqt ≤ ct ∀t, r, ϑ ,

(4.1)

t + α(ϑt , ϑ<t ).dt ≤ tmax ∀t, ϑ

(4.2)

t=1

where 1 ( . ) denotes the indicator function, which keeps the check on the time-step,
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such that if dt ≤ tmax − t, then 1() = 1. Further, based on the payment rule ρ(ϑt ), buyer’s
payment value is computed. Finally, at the end of time-step tmax , social-welfare of the
vendor is computed as sum of expected valuation from all the winning buyers as denoted
in Equation 4.3.
tmax

sw =

∑ α(ϑt , ϑ<t ).vt

(4.3)

t=1

One of the objectives of designing an online mechanism is to model an allocation policy
to maximises social welfare (sw). In this regard, an optimal allocation policy denoted as
α ∗ (.)), such that it maximises the expected sw of the vendor, as shown in Equation 4.4.
tmax

α ∗ = arg max E[ ∑ al pha(ϑt , ϑ<t ).vt ]
α

4.2.3

(4.4)

t=1

Strategyproof for Online Mechanism

This subsection presents the challenges associated with handling the strategic behaviour
of the participating buyers. Generally, in competitive resource allocation problems with
limited resources, greedy buyers tend to behave strategically to purchase these resources
at least reported valuation. For instance, a buyer would report a lower valuation or higher
volume of requested resources to lower the costs. In this context, with such a strategic
but realistic setting, it is challenging to develop a mechanism with accurate allocation and
pricing policy. In this regard, a stable online mechanism should exhibit strategyproofness and individual rationality. Before formally defining these properties, some related
concepts are as follows.
Definition 4.2.1. (Reported Type) For the buyer t, its true type is represented as ϑt =
(vt , qt , rt ), which is its private information, i.e., it is not known by the mechanism. And
the reported type is represented as ϑt′ = (vt′ , qt′ , rt′ ) is the actual type revealed by the buyer
to the mechanism on arrival. In this context, if ϑi = ϑi′ , then the buyer is truthful.
Definition 4.2.2. (Limited Misreport) In ORA paradigm, for buyer t ∈ B, let L(ϑt ) ⊆ ϑt ,
denotes the set of type from its type space available for manipulation.
In an ORA setting, wherein buyers arrive sequentially, so there is a set of limited misreport associated with each buyer. In specific, buyer t ∈ B can misreport its valuation vt and
quantity of resources qi . However, in an online setting, a buyer is not aware of its type until its arrival and needs to be serviced immediately, so it cannot misreport its arrival time.
Also, the buyer has no benefit in waiting after the completion of their resource request.
Therefore it is practical to assume that the buyer has limited late-departure misreport, i.e.,
dt′ ≤ dt . In this setting, the individual utility of the buyer is as follows:
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Definition 4.2.3. (Buyer’s Utility) The utility of an allocated buyer t in mechanism G is
′ ) ≡ α(ϑ ′ , ϑ ′ )v − ρ(ϑ ′ , ϑ ′ ).
given by ut (ϑt′ , ϑt , ϑ<t
t
<t t
t
<t
Now, this research aims to handle the strategic behaviour of the buyers by incentivising them to report its true type. Generally, for a resource allocation mechanism
G ≡ (α(.), ρ(.)) to be able to handle strategic behaviour, it must exhibit two key properties, i.e., strategyproofness and individual rationality.
Definition 4.2.4. (Strategyproof) An online mechanism G is strategyproof if buyer’s util′ )) ≥ u (ϑ ′ , (ϑ , ϑ ′ )),
ity is maximised for reporting its true type. Formally: ut (ϑt , (ϑt , ϑ<t
t t
t <t
′
′
∀ϑt , ϑt , ϑ<t . This is also called as dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC).
Definition 4.2.5. (Individual Rationality) An online mechanism G is individual rational
if the utility of the buyer is non-negative until and unless buyer is reporting its true value.
′ ) ≥ 0. This property also make sure that any truthful buyer is not
Formally: ut (ϑi , ϑ<t
made to pay more than their valuation, i.e. ρ(ϑt , ϑ<t ) ≤ vt .
Intuitively, Strategyproof property ensures that buyers would get given incentives for
reporting their true type. Whereas Individual Rationality ensures that no buyer is obligated to purchase resources or buyers would be having positive utility as long as they
report their true type. Further, similar to [126] setting, this research also considers a
single-minded resource allocation setting, i.e., each buyer will not accept the allocation
offer from the vendor if offered resources are less than q i .
In the offline setting, Strategyproof property is usually achieved by implementing VCG
[38] mechanism, wherein buyers payment value depends on the other participating buyers
as follows,
ρ(ϑt ) =

∑
′

t ∈ϑ−t

vt′ −

∑′

t ′ ∈ϑ ,t

vt′

(4.5)

̸=t

However, the vanilla form of VCG mechanism cannot be directly implemented in an
ORA problem. Since online mechanisms are not aware of all the arriving buyers at timestep t. In this regard, based on the Lemma 16.12 and Lemma 16.13 in [96], online mechanisms are said to be strategyproof if the online mechanism has monotonic allocation
policy (see Definition 4.2.6) and critical payment policy 4.2.7 (see Definition 4.2.7).
Definition 4.2.6. (Monotonic Allocation) An allocation rule α(.) in online mechanism is
monotonic, if any buyer allocated remains allocated for any other reported type which is
at least as good as previous reported type. Specifically, if buyer t with type ϑt = (vt , qt , dt )
is allocated, then buyer t ′ with type ϑt′ = (vt′ , qt′ , dt′ ) will also be allocated, if ϑt′ ⪰ ϑt , i.e.,
if vt′ ≥ vt ∧ qt′ ≤ qt ∧ dt′ ≤ dt . Formally: α(ϑt , ϑ<t ) = 1 → αt′ (ϑt′ , ϑ<t ′ ) = 1, ∀ϑt′ ⪰ ϑt .
Definition 4.2.7. (Critical Value) If a pricing policy ρ(.) in the online mechanism makes
the buyer pay the least possible value, that is enough for a particular buyer to remain
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allocated. Then it is said pricing policy is based on critical value. Formally, a it is denoted
as Equation 4.6.

min(v′ ) if α(ϑ ′ , ϑ ) = 1 .
<t
t
t
ρ(ϑt , ϑ<t ) =
∞
if no such vt′ exists,

(4.6)

In other words, monotonic allocations ensure that buyers would always win as long as
they report the minimum winning type. On the other hand, the critical payment value
does not depend on the buyer’s valuation. So the buyer has no incentive to manipulate its
reported type. In this regard, based on the above two techniques, a strategyproof online
mechanism is designed.
The following section introduces the implementation of the above techniques using the
RL technique.

4.3

Monotonic Policy based ORA

This section presents a novel Monotonic Policy-based ORA (MP-ORA) algorithm for ORA
setting. In particular, it implements a custom-designed proximal policy optimisation algorithm (PPO) to observe truthfulness in the proposed resource allocation mechanism.
In this context, a novel PPO based mechanism G ≡ (α(.), ρ(.)) is implemented at the
vendor’s end. Then the vendor optimises the allocation policy α(.) and the pricing policy ρ(.) for sequentially arriving buyers. In this regard, MP-ORA has two major steps,
as follows. Firstly, it computes novel resource dominant parameters using the proposed
resource dominant clustering technique. Then it implements PPO based adaptive mechanism using these parameters.

4.3.1

Resource Dominant Clustering

Resource dominant parameters [108, 141] are usually adopted in an offline market setting. In these settings, the resource allocation mechanism utilises the dominant resource
parameters to sort [108] the bidding buyers. And then allocate the bidders in descending
order of their value. However, in ORA paradigm, at any given time-step, a mechanism
is only aware of the current buyer and all the past buyers. In specific in every episode
of length tmax , buyers arrive sequentially one by one, ∀t ∈ T . In this context, allocation
begins as soon a buyer at time-step t reports its type ϑt′ . So at any given time-step, there
is no point of reference to make optimal decisions since it has to make decisions immediately. Therefore with knowledge of a single buyer and uncertainty of the future buyers,
designing the allocation decision becomes challenging.
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To address this challenge proposed mechanism makes use of past experiences recorded
in Transaction Database D. Then, to support the adaptive policies in making optimal
decisions. These recorded past experiences are catalogued into different profiles, such
that the mechanism could learn from its past decisions. In this regard, the buyers are
profiled into several categories using a novel clustering-based dominant resource strategy.
Intuitively, this estimates the dominance of an arriving buyer based on the previously
arrived buyers.
′ ∈ D is clustered in two classes of clusters.
In specific, all the reported buyer-type ϑ<t
′ , denoted as K t . Then, based on the number
Firstly, based on the set of reported sizes d<t
d
t
′
of reported resource requests q<t , denoted as K q . The objective is to utilise these classes
of clusters to label the arriving buyer. And the matched cluster information is utilised to
judge the current decisions. In other words, this past information is used in designing a
novel reward shaping function to train the RL based algorithm.
In particular, after the mechanism makes an acceptance or rejection decision. Then the
RL model is rewarded using this shaping function. In this regard, the reported type of
all the previously arrived buyers ϑ<t stored in Transaction Database utilised to scale the
impact of the decision at time-step t. Note that this cluster information is also recorded in
a Transaction Database updated after every allocation.
Further, two types of dominant parameters are computed based on this clustered inforq
mation, namely dominant size density (ηtd ) and dominant request density (ηt ). These two
dominant parameters resemble the dominance of the reported type and used as a basis to
compute the allocation and pricing decisions. Firstly, in order to compute dominant size
density parameter ηtd , a cluster is chosen from reported size clusters K td using cluster elicitation function K(δtd ), s.t. max(v′j /δ jd ) ≤ (vt′ /δtd ), where δtd is the size density reported
by the buyer t, j ∈ K(δtd ), and K(δtd ) ∈ K td . Then, we compute the dominant size density
parameter ηtd for buyer t using Equation 4.7.
∑
ηtd =

j∈K(δtd )

v j /δ jd
(4.7)

|K(δtd )|

where, |K(δtd )| denotes the size of the cluster; whereas, size density δbd for a buyer
b ∈ T is computed using Equation 4.8. Intuitively, Equation 4.8 computes the part of
the total available time-span at time-step c occupied by the allocated buyer. Also, let
n
th highest valuation size density in the cluster K(δ d ), s.t., vd 1
vdK(δ
=
d ) denotes the n
t
K(δ d )
t

t

max(v j /δ jd ), ∀ j ∈ K(δtd ).
δbd =

db′
tmax − b

(4.8)
q

Similarly, in order to compute dominant request density parameter ηt from the req
q
ported requested quantity clusters K tq , again a cluster K(δt ) is chosen, s.t. max(v′j /δ j ) ≤
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q

q

(vt′ /δt ), where δt is the normalised request density for buyer t, j ∈ K(δt ), and K(δtd ) ∈
q
K td . Then, the dominant request density ηt is computed using Equation 4.9 as follows:
q

∑

q

ηt =

q
j∈K(δt )

v j /δ j
q

|K(δt )|

(4.9)

q

where, K(δt ) represents the clustering function, whereas normalised request density
q
δb for buyer b arrived at time-step b ∈ T is computed using Equation 4.10.
q

δb =

∑r∈R normalise(drrb )
|R|

(4.10)

where, R is the set of all the resources and drbr is the resource request density computed
using Equation 4.11, whereas, normalise(.) is the normalising function for different types
of resource using Equation 4.12.
′

drbr

normalise(x) =




qr
= br
cb

xmax −x
,
xmax −xmin

1,

(4.11)

if xmax − xmin ̸= 0.

(4.12)

if xmax − xmin = 0.

where, xmax and xmin denotes the maximum and minimum value, respectively, in the
considered group. Also, let vqnK(δ q ) denotes the nth highest valuation request density in the
t
q
q
q
cluster K(δt ), s.t., vq1K(δ q ) = max(v j /δ j ), ∀ j ∈ K(δt ). Intuitively, dominant size density
t
parameter ηtd denotes the dominance of the valuation per size density of buyer t among
q
the similar cluster of buyers arrived in the past. Similarly, request density parameter ηt
denotes the dominance of valuation per requested resource density of buyer t amongst
the other buyers belonging to a similar cluster of buyers arrived in the past. Finally, these
cluster information are updated in the Transaction Database at the end of every allocation,
which is also used for representing the state of the environment and shaping a monotonic
reward function as discussed further.
Dominant Clustering Example
This subsection briefly demonstrates the novel resource dominant clustering method with
an example. This example demonstrate clustering technique for a buyer b11 at time-step
t = 11. Also, let |R| = 3 and c1 ≡ (50, 200, 600) and tmax = 200. In this context, Table
4.1 enlists all the reported type of ten buyers b1 , . . . , b10 arrived before b11 , along with its
q
q
corresponding drtr , δtd , δt , vt′ /δtd and vt′ /δt .
′ ≡ (8.2; (3, 9, 51); 9) and let c
Further, at t = 11, buyer b11 report its type ϑ11
11 ≡
(20, 120, 350). In this setting, firstly, buyers b1 , . . . , b10 are clustered into two different
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Table 4.1: Sample of Reported Buyer Type for 10 Time-Steps

# ID
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
b8
b9
b10

vt′
1.9
6.9
3.0
4.1
2.3
4.1
2.5
3.5
1.2
3.0

qt′
(3,20,60)
(12,32,25)
(6,24,30)
(10,32,25)
(2,13,32)
(6,26,51)
(1,14,21)
(3,6,62)
(3,8,20)
(2,12,28)

dt′
3
8
15
2
3
4
14
4
3
18

drtr = qt′ /cct
δd
(0.06,0.1,0.1)
0.015
(0.25,0.17,0.04) 0.044
(0.14,0.15,0.05) 0.078
(0.32,0.25,0.05) 0.0113
(0.07,0.011,0.07) 0.016
(0.12,0.34,0.12) 0.0103
(0.04,0.19,0.055) 0.072
(0.17,0.09,0.19) 0.021
(0.2,0.14,0.06)
0.015
(0.17,0.24,0.1)
0.096

δ q vt′ /δtd
0.3
126
0.32 156
0.73
39
0.8
362
0.77 143
0.17 398
0.34
34
0.35 166
0.39
80
0.83
31

q

vt′ /δt
6.3
21.56
5.3
5.1
2.98
24
7.3
20
4.8
3.6

q
11
d
classes, K 11
d and K q based on δ<11 and δ<11 , respectively. In this context, number of
clusters, i.e., value of K in each class is determined based on the within cluster sum of
squares (WCSS) [42] technique using elbow method. For instance, from Figure 4.1 and
11
4.2 it can be seen that, K = 4 and K = 3 for K 11
d and K q , respectively.

Figure 4.1: Value of K in Size Density
Class

Figure 4.2: Value of K in Request Density Class

Moving further, buyers are clustered into two classes as shown in Figure 4.3 and 4.4,
using the identified values of K. The details of these two classes of clusters listed in Table
4.2.

Figure 4.3: Size Density Clusters K 11
d

Figure 4.4: Request Density Clusters
K 11
q

d is computed as δ d = 9/(200 − 11) = 0.047. SimiThen using Equation 4.8, δ11
11
q
q
larly, using Equation 4.10 δ11 is computed. In this regard, to compute δ11 reported
resource request is normalised using Equation 4.12. In doing so, from Table 4.1, min
1 ;dr 1 ) ≡
and max values for all resource request densities are noted, such as, (drmin
max
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Table 4.2: Dominant Cluster Values

# Cluster
#cluster1
#cluster2
#cluster3
#cluster4

K 11
d
(b4 ,b6 ,b8 )
(b2 )
(b1 ,b5 ,b9 )
(b3 ,b7 ,b10 )

K 11
q
(b3 ,b4 ,b6 ,b8 ,b10 )
(b2 )
(b1 ,b5 ,b7 ,b9 )
-

2 ; dr 2 ) ≡ (0.011, 0.34) and (dr 3 ; dr 3 ) ≡ (0.04, 0.19). Further,
(0.06, 0.17); (drmin
max
max
min
2 = 9/120 =
1
resource request densities for b11 is computed as dr11 = 3/20 = 0.15; dr11
3 = 51/350 = 0.14. Then, based on these values, using Equation 4.12,
0.075; and dr11
1 ) = dr 1 − dr 1 /dr 1 − dr 1 = (0.17 − 0.15)/(0.17 − 0.06) = 0.18;
normalise(dr11
max
max
min
11
2 ) = (0.34 − 0.075)/(0.34 − 0.011) = 0.8; and normalise(dr 3 ) = (0.19 −
normalise(dr11
11
q
0.14)/(0.19 − 0.04) = 0.33. Then, using these computed values, δ11 = (0.18 + 0.8 +
q
0.33)/3 = 0.43; vt′ /δtd = 8.2/0.047 = 174; and vt′ /δt = 8.2/0.43 = 19.
Now, a single cluster is chosen from K 11
d , in which maximum bid to size ratio is at
′
d
max v11 /δ11 . Therefore, from Table 4.1 and 4.2, with random tie-breaking we elicit
d
cluster cluster4 ⊆ K 11
d , i.e., K(δ11 ) ≡ cluster4 ≡ {b3 , b8 }. Similarly, a single cluster is
q
′
chosen from K 11
q , in which maximum bid to request ratio is at max v11 /δ11 . Therefore,
from Table 4.1 and 4.2, with random tie-breaking a cluster cluster3 ⊆ K 11
q is chosen, i.e.,
q
K(δ11 ) ≡ cluster3 ≡ {b1 , b5 , b7 , b9 }.
d = (39 + 166/2) = 102.5 and η q = (4.8 +
Finally, using Equation 4.7 and 4.9, η11
11
2.98 + 7.3 + 4.8/4) = 4.97 is computed. Note that, in this example, vq1K(δ d ) = v′8 = 3.5,
t

whereas vq1K(δ q ) = v′b7 = 2.5. In this regard, resource dominant parameters are computed.
t

4.3.2

PPO Learning Algorithm

This subsection model the ORA problem into the Markov decision process (MDP) and
then present the modified PPO algorithm. Firstly, vendor v is interacting in an ORA
market environment as an agent. In this regard, the state-space of the environment for
every episode of length T = {1, 2, . . . ,tmax } is denoted as S = {s1 , s2 , . . . stmax }. Also, recall
that, single buyer arrive at each time-step t ∈ T , there st denotes state change on arrival
of buyer of reported type ϑt′ = (vt′ , qt′ , dt′ ). Also, in ORA setting at any time-step t ∈ T
′ . On the other hand, in
vendor is aware of the set of previously arrived buyers, i.e., ϑ<t
an offline setting, the vendor is aware of all the buyers, so the state is represented using a
type of all the current bidding buyers. In either case, the state must represent using all the
available information about the buyers. So this setting ideally should be represented using
′ , ϑ ′ }. However, as the number
all the past buyers along with current buyer i.e., st ∼ {ϑ<t
t
of buyers increases, such representation would be computationally expensive. Therefore,
it represents the past buyer in the state using the cluster information stored in Transaction
Database.
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In particular, state is represented using ϑt , requested request density δtd on the available
resources, size density δtd on the total time-step to tmax and the occupancy or, j of the
each resource type, where r ∈ R and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , cr }. Here occupancy or, j represents
the time-step at which single unit of resource type r will be available. For instance, if
or = [0, 1, 1, 2, 5], then single unit of resource will be available at time-step 0, then at
time-step 1, 2 more units of resource r = 1 will be available and directly at time-step
5, one more unit will be available. Besides, the corresponding buyer clusters K(δtd ) and
q
K(δt ) (see subsection 4.3.1) is included. In this regard, the the final state is denoted using
Equation 4.13.
q

st = [ϑt , ρt,r1 , . . . , δt , δtd , {o1,1 , . . . , o1,a1 }, . . . ,
{ormax ,1 }, . . . , {ormax ,armax },

(4.13)

q

K(δtd ), K(δt )]
In this context, stmax is the terminal state, therefore, after tmax , i.e., at tmax + 1, the state
will be reset and reward will be zero. Further, at each time-step t ∈ T vendor v has
continuous action-space a ∈ [0, 1], wherein 0 usually means reject and 1 usually means
accept. Further, at each time-step t ∈ T on arrival of buyer θt′ , vendor v mainly have two
actions, either to accept i.e., at = 1 or to reject, i.e., at = 0. However, in this research,
apart from the above two extreme actions, intermediate actions are considered using a
continuous action-space a ∈ [0, 1] at each time step. This intermediate actions would aid
the mechanism to understand the extent at which MDP model is willing to accept of reject
the buyer request. Then after performing action at , state of the environment is transferred
to next state st+1 based on the transition function τ, s.t. τ : st × At → st+1 . Finally, agent
v receives reward rewardt based on the state st+1 and action at . Usually, in such auction
based resource allocation setting, reward is function of the bidding values [85], s.t. reward
rewardt for taking action at in state st is denoted as ℜ(st , at ) = vt′ . However, in order to
observe truthfulness in the proposed mechanism, we implemented a novel monotonic
reward function based on resource dominant parameters as depicted in Algorithm 3.
The algorithm takes three input, i.e., action at and two resource dominant parameters
q
d
ηt and ηt . And an average of reward values is the output. In this regard, two rewards
are calculated using reported size dt′ and resource request q ′ , denoted as rewardtd and
q
rewardt , respectively. Then these reward values are classified as positive or negative
based on the resource dominant parameters. In specific, dominant parameters are used
as a benchmark to label the rewards as negative reward, positive but good reward and
positive but better reward, wherein positive but better reward being the optimal solution.
Intuitively, if an allocated buyer reports dt′ or qt′ , which is greater than its corresponding
dominant parameter. Then this decision is considered optimal, so it is a positive reward,
else it is given a negative reward.
Further, once the ORA problem is modelled as MDP, it implements custom PPO al-
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Algorithm 3: Monotonic Reward Function
q
Input: at , ηtd , ηt
Result: rewardi
1 /*initialisation*/;
q
d
2 rewardt , rewardt ;
′
3 if cannotSchedule(ϑt ) then
1
4
rewardtd = vdK(δ
// positive reward: rejection is good decision
d) ;
5

q

t

rewardt = vq1K(δ q ) ;

// positive reward:

rejection is good decision

t

6
7
8
9

else
/* reward based on reported size */ ;
if ηtd ∗ dt′ ≤ vt′ then
1
rewardtd = −1 ∗ vdK(δ
// negative reward: rejection is not good
d) ;
t

decision
10
11

else
1
′
rewardtd = vdK(δ
d ) ∗ dt ;

// positive reward:

rejection is better

t

decision
12
13
14
15

end
/* reward based on reported resource request */ ;
q
if ηt ∗ qtavg ≤ vt′ then
q
rewardt = −1 ∗ vq1K(δ q ) ;
// negative reward: rejection is not good
t

decision
16
17

else
q
rewardt = vq1K(δ q ) ∗ qtavg ;

// positive reward:

rejection is better

t

decision
18
19
20
21

end
end
q
rewardt = (rewardtd + rewardt )/2 ;
return rewardt ;

gorithm [112] to design a mechanism. In this paradigm, since we consider a continuous
action-space, so PPO algorithm is suitable. Also, its implementation is simpler in comparison with its counterpart, trust region policy optimisation (TPRO) [113]. Apart from
that, PPO algorithm is scalable and performance is better [61] as compared to other onpolicy algorithms. Besides, the clipping feature of the algorithm helps in achieving a
monotonic policy update. Therefore, proposed mechanism implements PPO algorithm,
which employs the resource dominant parameters to optimise the stochastic policy πθt to
choose an optimal action at ∈ At , ∀t ∈ T , s.t. πθt : At → [0, 1], where θ represents the RLparameters. Also, in this research as PPO-Clip variant of the PPO algorithm is adopted,
the policy parameter is updated using Equation 4.14.
θt+1 = arg max Est ,at
θ

πθt [L(st , at , θt , θ )]

(4.14)
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wherein, L denotes the surrogate advantage function [1], which measure relative performance of new policy πθ with respect to current policy πθt , computed using Equation
4.15.
L(s, a, θt , θ ) = min(

πθ (a|s) πθ
A t (s, a), g(εt−1 , Aπθt (s, a)))
πθt (a|s)

(4.15)

where, Aπθt denotes the advantage function for the current policy πθt computed using
advantage estimation [86], and value of g(.) is computed as follow:

(1 + ε)A, if A ≥ 0.
g(ε, A) =
(1 − ε)A, if A < 0.

(4.16)

where, ε is the clipping function computed using Equation 4.17

min(ε, a ), if canSchedule(ϑ ′ ).
t
t
εt =
ε

(4.17)

where, ε is the clipping variable, a hyper-parameter which resembles how far new
policy is allowed to drift away from the old policy, whereas canSchedule(.) return true
when resources are available with the vendor. Algorithm 4 depicts the modified PPO,
which takes policy parameters as input and returns an optimise action value at along with
resource dominant parameters for each time-step.
Algorithm 4: Modified PPO-Clip
Input: θ0 : initial policy parameter ; φ0 : initial value function parameters
Input: set clip-ratio ε ∈ [0.1, 0.3] & a0 ∈ [0.1, 0.3]
1 t =1;
2 while t ̸= tmax do
3
Run policy πθold for T’ time-steps ;
4
Compute advantage estimate A1 , . . . , AK ;
5
Observe state st from the environment ;
6
Obtain at−1 from previous time-step ;
7
Obtain εt−1 using Equation 4.17 ;
policy

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Obtain at ←−−− π(at |st , ϑt′ ); using Equation 4.14 ;
Obtain rewardt using Algorithm 3 ;
q
Compute the ηtd and ηt using Equation 4.7 and 4.9 ;
Asynchronous Update PPO model using gradient decent method ;
return at ;
t + +;
end

Further, after computing the action value at for the buyer ϑt′ , cost of the requested
resources are computed using Equation 4.18.
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q

.(1 − at ), if K (δtd ), K (δt ) ̸= 0.
/

(4.18)

 ′
vi (1 − ai )

From Equation 4.18, the cost function computes the cost based on the reported valuation of the buyers in the selected cluster. Further, if the no similar buyers have arrived
q
in the past (i.e. cluster K (δtd ) or K (δt ) is empty), then cost is computed based on its
reported valuation. On the other hand, the allocation decision based on Equation 4.19,
s.t., 1 means the request is allocated or else it is rejected.

1 if cost(ϑ ′ ) ≤ v′ .
t
t
α(ϑt , ϑ<t ) =
0

(4.19)

Finally, using the computed cost and the allocation value, critical payment is computed
for each buyer using Equation 4.20
ρ(ϑt′ ) = cost(ϑt′ ) × α(ϑt′ , ϑ<t )

(4.20)

In this regard, allocation and payment decisions for the arriving buyer are based on
dominant resource strategy and the modified PPO algorithm. Also, it can be seen from
Equation 4.18, since the payment is computed from other similar buyers but not the reported valuation, this satisfies the critical payment theory. However, it is a special case
q
when K (δtd ) = 0/ or K (δt ) = 0,
/ this can be seen as a market with single buyers, so the
payment policy is computed based on reserve price mechanism [93].

4.3.3

Execution of MP-ORA

This subsection presents the working the novel MP-ORA mechanism. Continuing from
the example discussed in section 4.3.1, at time-stem t = 11, decision to allocate buyer
b11 is to be made. In this context, let us assume a11 = 0.1 computed using Algorithm 4.
Also from discussion in section 4.3.1, K ( δ d11 ) ≡ (b3 , b8 ), so v2K(δ d ) = v′3 = 3.0. Simi11

q
larly, K ( δ 11 ) ≡ (b1 , b5 , b7 , b9 ), so v2K(δ q ) = v′5 = 3.5. In this regard, from Equation 4.18,
11
′ ) = 3 + 3.5/2(1 − 0.1) = 4.77. Now since 4.77 ≤ 6.2, therefore b would be
cost(ϑ11
11
allocated (from Equation 4.19), s.t. alloc(ϑ11 , ϑ<11 ) = 1. Finally, payment is computed
′ ) = 4.77x1 = 4.77.
as pay(ϑ11
In this transaction, vendor v earns 4.77 , whereas the utility of the buyer b11 is computed as 6.2 − 4.77 = 1.43 (From Definition 4.2.3). Further, through this example, we
would also show that how allocation decision in Equation 4.19 ensures strategyproofness.
To begin with, if the buyer reports greater than 6.2, then there could be two, there will
be no change in the allocation, and payment will still be 4.77. So, buyers do not have an
incentive in reporting higher value. Further, if the buyer reports the valuation less than
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the computed critical value, i.e., 4.77, then based on Equation 4.19, the buyer will not be
allocated, so its utility will be zero. So we showed that buyers do not have any incentive in misreporting their valuations. Therefore, the novel MP-ORA mechanism ensures
strategyproofness by computing critical payment value for all the arriving buyers. The
detailed proof of this strategyproof property discussed further.

4.4

Properties of MP-ORA

This section investigates the properties of MP-ORA. Firstly, it is proved that the MP-ORA
mechanism is individually rational (i.e., truthful users will never incur a loss).
Theorem 1. The MP-ORA mechanism is individually rational.
′ )=1
Proof. Let us consider a buyer t with reported type ϑt′ = (vt′ , d t′ , qt′ ), and α(ϑt′ , ϑ<t
i.e., buyer t is allocated. Then this proof would prove that, if reported type is true then
its utility is non-negative. This can be easily be seen from Equation 4.18, cost of the
q
requested resources depends on the resource dominant parameter, ηtd and ηt , which are
computed using Equation 4.7 and 4.9. Since these parameters represents the valuation
density in their corresponding clusters K(drtd ) group, such that maximum value is not
more than the reported valuation vt′ . In this regard, always the computed payment as
ρ(ϑt′ ) ≤ vt′ . As a result, the utility of the buyer t, ut = vt′ − pay(ϑt′ ) ≥ 0 is non-negative and
thus buyer will never face loss. On the other hand, payment for truthful buyer which do not
win is 0 from Equation 4.20, since α(ϑt′ , ϑ<t ) = 0. Therefore, in the MP-ORA mechanism
utility of all the buyer is non-negative, thus MP=ORA mechanism is individually rational.

Next, proving that MP-ORA mechanism is incentive compatible. This proof would
show that the allocation algorithm is monotone, and the payment rule is based on the
critical payment.
Theorem 2. The MP-ORA mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. Firstly, this proof would show that the allocation rule in the MP-ORA mechanism
is monotone. That is, if buyer t ∈ T is allocated by reporting ϑt′ , then it will also be
allocated if buyer reports more preferred request i.e., ϑt′′ ⊆ ϑt′ . In this regard, if vt′′ ≥ vt′ ,
then clearly from Equation 4.19, ϑt′′ will also be allocated. Because, cluster K (δtd ) and
q
K (δt ) remains the same from Equation 4.7 and 4.9, respectively. Further, if the buyer is
allocated on reporting dt′ , then it will also be allocated with dt′′ ≤ dt′ , as canAllocate(.)
function will return true. Similarly, if buyer is allocated reporting qt′ , then it will also be
allocated with qt′′ ≤ qt′ .
Further, proving that the payment rule in MP-ORA mechanism is based on the critical
payment. In order to show that, it would prove that ρ(ϑt′ ) computed in Equation 4.20
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is the least value that buyer t ∈ T is expected to report to get the allocation. Since from
Equation 4.19, if vt′ < cost(ϑt′ ), then α(ϑt′ ) = 0. Therefore, cost(ϑt′ ) is the critical value
for the buyer t which satisfies Definition critical payment property.

Proving that novel MP-ORA mechanism has polynomial time complexity.
Theorem 3. The time complexity of MP-ORA mechanism is polynomial.
Proof. Firstly, Algorithm 3 i.e. Monotonic Reward Function comprises of three primary
computations requiring steps, clustering of past buyers, sorting of cluster and checking
the feasibility of scheduling. Firstly, clustering the buyers in set B at time-step t has the
O(|B|2 ) time complexity. Then the time complexity of sorting the chosen clusters K(δtd )
q
and K(δt ) is O(|B|log(|B|)). Finally, the time complexity of checking the feasibility
of the allocation for the arrival of the buyers would be O(|B||R|), where —B— is the
number of buyers and —R— is the types of resources. As a whole overall complexity of
Algorithm 3 is O(|B|2 + |B|log(|B|) + |B||R|), i.e. polynomial time.
Further, Algorithm 4, i.e. Modified PPO-Clip is the PPO based learning algorithm
which has a learning network to generate action values for every allocation request.
Therefore, its time complexity depends on the implemented fully connected neural network [155]. In this regard, the time complexity of the fully connected neural network
depends on the number of neural nodes performing multiplication operations [40]. In this
context, the time complexity is polynomial-time represented as O(∑Ff=1 n f n f −1 ), where n
is the number of neural nodes and f represents the fully connected layers. Since the time
complexity of both the algorithms is in polynomial time, so the time complexity of the
novel MP-ORA mechanism is polynomial.

4.5

Experimental Evaluation

This section presents the experimental setting and results to evaluate the novel MP-ORA
mechanism. In this regard, extensive experimental settings were performed on real like
workload for three types cloud resources, i.e., CPU, memory and storage. Throughout
the experiment, following hyper-parameters are set for MP-ORA: ε = 0.1 (clip ratio) ;
γ = 0.9 (discount factor) ; learning-rate= 3e−4 ; epochs = 20, batch − size = 64, as these
hyper-parameters gave good results. Towards the end, the proposed MPORA mechanism
is compare with following benchmarks.
• Offline Greedy: An offline setting wherein future buyer type is already known,
i.e., unrealistic solution for ORA paradigm. It is similar to the classical winner
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Table 4.3: List of Symbols in MP-ORA Mechanism

# Symbol
v, & B
T
R = {1, 2, . . . , m}
ct ≡ {ct1 , . . . , ctm }
ϑt′
(vt′ , qt′ , dt′ )
qt′ = {qt1 , . . . , qtm }
G ≡ (α(.), ρ(.))
ϑ<t
K td
K tq
q

δtd & δt
q
ηtd & ηt
q
K(δtd ) & K(δt )
vqnK(δ q )
t

# Definitions
the vendor and set of buyers
time horizon upto max-time step tmax
m types of resources available with the vendor
set of maximum capacity of resource wit the vendor at t
reported type of the buyer t
reported: valuation; resource requests; and request size of the buyer t
qtx units of resources of type x ∈ R
G : RAM; α(.) : allocation rule; ρ(.) : pricing rule
set of all the buyers arrived until time-step t
buyer clusters based on reported size d arrived before time step t
clusters of buyers based on reported resource request q arrived before
time step t
size density & resource density of buyer t ∈ B
dominant size density & dominant request density of buyer t ∈ B
cluster elicitation function
q
nth highest valuation request density in the cluster K(δt )

determination problem, and the mechanism elects the buyers in decreasing order of
their valuations.
• Optimal Pricing: A posted-pricing based algorithm, wherein allocation decisions
depends on the fixed reserve price. Specifically, the buyer’s request gets allocated
only if v′i ≥ ψ, where ψ are optimally selected reserve prices from a pre-defined
specific range of prices, as discussed in [49].
• First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS): This is the simple rule-based scheduling mechanism, and this algorithm would allocate the buyer’s request as long as there are still
sufficient resources available.
• Strategyproof-Reinforcement Learning (SP-RL): This is a linear approximation based
strategyproof reinforcement learning mechanism [126]. Besides, the strategyproof
property was ensured by implemented monotonic allocation rule and critical payment rule.
From the above-mentioned benchmarks algorithms, Offline Greedy, Optimal Pricing,
and FCFS are evaluated based on average of 2000 iteration. On the other hand, SP-RL
and MP-ORA algorithms are evaluated based on training the algorithm from scratch after
every 100 episodes for 10,000 training episodes, to ensure noise reduction. Finally, all
the algorithms are implemented in Python 3 and the experiments are performed on Intel
Xeon 3.6GHz 6 core processor with 32 GB RAM.
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Experimental Setup

This subsection presents the experimental setting in which MP-ORA mechanism is evaluated. Firstly, buyers request are extracted for three types of resources, namely, CPU,
Memory and Disk Storage from the Task Events Tables in Google cluster traces [145],
i.e., m = 3 s.t, R = {CPU, Memory, Storage}. Also, in the provided dataset, the volume
of each requested resources i.e., qt ≡ {qCPU
, qtMemory , qtStorage are the re-scaled values not
t
the actual values. So, based on these re-scaled values the buyers are divided into two
categories, namely moderate buyers (ϑα′ ) and heavy buyers (ϑβ′ )) using a median split
technique [115]. Then, these scaled values are scaled back by considering the maximum
re-scaled value as one unit for each resource type and then scaled all the requested units
by it.
Also, since, size for each resource request is not publicly available in the dataset (i.e.,
Task Events Tables). Therefore, similar to [126], the size for both dα′ and dβ′ is simulated
by sampling uniformly at random from [1, 30]. Similarly, the valuation v′α and v′α per unit
price (PUP) for all three resources CPU, Memory and Storage is sampled uniformly at
random from PUPCPU ∈ [10, 20], PUPMemory ∈ [5, 10] and PUPStorage ∈ [1, 10], respectively. The intuition behind choosing such distribution is that, cost of CPU is expensive
as compared to other two, and storage is the least expensive. Further, using these per
unit prices, valuation is computed for every buyer is computed v′i = di ∑R∈r PUPr ∗ q(i,r) ,
∀i ∈ [1,tmax ].
In this setting, the PPO algorithm trained for 10, 000 training episodes, which has fixed
length tmax preset at the beginning of the experiment. Also the minimum available resources is preset as c r ≡ (CPU = 10, Memory = 50, Storage = 100). Finally, all the
mechanisms are implemented in Python 3 [80] and are performed on Intel Xeon 3.6GHz 6
core processor with 32 GB RAM. In this setting, the performance of the MP-ORA mechanism is compared with the other mechanism for different workloads.
The following subsection presents the results obtained by MP-ORA and other benchmarks for the selected parameters in three different cases. In all the different experimental
settings, the performance is evaluated on four different parameters, as follows:
• social welfare of the vendor computed using Equation 4.3
• execution time, which represents the delay in allocation of the resources.
• allocation efficacy, which denotes the total number of buyers allocated.
• resource utilisation for every resource type is the percentage of allocated resources
out of the total capacity of that resource over the entire time.
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Case I: Impact of type of buyer on the mechanism

This experimental setting aims to evaluate the impact of the arrival of the different buyer
types (i.e., heavy buyer and moderate buyer) on the performances of all the mechanisms.
In this setting, six test cases are designed with different probabilities (e) at which heavy
buyer arrive as follows: 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25 and 0.3. And the total number of the
buyer is kept as tmax = 200 and the resource capacity multiplier as 40, i.e., c 1 = (CPU =
400, Memory = 2000, Storage = 4000).
Firstly, from Figure 4.5, it is observed that the social welfare of the vendor in all the
mechanisms increases with the increase in the probability of heavy buyers. In particular,
it is maximum whene = 0.3 and least when e = 0.05. Also, social welfare in the SP-RL
mechanism is least as compared to optimal pricing and MP-ORA. Overall, in all the test
cases, social welfare in MP-ORA is comparatively higher.
OPTIMAL PRICE

SPRL-M

MP-ORA

Social Welfare

300000

200000

100000

0
0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

Buyer Type

Figure 4.5: Case I: Evaluation of Resource Vendor’s Social Welfare

Figure 4.6 depicts the execution time, i.e., the delay in allocation of the winning buyers.
Note that execution time for non-learning based algorithms (FCFS, Optimal Price and
Offline Greedy) is negligible as expected. Therefore, evaluation is compared on learningbased mechanisms, (SP-RL and MP-ORA). From Figure 4.6 it is observed that execution
time in MP-ORA is comparatively much lower. Besides, execution time for SP-RL algorithm slowly rises with increase in number of heavy buyers. On the other hand, execution
time is either levelled off or drops slightly with an increase in e. This observation is interesting as it shows that, unlike SP-RL, the novel MP-ORA is adaptable to change in buyer
type. In particular, at e = 0.25, execution time for SP-RL algorithm rises, whereas it drops
for MP-ORA algorithm.
Figure 4.7 shows the average number of buyers allocated for different mechanisms.
Generally, a higher number of allocated buyers not necessarily denotes the efficiency
of the algorithm. However, higher social welfare and the higher number of allocated
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OFFLINE GREEDY
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Figure 4.6: Case I: Evaluation of Execution Time in MP-ORA Mechanism

buyers showcase the reliability of the system. This can also be observed from Figure 4.7
and 4.5, there is no large difference in number of allocated buyers for different buyers
(Figure 4.7). However, the social welfare of vendors in MP-ORA is higher as compared
to other mechanisms. It is observed due to optimal bidding values and efficient allocation
of buyers by MP-ORA mechanism in different time-slots based on the supply and demand
in the market. Therefore, even if the number of allocated buyers are the same, their social
welfare has a larger difference. Overall, the number of allocated buyers remains steady as
the number of heavy buyers increase in e and novel MP-ORA has the maximum number
of buyers in all the test cases.
FCFS
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Figure 4.7: Case I: Number of buyers Completed in MP-ORA Mechanism

Further, Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 depicts the resource utilisation of all the three types
of resources in different test cases. It can be seen in the figures that, with a higher probability of heavy buyers, resource utilisation is also high. For instance, when e = 0.25, the
resource utilisation is more as compared to when e = 0.05, e = 0.1 and e = 0.15. Thus
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Figure 4.8: Case I: CPU Utilisation in
MP-ORA Mechanism
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Figure 4.9: Case I: Memory Utilisation
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Figure 4.10: Case I: Storage Utilisation in MP-ORA Mechanism

the presence of heavy buyers has an impact on resource utilisation. Overall, resource
utilisation is least for the MP-ORA algorithm in all the test cases, which showcases the
availability of the resources in all the cases.

4.5.3

Case II: Impact of number of buyers

This experimental setting aims to evaluate the impact of the increase in the number of
buyers, i.e., increase in total time-step on performance of all the mechanism. And the
probability of heavy buyer is set to e = 0.3 and capacity multiplier is set c = 40, i.e.,
c 1 = (CPU = 400, Memory = 2000, Storage = 4000). In this setting, four test cases are
designed having different time-step tmax = 200, tmax = 400, tmax = 600 and tmax = 800.
Figure 4.11 depicts that the social welfare of the vendor. It is visible that social welfare is directly proportional to the number of buyers served. Also, for FCFS and Offline
Greedy algorithm, total social welfare is negligible compared to the other three mechanisms. On the other hand, in SP-RL and the Optimal Price trend is the same in all the
test cases. However, the social welfare in the MP-ORA algorithm doubles with the increase in the number of buyers. In particular, with the number of buyers 800, it is almost
double from the setting when the number of buyers is 600. Overall, the social welfare in
MP-ORA is higher compared to SP-RL algorithm for all test cases.
Further from Figure 4.12, it is established that execution time increases gradually with
the rise in the number of buyers, learning-based mechanisms. However, this trend is
visible in MP-ORA only for tmax = 200 and tmax = 400. Then at tmax = 600, it reaches its
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Figure 4.11: Case II: Evaluation of Resource vendor’s Social Welfare

maximum values, and then it remains steady. This indicates the after a threshold value,
there is no impact of number of buyers on the MP-ORA mechanism.
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Figure 4.12: Case II: Evaluation of Execution Time in MP-ORA Mechanism

Figure 4.13 depicts the average number of buyers allocated in different mechanisms.
Overall, the number of allocated buyers steadily increases with an increase in the number
of buyers. Apart from that, the novel MP-ORA has the maximum number of buyers
allocated in all test cases.
Further, Figures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 depicts the resource utilisation of all the three types
of resources in different test cases. In an offline setting, with the increase in the number of
buyers, resource utilisation must rise. However, in an online setting, all the resources are
not exhausted at the same time. Therefore, the average utilisation of the resources remains
lower as compared to the offline setting. Overall, in all test cases, resource utilisation in
Optimal Pricing is the highest, whereas it is lowest in MP-ORA algorithm.
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Figure 4.13: Case II: Number of buyers Completed in Mp-ORA Mechanism
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Figure 4.16: Case II: Storage Utilisation in MP-ORA Mechanism

4.5.4

Case III: Impact of available resource capacity with the vendor

This experimental setting aims to evaluate impact of the available resource capacity of
the market on the performance of all the mechanisms. In this regard, four test cases were
designed with resource different resource capacity, by changing the capacity multiplier c,
as c = 40, c = 80, c = 160 and c = 320. In this setting, probability of higher buyer is set
as e = 0.3 and tmax = 400.
From Figure 4.17, social welfare in MP-ORA mechanism is more as compared to other
mechanisms. Also, initially social welfare in the MP-ORA mechanism rises with the
rise in total available resources but then decreases gradually. In particular, when c = 40,
social welfare is maximum but then it drops when c = 80. It could be because of the
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greater interval between the two allocations to the size of the requests. Such that, there
could be many time steps, wherein no allocation took place.
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Figure 4.17: Case III: Evaluation of Resource vendor’s Social Welfare

Further, from Figure 4.18, it is observed that execution time in MP-ORA remains lower
but steady in all four test cases. On the other hand, the execution time in SP-RL algorithm
gradually increases with the increase in available resources. Also, a sudden increase is
observed in the execution time at c = 160. One logical justification for such behaviour
could be in the implementation of a linear function approximator in SP-RL. Because with
the increase in the number of resources, the complexity of state representation increases.
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Figure 4.18: Case III: Evaluation of Execution Time in MP-ORA Mechanism

From Figure 4.19, it observed that the number of buyers getting allocated rises only
in the beginning. Later the number of buyers allocated becomes steady in all the mechanisms. In specific, number of allocated buyers increases when c = 40 is changed to c = 80,
but for c = 160 and c = 320, average number of allocated buyers are approximately same.
Interestingly the trend in total allocated buyers is nearly the same in all the mechanisms
for every test case.
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Figure 4.19: Case III: Number of buyers Completed in MP-ORA Mechanism

Finally, from Figures 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22, the resource utilisation of all the three resources in different test cases is observed. On common visible trend is the resource utilisation gradually increases with the increase in the availability of the resources. Although
utilisation is observed nearly the same in all the mechanisms, MP-ORA mechanism has
the highest number.
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Figure 4.20: Case III: CPU Utilisation
in MP-ORA Mechanism
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Figure 4.22: Case III: Storage Utilisation in MP-ORA Mechanism

4.5.5

Case IV: Impact of time-varying resource request

This experimental setting aims to evaluate the impact of the time-varying resource requests for the different numbers of buyers. In this regard, we set the probability of higher
buyer is set as, e = 0.3 and capacity multiplier c = 40, i.e., ct = (CPU = 400, Memory =
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2000, Storage = 4000). Further, to simulate the time-varying resource requests, each request is divided randomly into 50 time varying requests sampled from dataset. This sampled requests includes time-varying CPU, Memory and Storage requests for 50 time-slots,
sample of resource request from buyer id 125 is depicted in Table 4.4. In this setting, four
test cases are designed with different time-step tmax = 200, tmax = 400, tmax = 600 and
tmax = 800.
Table 4.4: Sample Time-varying Resource Request

# ID
125
125
125
125
125

Time slot
1
2
3
...
50

CPU
0.03
0.06
0.02
...
0.07

Memory
0.4
0.8
0.2
...
0.9

Storage
50
65
40
...
50

From Figure 4.23, social welfare gradually increases with the increase in the number
of arriving buyers. Also, similar to consistent resource requests setting, social welfare
in FCFS and Offline Greedy algorithm are negligible comparatively. So social welfare
observed in SP-RL and Optimal Price are nearly the same, whereas social welfare is
rising rose as high as double compared to SP-RL algorithm. Therefore, again the overall,
social welfare observed in that MP-ORA is more compared to SP-RL algorithm in all test
cases.
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Figure 4.23: Case IV: Evaluation of Resource vendor’s Social Welfare

Moving to execution time, from Figure 4.24, similar to the consistent resource request,
execution time observed in MP-ORA remains steady with the increase in the number of
buyers. On the other hand, the execution time in SP-RL algorithm gradually increases
with the increase in available resources. One interesting observation is, until tmax = 600,
execution time rises gradually in MP-ORA algorithm, then it is levelled-off.
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Figure 4.24: Case IV: Evaluation of Execution Time in MP-ORA Mechanism

Further, from Figure 4.25, it is observed that the number of allocated buyers in MP-ORA
algorithm is maximum as compared to other algorithms, except for the Offline Greedy
algorithm. Besides, initially, the number of allocations rises. Then it begins to fall after
reaching its threshold value.
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Figure 4.25: Case IV: Number of buyers Completed in MP-ORA Mechanism

Furthermore, from Figures 4.26, 4.27 and 4.28 depicts the resource utilisation of all the
three types of resources in different test cases, respectively. Since in an online setting, all
the resources do not get allocated at once, so its resource utilisation always falls below the
offline setting, i.e., offline greedy algorithm. Overall, in all test cases, resource utilisation
is lowest in MP-ORA algorithm as compared to all the benchmarks algorithms.
Besides, the performance of the novel MP-ORA mechanism compared in time-varying
and non-time-varying resource requests. In this context, setting with consistent buyer
requests is denoted as MP-ORA-C, and with the time-varying buyer, requests are denoted
as MP-ORA-TV. From Figure 4.29, the higher number of buyers are allocated in MP-ORA-
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Figure 4.28: Case IV: Storage Utilisation in MP-ORA Mechanism

TV setting, as compared to in MP-ORA-C setting. This rise in the number of allocated
buyers could be due to the higher availability of resources. An interesting observation
is, in the beginning, the number of allocated buyers increases with the number of arriving
buyers, but later it is levelled off. For instance until tmax = 600, number of allocated buyers
reached a threshold value of about 550, but then it remained consistent for tmax = 800. One
reason for this behaviour could be consumption of resources must have reached its peak
value, such that no further buyers get allocated. Overall, this provides evidence that novel
MP-ORA is compatible with the time-varying buyers.
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Figure 4.29: Comparative Evaluation of Number of User Completed

Further, to provide evidence of the enhanced performance of the MP-ORA in a timevarying setting. The social welfare of the vendor is compared with consistent resource
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requests. From Figure 4.30, it is visible that, MP-ORA-TV has higher social welfare since
it has a comparatively higher number of allocated buyers. However, from Figure 4.30
it is seen that unlike Figure 4.29, social welfare continues to increase with the increase
in the number of buyers. This observation illustrates that social welfare depends on the
type of buyers allocated rather than the number of buyers. Therefore, novel MP-ORA
mechanism-based allocation decisions are optimised such that it maximises the overall
social welfare.
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Figure 4.30: Comparative Evaluation of Social Welfare

Briefly, from the above results and discussion in all the experimental settings, it is clear
that the novel MP-ORA algorithm has higher social welfare for the vendors. Also, the
novel MP-ORA mechanism ensures the stability of the online market by keeping efficient
resource utilisation and truthfulness of the arriving buyers. Finally, from the time-varying
experimental setting, novel MP-ORA is compatible with the time-varying resource requests.

4.6

Summary

This research focuses on building a novel online mechanism to address the challenges
associated with ORA paradigms. Specifically, it introduced an RL-based strategyproof
online mechanism that gradually adapts itself to the dynamics of the environment. In
this context, it implements a custom proximal policy optimisation algorithm to build a
monotonic allocation policy. Then a critical payment based payment policy is designed.
In this regard, the novel MP-ORA mechanism incentivises each buyer to report truthfully
and maximise the social welfare of the vendor.
Towards the end, the novel MP-ORA mechanism outperforms other sophisticated counterparts proved in the series of experiments. In addition, the proposed mechanism is faster
as compared to the learning-based SPRL mechanism, having higher resource utilisation.

Chapter 5
Diffusion Mechanism Driven
Homogeneous Resource Allocation
This chapter introduces a novel information diffusion based RAM for open economic networks with multi-units of a resource. In this regard, the objective is to minimise the procurement cost in open economic networks. In classical procurement paradigms, the buyer
is aware of a limited number of vendors. Limited participation of vendors might lead
to drop-in competition, which in turn, leads to higher procurement cost. In this regard,
this chapter introduces a dual-bid procurement auction (DBPA) mechanism for resource
allocation. The DBPA incentivises every participating vendor to report their resources
and pricing truthfully. Also, it encourages them to spread the procurement information
to other neighbouring vendors. In this way, this mechanism helps the buyer to reach out
to distant vendors and procure the required amount of commodities at the minimum possible price. Additionally, DBPA mechanism promotes fair chances to distant vendors to
participate in the procurement auction. Towards this end, DBPA is proven to be incentivecompatible and individually rational. Besides, it shows that the DBPA mechanism has a
lower procurement cost than the direct extension of the VCG mechanism.

5.1

Introduction

This chapter essentially focuses on the procurement of multi-units of resources in an open
market setting similar to work discussed in [91]. Procurement in any competitive open
markets takes place through a reverse auction paradigm [55]. In this context, classical
auction paradigms are adopted to minimise the procurement cost of the buyers such that
vendors with the lowest offered price are the winners. Then finally, a payment is decided
based on different mechanism [93], such as first-price auction, second-price auction, etc.
In such a market setting, the buyer (procurer) is aware of a limited number of resource
vendors. It leads to competition drop and a rise in resource prices in the market. Also,

75

5.1. INTRODUCTION

76

such market settings have little or no constraints over the participation of resource buyers.
Therefore, such mechanisms fail to address two crucial problems: (1) resource supply:
availability of resource vendors in the market; and (2) resource demand: the scarcity of resource buyers in the market. However, for any business model to sustain, the equilibrium
between demand and supply is very crucial [132]. Such problems exists in many realworld decision-making problems, especially in government schemes that aim to boost the
local economy [137, 98], through bulk procurement of crops, milk, transportation, etc.,
from local vendors. Further, not limited to bulk procurement, present-day, e-commerce
retail giant platforms, such as Amazon.com a , FlipKart.com b , etc. are creating monopoly
in the consumer market. These platforms are usually super-competitive for small vendors
as they have to compete against distributors and manufacturers. Therefore, it becomes
taxing for local vendors to sustain in such super-competitive markets.
Resource sharing mechanisms would be one suitable approach to address the scarcity of
resources in the market. However, with an initially given limited number of vendors, the
problem would persist. In this regard, this chapter models such open markets into a network of buyers and vendors such that, buyer is connected to a limited number of initially
known vendors. Then, more number vendors in connection with the initial vendors join
the network. It continues to form a large network of a buyer and several distant vendors
called an open economic network. Now, different mechanisms related to the social network can be applied in this open economic network particularly, an information-diffusion
technique to diffuse the information about procurement in this network. The information
diffusion techniques are widely implemented in social networks [35, 116, 89] for advertisement. Similarly, such diffusion-based RAMs are deployed for allocation of resources
[67, 66, 160] through social networks. These diffusion mechanisms help the vendors
to invite distant buyers to buy their resources in an auction paradigm. Such techniques
increase the resource demand to some extent with additional diffusion costs. However,
it still fails to address the problem of resource scarcity in the market, for instance, in a
market setting wherein vendors have limited resource capacity. Then it would be difficult for an individual vendor to fulfil the resource demand to a certain extent. Therefore,
promoting cooperation among a group of vendors to share their resources would possibly
address this problem. Such cooperative behaviour would efficiently maximise the overall
availability of supply in the network of a group of neighbouring vendors termed as local
economic network.
Furthermore, to ensure participation fairness, there is a need for a distributed RAM that
should promote fair opportunity for all the participants. Further, such diffusion techniques
must incentivise vendors to invite other distant vendors. Naturally, a particular vendor
with insufficient available resources would actively invite more vendors to share their
a https://www.amazon.com/
b https://www.flipkart.com/
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resources. Otherwise, any vendor would not want to increase its competition by inviting
more vendors. In this regard, vendors would need incentives to encourage or obligate
them to disclose the procurement information to distant vendors.
Owing to the above reasons, this chapter focus on designing a diffusion enabled multiunit resource procurement auction in a decentralised manner. Specifically, the aim is
to maximise the availability of resources in the market through a diffusion mechanism
and procure them using an auction paradigm, without any intermediate entity to avoid
commission overhead. Designing an optimal diffusion enabled auction mechanism for
the above setting is a challenging task because, in such a setting, apart from modelling
a strategy-proof allocation and pricing rule [93], it must also promote cooperative behaviour amongst the vendors, while maintaining the competitiveness in the environment
to control the prices [122]. In this context, many diffusion-based allocation mechanisms
have been proposed [160, 66]. However, those works mainly focused on single-unit of
resource allocation and were vendor-centric mechanisms. Lately, few multi-unit resource
allocations in social networks have been proposed [161, 50, 128]. Also, those works were
vendor-centric, wherein each buyer has at most a single resource request. Although group
task allocation approaches have been proposed in the literature [54, 150, 59], the existing
group allocation approaches assumed that every buyer is aware of all the vendors in the
network, which is not a practical assumption for real decentralised markets. Also, in the
existing approaches, vendors with enough resources do not have any incentives in inviting
other vendors.
Briefly, this research proposes a dual-bid based diffusion mechanism, which utilises
information diffusion mechanism in open economic networks for multi-unit resource allocation. In particular, this mechanism proposes a truthful procurement auction paradigm.
Firstly single buyer directly submits its multi-unit resource request to a limited number of
vendors. Then, based on the diffusion technique, this procurement information is spread
to other distant vendors. Besides, the proposed mechanism allows all the vendors to share
their resources to fulfil the multi-unit resource requests. Also, the proposed mechanism
is incentive compatible, individually rational and optimal payment mechanism for multiunit resource allocation in economic networks. To summarise, the contributions of this
research are as follows:
• Novel dual-bid based diffusion mechanism for multi-unit resource allocation in economic networks.
• Introduces a practical information propagation strategy to give fair participation
chance for the vendors to participate even after information diffusion.
• Then, a decentralised group determination strategy based on the concept of local
procurement, which takes place independently in local economic networks.
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents various key definitions to model the proposed mechanism. Section 5.3 presents the proposed dual-bid procurement auction (DBPA) mechanism. In Section 5.4, properties of the proposed mechanism DBPA are discussed. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 5.5.
Table 5.1: List of Symbols in DBPA Mechanism

# Symbol
b
Ri
Rall
i
Gk
G
pi
Ii
a1i , a2i
vi
qi
lwi
payi
w∗D
v∗∗N

5.2

Definition
the buyer
neighbour set of node i
all the descendant of node i
local economic network with node k as root node
global economic network
ancestor of node i
information message from node i
node i’s local and global reported type respectively
per unit valuation of node i
available resource of node i
local winner of node i
payment received by node i
node with minimum valuation within set D
valuation of node with minimum valuation within set D

The Model

This chapter considers an open economic network, with a single buyer b, having multiunit resource procurement request reqb . Also, there is a set N of n vendors. The resource
request reqb from buyer b denotes the minimum resource demand that the buyer intends
to procure. Naturally, in the procurement of multi-units of resources, it would be ideal
for the buyer to reach and submit its resource request to the maximum possible potential
vendors to avoid monopoly and scarcity of the resources. However, initially, buyer b
can only submit its procurement request to its neighbour set denoted as Rb . In such a
setting, submitting its procurement request to distant potential vendors would incur extra
costs on the buyer’s budget. Therefore, to avoid this extra cost, we propose a diffusionbased mechanism, that encourages each vendor to invite neighbours to participate in the
procurement. In specific, firstly, buyer b submit its procurement request to its neighbours
in set Rb . Then, all the vendors ∀ j ∈ Rb would diffuse the information to its corresponding
neighbour set denoted as R j . Let node i ∈ N and its respective neighbouring set Ri termed
as local economic network. In this regard, m independent local economic networks are
connected to form a complete economic network denoted as G = G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gm , wherein,
Gk denotes the local economic network formed by vendor k ∈ N and j ∈ Rk .
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Figure 5.2: Global Economic Networks with Three Local Networks

This economic network G resembles a directed rooted tree G ≡ (V, E), wherein the
buyer b is the root node and a set N of potential vendors as leaf nodes. Further, V ≡
N ∪ {b} represents the set of nodes (vendors and a buyers) and E represents the set of
edges between these nodes which denotes the neighbourhood relationship. For nodes
i ∈ V , its set of immediate child nodes are called as neighbours, denoted as Ri ⊆ N such
that, ∀ j ∈ Ri , there exists an edge ei, j ∈ E. Let di > 0 be the depth for node ∀i ∈ N, which
represents the shortest path from buyer b to vendor i. Note that initially, buyer b has no
prior information about all the vendors in the market, i.e., b ∈ V is only aware of a set of
vendors in Rb . Similarly, all the vendors i ∈ N are aware of their respective vendors in Ri ,
i.e., its local economic network. For instance, Figure 5.1 depicts an example of economic
network, wherein |Rb | = 3 and reqb = 10. In this regard, upon receiving a resource request
from the buyer b, b’s immediate neighbours along with their local economic networks are
combined to form an economic network as depicted in Figure 5.2.
In this market setting, each vendor i ∈ V \ b has two private values, i.e., per-unit valuation of the resource (bid-density) vi ≥ 0 and the maximum quantity of resource the vendor
is offering to sell qi . In this work, the parent node for node i ∈ V is denoted as pi , s.t.,
pi ∈ V . Also, ∀ j ∈ N, let N− j ≡ N \ j, i.e., set of all the vendors except vendor j and let
Rall
i be set of all the descendants for node i ∈ N. For example, in Figure 5.2, for the node
s1 , Rs1 ≡ {s4 , s5 , s6 }, whereas, Rall
s1 = {s4 , s5 , s6 , s8 , s9 , s11 , s13 , s14 }.
Definition 5.2.1. A information message from a vendor ∀i ∈ N is denoted as Ii ≡ (reqi , b),
where reqi denotes the minimum amount of resources requested by vendor i, whereas b
denotes procurer’s information, so that on receiving this information message, vendor

5.2. THE MODEL

80

could directly report their bid to buyer b.
For all vendor i ∈ N, their truthful type is denoted as ai = (vi , qi , Ri ), where vi , qi
and Ri are the per unit valuation, available quantity of resource, and set of neighbours,
respectively. Similarly, the type profile of all the vendors is denoted as θ = (a1 , . . . , an ).
In this context, let θ−i be the type profile for vendors except i such that θ ≡ (θ−i , ai ). Also,
let Θi be the type space for vendor i such that Θ ≡ (Θi , . . . , Θn ) ≡ (Θ−i , Θ) be the the type
profile space for all vendors. In this regard, each vendor can participate in procurement
by reporting its type to the buyer b. This reported type of vendor i ∈ N is represented as
a′i ≡ (v′i , q′i , R′i ), where v′i , q′i and R′i are its reported per unit valuation, reported available
quantity of resources and its reported neighbour set,respectively, s.t., R′i ⊆ Ri . Also, let
0/ be the default reported type, when i ∈ N had not received the information I pi from its
parent vendor or vendor i ∈ N does not want to participate in the procurement.
Definition 5.2.2. In this mechanism, a type profile θ ′ is feasible if for every vendor i ∈ N
with a′i ̸= nil, there must exist at least one path Pb,h = (b, a, . . . , k, h) from b to h, where
a ∈ Rb , h ∈ Rk and t + 1 ∈ Rt for 1 ≤ t ≤ k. In other words, it means that a vendor cannot
participate in the procurement without an invitation. In this regard, let F(θ ′ ) ⊆ Θ be the
set of all the feasible type profiles.
In this context, if a vendor i ∈ N remains uninvited, then the mechanism will not observe
any action from that vendor. Further, the diffusion mechanism is defined as follows.
Definition 5.2.3. A diffusion mechanism M in the economic network is denoted by an
allocation policy π ≡ (π1 , π2 , . . . , πn ) and a payment policy pay ≡ (pay1 , pay2 , . . . , payn ),
where πi : Θ → {0, 1}, π : Θ → R and payi denotes the payment received by the vendor
i ∈ N from buyer b.
Given the type profile θ ≡ (a1 , . . . , a(n) ) ∈ F(θ ′ ), the payment policy pay(θ ′ ) ≡
(pay1 (θ ′ ), . . . , pay(n) (θ ′ )) represents the amount of money each vendor would be paid at
the end of the resource procurement. For vendor i ∈ N, if payi (θ ′ ) ≥ 0, then it receives
payi (θ ′ ) from the buyer and if payi (θ ′ ) ≤ 0, then it will pay to the buyer. In this regard,
the allocation policy π(θ ′ ) = (π1 (θ ′ ), . . . , πn (θ ′ )) represents the resource allocation.

1 if i ∈ N is the winning vendor .
πi (θ ′ ) =
0, if i ∈ N is set of not winning vendors.

(5.1)

Definition 5.2.4. Given a feasible type profile θ ′ ∈ F(θ ′ ) and a feasible allocation π, the
social welfare of allocation π(θ ′ ) is SW ≡ − ∑i∈N πi (θ ′ ) × q′i × v′i .
In this context, for the diffusion mechanism, M = (π, pay), it is assumed that there is
no cost for a vendor to spread the procurement information to its neighbours. Thus, for
vendor i ∈ N of type profile ai , given a feasible type profile θ ∈ F(θ ) of all vendors, then
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the utility of vendor i is defined as the payment received minus the expected payment
based on its true valuation.
ui (ai , θ ′ ) = payi (θ ′ ) − πi (θ ′ ) × v′i × q′i

(5.2)

In this context, a diffusion mechanism is individually rational if the utility of a vendor
is non-negative as long as it is reporting its valuation truthfully and does not depend on
how many neighbours it invites or the number of resources it is willing to sell. Intuitively,
it indicates that vendors do not necessarily have to invite more vendors or disclose all of
their available resources, to guarantee non-negative gain.
Definition 5.2.5. A diffusion mechanism M = (π, pay) is individually rational (IR) if
′ )) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀θ ′ ∈ Θ and all θ ′ ∈ F(θ ′ ).
ui (ai , (ai , θ−i
Similarly, a mechanism is said to be incentive-compatible, if all the vendors in the
market are reporting their true valuation. However, in this mechanism, vendors also need
to invite their neighbours. Therefore a mechanism should incentivise vendors to invite
their neighbours also. In this regard, the definition of incentive compatibility is as follows.
Definition 5.2.6. A diffusion mechanism M = (π, pay) is incentive compatible (IC), if
′ )) ≥ u (a , (a′ , θ ′′ )), ∀i ∈ N, all a′ ∈ Θ , where (a′ , θ ′′ ) ∈ F(a′ , θ ′ ).
ui (ai , (ai , θ−i
i i
i
i −i
i
i −i
i −i
′′

′ is changes to θ when i’s type is changed from a
Note that from Definition 5.2.6, θ−i
i
−i
′
′
to ai . This is because if type ai does not spread the procurement information to all the i’s
neighbours, then some vendors, who did receive the information under type ai , may not
′ ) ⊆ F(θ ′ ), it does
be able get the information message under a′i . Although the type (ai , θ−i
not guarantee that (a′i , θi′ ) is also feasible. Therefor the IC definition denotes the feasible
′′
type profile as θ for corresponding type a′i .
The following section introduces a novel diffusion based resource allocation mechanism for MUMI resource procurement.

5.3

Dual Bid Procurement Auction

This section presents the novel Dual Bid Procurement Auction (DBPA) diffusion-based
mechanism for procurement multi-unit demand of homogeneous resources. Firstly, buyer
b submits its minimum resource request reqb to all the vendors in set Rb . Then, all the
vendors in Rb are encouraged through incentives to diffuse this procurement information
in their respective local economic network. Finally, a resource request reqb is satisfied by
a single or group of vendors. Also, payments for all the winning vendors are computed
based on the adopted payment rule. Besides, all the intermediate vendors between the
buyer and the winning vendors get rewards for information diffusion.
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In this novel mechanism, two independent procurement are carried out sequentially,
namely a local procurement and a global procurement. The local procurement takes place
within the local economic networks, whereas global procurement takes place between
all the potential vendors and the buyer. So, a vendor i ∈ N have to report their type a′i
′
′
′
twice, firstly in local procurement which is denoted as ai1 = (vi1 , qi1 , R′ i ), and then in the
′
′
′
global procurement which is denoted as ai2 = (vi2 , qi2 , R′ i ). The set of neighbours remains
′
′
the same in both the reported type, however, reported per unit valuation vi1 and vi2 and
′
reported available quantity q′i and qi2 may or may not be same (refer subsection 6.3.2).
Also, the mechanism allows vendor to participate in the global procurement, only if it
participates in local procurement.
In this regard, the whole mechanism has three major stages, namely, (1) information
propagation, (2) group determination, and (3) winner determination and payment distribution, discussed in the following subsections.

5.3.1

Information Propagation

This subsection presents the information diffusion stage of the novel DBPA mechanism.
In this stage, upon receiving reqb from b, all the vendors i ∈ N diffuse the information
message Ii = (reqi , b) to Ri sequentially, wherein, reqi represents the minimum local request for Ri , which is a minimum quantity required by its neighbours to participate in the
local procurement, computed using Equation 5.3 and b represent the buyer b’s information.

reqi =


′


qi ,


if i = b.

req pi − q′i , if req pi > q′i .



0,
if req pi ≤ q′i .

(5.3)

In this regard, nodes i ∈ V diffuse message Ii to their neighbours k ∈ R′i . From Equation
5.3, vendor i ∈ N only reveals the difference of the resource requests from its parent node
pi . This quantity-difference mechanism is adopted to encourage the vendors to diffuse
true information. Such behaviour is natural in real-world markets, as the greedy vendor
would be interested in selling its resource first and then inviting other vendors. So any
greedy vendors would voluntarily disclose at least the difference between the available
and requested resources truthfully. Besides, any vendor would not prefer to reveal all
information to avoid neighbours from stealing its profits.
Furthermore, to avoid information diffusion for infinitely larger economic networks,
the diffusion phase will continue until a period of maximum time steps called diffusion
period Tmax . The value of Tmax is crucial to keep a check on the available resources. In
this regard, the Tmax value shouldn’t be too low to create scarcity of resources or too high
to bring a surplus of resources in the market. Algorithm 5 gives the pseudocode for the
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information propagation stage.
Algorithm 5: Information Propagation
Input: b, Rb , Tmax , G
Result: vendor list, neighbour list
1

/*initialisation*/;

2

vendor list[]; t ← 0 ;

3

/* 3D array vendor, neighbour and local winner flag indices */;

4

neighbour list[][][]; neighbour list arbitrary[][] ← 0;
/
neighbour list[b][]; neighbour list arbitrary[b][] ← Rb ;
while t ̸= Tmax AND neighbour list arbitrary ̸= NULL do
i ← POP(neighbour list arbitrary[]);

5
6
7
8

/*neighbour list[i][] denotes Ri */;

9

if neighbour list[i][] ̸= null then
reqi ← req pi − q′i ;
Ii = (reqi , b);
for j ∈ neighbour list[i][] do

10
11
12
13

/*diffuse information*/;

14

j ⇐=== Ii ;

diffuse

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

neighbour list[i][]; ;
neighbour list arbitrary[i][] ← j;
vendor list[] ← j ;
end
else
t + +;
end
end

This algorithm takes four inputs, namely buyer’s information b, reqb , Rb and G. The algorithm first initialises (Lines 2-5) neighbour and arbitrary neighbour list with the neighbouring vendors, i.e., ∀i ∈ Rb . Then, the algorithm removes the top element from the
arbitrary neighbour list and diffuses the information to its neighbours and adds all its
neighbours sequentially to the neighbour list and arbitrary list. It continues in a loop until
all the neighbours are traversed, or until diffusion period Tmax . Finally, the output is the
list of vendors and their respective neighbour’s list.
Definition 5.3.1. A feasible local neighbours (R∗i ) is a set of neighbours for vendor i
having reqi ≤ q′k , s.t k ∈ Ri and R∗i ⊆ Ri . Similarly, feasible global neighbours (N ∗ ) is a
set of all vendors for buyer b having reqb ≤ q′k , s.t k ∈ N and N ∗ ⊆ N
Following that, the vendors in a local economic network form groups, as discussed in
the following subsection.

5.3. DUAL BID PROCUREMENT AUCTION

5.3.2

84

Group Determination

This subsection presents the group determination stage of the novel DBPA mechanism.
Upon receiving the information messages Ii from ancestor node pi , every vendor i ∈ N
has to report its type a1i to parent node pi , to participate in the local procurement. Then, at
the end of local procurement i.e., after receiving reported type a1i , ∀i ∈ N, a local winner
lwi is elected amongst the feasible local neighbours R∗i , s.t lwi ≡ min(v′j ), ∀ j ∈ R∗i . Then
vendors i would update its total available resources q′i using Equation 5.4
q′i = q′i + q′lwi

(5.4)

Similarly, vendor i ∈ R∗i computes its per unit valuation using Equation 5.5 at which
local winner lwi would get its payment, if vendor i is the winner in the procurement.

v′lwi




min(v′ j )∀ j ∈ R∗i \ j ̸= lwi , if |R∗k | > 1.


= max(v′i , v′j ),
if |R∗k | = 1.



0,
otherwise.

(5.5)

Equation 5.5 states that, if there are more than one feasible local neighbour, i.e., |R∗k | >
1, then the valuation of the local winner is computed based on the VCG mechanism,
specifically the second price auction [55]. However, if there is only one feasible local
neighbour, i.e., |R∗k | = 1, then the valuation is the maximum valuation among vendor i
and j ∈ R∗i ; otherwise its set to be zero. Similarly, the valuation for the parent vendor is
updated based on the valuation of the local winner using Equation 5.6.

v′i

=


v′i ,


v′i ×(q′i −q′ i )+v′ i ×q′ i
lw
lw
lw
q′i +q′ i
lw

if R∗k = {null}.
, otherwise.

(5.6)

This reporting continues sequentially in each local economic network from bottom to
top. At the end of each local procurement, all the vendors in that local economic network
report their type a2i to buyer b. In this way, local groups are formed within the local
economic networks in a decentralised manner. In this context, vendor would consume the
resource from its neighbours, only when its available resource is less than the resource
request from its respective parent. This is true because, greedy vendors prefer to sell their
resource first then would try to share or consume resources from their neighbours. In this
regard, if q′i < req pi , then only vendor i would collaborate with one of its neighbour and
report the combined resource (i.e., q′i = q′i + q′lwi ) in the local procurement a1i . Similarly,
if q′i < reqb , then only the vendor would collaborate with one of its neighbour and report
the combined resource in its reported profile a2i .
Algorithm 6 presents the full pseudocode for group determination stage. Algorithm 6
takes two input, i.e., vendor list and neighbour list, which is the output from Algorithm
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Algorithm 6: Group Determination
Input: vendor list, neighbour list
Result: vendor list ′ , neighbour list ′
′
′
1 vendor list ← vendor list & neighbour list ← neighbour list ;
2 while vendor list! = 0
/ do
3
/*pop the last vendor*/;
4
i ← POP(vendor list) ;
5

/* neighbour list ∗ [i][] denotes the set of feasible local vendor*/;

6

if neighbour list[i][] ̸= null then
/*local winner determination*/;

7

lwi ← j with min(v′j ∈ neighbour list ∗ [i][]) ;
if j ∈ neighbour list ′ [i][] = lwi then

8
9

/*flag index set 1 for local-winner*/ neighbour

10

list ′ [i][ j][0] ← 1 ;

else

11

/*flag index set 0 for non-local-winner*/

12

neighbourl ist ′ [i][ j][0] ← 0 ;
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

end
compute v′lwi using Equation 5.8 /*bid density of local winner*/;
compute q′i using Equation 5.4 /*update*/;
compute v′i using Equation 5.6;
else
nothing;
end
end

5. This algorithm runs until all the potential vendors in vendor list is exhausted. In this
regard, the algorithm determines a local winner lwi for each vendor i ∈ vendor list (Line
5). Then, the bid density for the local winner lwi gets calculated. Also, the valuation and
the available resources for the vendor i ∈ vendor list are updated (Line 13-15). Finally,
the output is the updated list of vendors and their respective updated list of neighbours,
which denotes the local groups.

5.3.3

Winner Determination and Revenue Distribution

This subsection presents the winner determination and revenue distribution stage. At
this stage, winning vendors are decided and their respective payments are computed. In
addition to that, it computes rewards for all the vendors who has contributed through
information diffusion. Firstly, the mechanism elicits a winning vendor w ∈ N ∗ , s.t., w ∈
argmini∈N ∗ v′i (with random tie-breaking). Also, all the vendors in the path Pbw from
buyer b to the winning vendor w are rewarded for diffusing the information to the winning
vendor w. The path Pbw is called as winning path and represented as Pbw ≡ {b, . . . , w}.
Also, for any vendor, let v∗D = mini∈D v′i be the minimum reported valuation in the subset
D ⊆ N and the corresponding vendor is represented as w∗D , and then v′w = v∗∗N whereas
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w = w∗N . Similarly, v∗D\i denotes the minimum valuation and w∗D\i when vendor i ∈ D does
not participate. Also to simplify the notations, let v∗N ∗ \i = v∗−i .
Definition 5.3.2. A critical vendor set (C), is a set of all the vendors in winning path Pbw
including the local winner of the winning vendor, i.e., C ≡ {c1 , . . . , w, lww }, where i ∈ Pbw ,
w = w∗N ∗ . This critical vendor C set is an ordered set, s.t., dc1 ⊃ dc2 ⊃, . . . , ⊃ dw ⊃ dlww ,
where dci denotes the depth of the node ci from buyer b.
In this regard, the allocation policy for diffusing mechanism DBPA is computed using
Equation 5.7.

1 if i ∈ C, v′ = v∗
i
−(i+1) .
πi (θ ) =
0, if i ∈
/ C.

(5.7)

From Equation 5.7 it is observed that the winning vendor elected from the critical
vendor who has the least per unit valuation when critical vendor i + 1 removed from the
economic network. The intuition behind Equation 5.7 is that mechanism allocates the
resource to the very first vendor node in the set C, if the i + 1th vendor is removed from
the network, where i ∈ C. Then, the bid density bdi ∀i ∈ C computed using Equation 5.8,
bid density represents the value at which payment for every vendor computed.

bd i =




v∗−i + γi




γ ,

if i = w.
if i ∈ C−w .

i



v′lwi ,




0,

if i = lww .

(5.8)

Otherwise.

where, γi represents the valuation at which reward is computed for vendor i ∈ C for
diffusing the information to its neighbours, which is computed using Equation 5.9.

γi =

v∗−(xi+1 ,w∗ ) − v∗−xi
xi

|C − 1|

(5.9)

where, xi is determined using Equation 5.10, representing the closest ancestor node in
if i ∈
/ N∗

N∗


i
xi =
 pi

if i ∈ C and i ∈ N ∗ .
if i ∈ C and i ∈
/ N ∗ and pi ∈ N ∗ .

(5.10)

According to Equation 5.8, winning vendor’s bid density is sum of VCG payment v∗−w ,
i.e., winner receives the second lowest per unit valuation. In addition, winning vendor is
rewarded γw for diffusing the information to its neighbour. Besides, all the other critical
vendors are rewarded γi for information diffusion. Intuitively, reward is the decrease in
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payment for buyer b for vendor i ∈ C diffusion action. In particular, it is change in payment for buyer b when vendor i + 1 along with the vendor w∗−i (when vendor i do not participate) do not participate and when vendor i ∈ C do not participate in the procurement.
Finally, bid density of local winner is same as computed during its local procurement
based on VCG mechanism.
To the end, based on the valuation computed using Equation 5.8 and 5.9, payment payi
is computed for all the critical vendors in set C.

bd × (q′ − q′ ), if lwi ̸= null and i ∈ C.
i
i
lwi
payi =
bd × q′ ,
otherwise.
i
i

(5.11)

Further, the total payment given by the buyer b to all the vendors in winning path Pbw
is computed using Equation 5.12.
pay =

∑ payi

(5.12)

i∈C

In this way, winner and their respective payment is computed, also rewards for all the
vendors in winning path is computed for information diffusion. Further, Algorithm 7
gives the full pseudocode for group determination stage.
Algorithm 7: Winner Determination and Revenue Distribution
Input: vendor list ′ , neighbour list ′
Result: w,Pbw ,π, pay
1 /*w is the winner*/ ;
/ do
2 while vendor list! = 0
3
i ← deque(vendor list) ;
4
if q′i ≥ reqb then
5
w = j, using Equation 5.7 /* global winning bidder */ ;
6
compute Pbw , C ;
7
compute bdi using Equation 5.8 ;
8
compute payi using Equation 5.11 ;
9
compute pay using Equation 5.12 ;
10
else
11
nothing;
12
end
13 end
Algorithm 7 takes two input, i.e., vendor list ′ and neighbour list ′ , which are the output
from Algorithm 6. Then, the algorithm runs until all the potential vendors in vendor list
are exhausted. In this regard, the algorithm determines a winner w using Equation 5.7
(Line 4). Then, payment for each vendor in winning path is computed (Lines 6-8). Finally,
this algorithm gives allocation and payment policy as output.
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The next subsection presents an example economic network, on which we run the
DBPA mechanism. Before, moving on to the next subsection, that summarises all the
key assumptions made in designing the mechanism as follows:
• There is only one buyer b in rooted directed graph G, and all the other nodes are
vendors.
• The available resource reported by any vendor represents the number of resources
the vendor is willing to sell, not necessarily the total available resource.
• Any vendor i ∈ N can participate in local procurement, if it receives an invitation
from its parent vendor pi .
• Any vendor i ∈ N ∗ can participate in global procurement, if it participates first in
the local procurement.

5.3.4

DBPA Scenario

This subsection presents a running example of DBPA mechanism using the economic
network depicted in Figure 5.2. Firstly, in the information propagation phase, the request
message is propagated to all the nodes until diffusion period Tmax . The economic network
at the end of first phase is depicted in Figure 5.3, wherein weights on the edges represent
the requested quantity of resource at each levels.

Figure 5.3: Information Diffusion: the
number in red represents the local requests

Figure 5.4: Local Procurement: the
yellow nodes are the feasible global
neighbours
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For instance, buyer b submit its minimum request reqb = 10 to vendors s1 , s2 and s3 .
Then, vendor s1 submits reqs1 = 8 to its neighbours s4 , s5 and s6 . Similarly, vendor 2 and
s3 submits reqs2 = 7 and reqs3 = 5, to their respective neighbours. Note that, vendor can
receive information from multiple parent vendors, but it would respond to information
message which promises higher utility, i.e., higher resource request. For instance, vendor
s6 would receive request from vendor s1 and s2 , then s6 responds to s1 , since reqs1 =
8 > reqs2 = 7. In this regard, information is diffused to all the vendors in the economic
network and then all the invited vendors report two bids as mentioned in Section 2. For
instance, s14 reports bids′ 14 = (2, 3, 0)
/ to s13 , then s14 and s13 would form group, if s13
falls short of minimum local request or minimum global request. In this regard, Table 5.2
enlists all the local and global bids for every vendor.

Figure 5.5: Global procurement: the nodes in red border are the critical vendors, orange
nodes are local vendor and yellow nodes are feasible global neighbours

From Table 5.2 and Figure 5.5, set of feasible global neighbours is N ∗ ≡ {s1 , s3 , s7 ,
s11 , s13 }, and vendor s13 is the winner as its valuation minimum (random tie breaking
between s13 and s11 ). However, based on the allocation policy in Equation 5.7, since,
v′s11 = v∗N∗\s13 , therefore s11 is the winner, i.e., w = s11 . Then, the winning path is Pbw =
{s1 , s6 , s10 , s11 }. Further, critical vendors C ≡ {s1 , s6 , s10 , s11 , s13 }, this |C − 1| = 5 − 1| =
4. In this context, firstly, based on Equation 5.8, valuation of all the vendors in C is
v∗−(x

−v∗−x j
∗
j+1 ,w−x j )

v∗−(s1 ,s7 ) −v∗−s1
vs −vs
= 3 4 7 = 7−5
4 =
|C−1|
∗
∗
v−(xs ,xs ) −v−xs
vs −vs
6
10 7
2/4. Similarly, for vendor i = s6 , bds6 =
= 1 4 7 = 6−5
4
4 = 1/4. Further,
vs1 −vs7
for vendor i = s10 , it is bds10 = 6−5
+
4 = 1/4. Then, finally, for vendor s11 , bds11 =
4
6−5
1
∗
v−s11 = 4 + vs1 = 4 + 6. In this regard, revenue for each vendor is computed based on

computed. For vendor j = s1 , bds1 =

|C−1|

=

′

′

Equation 5.11. Such as, revenue for s1 , pays1 = bd s1 × (qs1 − qlws1 ) = 2/4 × (11 − 9) =
2/4 × 2. Similarly, revenue for s6 and s10 are 5/4 and 1/4 respectively. Finally, revenue
′
for vendor s11 is revs11 = (1/4 + 6) × 3 and for vendor s13 is pays13 = vls13 × qs13 = 3 × 7 =
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21. Now, sum of revenue denotes the payment done by buyer to each vendor in winning
path, i.e., pay = 1 + 5/4 + 1/4 + (1/4 + 6) × 3 + 21 = 42.25. As shown in the running
example, allocation and payment rule is decided in the novel DBPA mechanism.
Table 5.2: Group Determination: the tuples in red are the Feasible Global Neighbours

# vendor
s14
s13
s11
s12
s10
s6
s2
s7
s3
s8
s9
s4
s5
s1

req pi
0
0
1
1
2
7
10
5
10
3
1
8
8
10

′

′

(vi1 , qi1 , lwi )
(2, 3, 0)
/
(3, 7, 0)
/
(3, 3, 0)
/
(5, 1, 0)
/
(4.75, 4, s11 )
(5, 9, s10 )
(2, 3, 0)
/
(5, 10, 0)
/
(7, 15, s7 )
(3, 5, 0)
/
(2, 2, 0)
/
(7, 10, s8 )
(7, 9, s9 )
(6, 11, s6 )

′

′

(vi2 , qi2 , lwi )
(2, 3, 0)
/
(3, 10, s14 )
(3, 10, s13 )
(5, 1, 0)
/
(4.75, 4, s11 )
(5, 9, s10 )
(2, 3, 0)
/
(5, 10, 0)
/
(7, 15, s7 )
(3, 5, 0)
/
(2, 2, 0)
/
(7, 10, s8 )
(7, 9, s9 )
(6, 11, s6 )

Next section discusses the existence of two properties, namely, individual rational (IR),
incentive compatible (IC) in the novel DBPA mechanism.

5.4

Properties of DBPA

This section proves that DBPA mechanism is individual rational (IR), incentive compatible
(IC) and also that the buyer’s procurement cost in DBPA mechanism is at least as good
as its payment made in traditional VCG mechanism. The following proofs are motivated
by the proofs discussed in [160] for the diffusion mechanism. Firstly, show that all the
participating vendors in the proposed mechanism will not have negative utilities if they
report their valuation truthfully.
Theorem 4. The dual-bid procurement auction mechanism (DBPA) is individually rational.
Proof. After the executing the DBPA mechanism on an economic network, only the set
of critical vendors may have non-zero utilities. In this context, there are three different
categories of critical vendors, namely, non-winning critical vendors, winning vendor, and
local winner of winning vendor. From this proof, utility ui ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ C ⊆ V as follows.
• Firstly, for critical vendors i ∈ C−w , wherein w is the winner. Then vendor i’s expected payment is zero, based on Equation 5.7 and payment received is γi (Equation
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(θ ′ )

v∗−{(i+1),w∗ } −v∗−i

−i
5.9. In this context, its utility is computed as ui
=
× q′i . Since,
|C−1|
v∗−i would be lowest valuation if vendor i does not participate in the auction, and
v∗−{(i+1),w∗ } would be at most as low as v∗−i . Therefore ui (θ ) = γi × q′i ≥ 0, for
−i
|C − 1| ̸= 0.

• Secondly, for winning vendor w ∈ C, since it is the winner, its expected payment for
the reported available resources exp revw = vw × (q′w − q′lww ), if lww = null, then
q′lww = 0. In this context, its utility is computed as uw (a) = payw − πw × exp revw =
bdw × (q′w − q′lww ) − vw × (q′w + q′lww ). Now from Equation 5.8, bdw ≥ vw , therefore
uw = bdw × (q′w − q′lww ) − vw × (q′w + q′lww ) ≥ 0
• Finally, for local winner of winning vendor i = lww , where w ∈ C is the winner, utility is computed as uw = v′lww ∗ (q′lww ). Since, from Equation 5.5 v′lww ≥ 0, therefore
uw ≥ 0
Towards this end, based on allocation policy in Equation 5.7, payment for all the other
vendors is zero. Therefore, in the DBPA mechanism utility of all the vendor is nonnegative, thus DPPA mechanism is individually rational.

The next Theorem 5 prove that in DBPA mechanism all the vendors are incentivised to
report their type truthfully to buyer b as well as report their local bid truthfully to their
respective parent vendor, whereas the reported quantity is kept fixed.
Theorem 5. The dual-bid procurement auction mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. According to the definition of incentive compatibility, this proof would prove that,
for all the vendors in the economic network, reporting their truthful valuations for the
reported resources and diffusing the procurement information to all their neighbours is the
dominant strategy. In this context, the vendors on the economic network can be classified
into four different categories in DBPA as follow:
1. the non-winner critical vendors, i.e., i ∈ C \ w
2. the winner w ∈ C, who serves the item.
3. local winner lww and its respective winner if any, for the winner w.
4. all the other vendors who are not in category (1), (2) and (3).
• For any critical vendors i in category (1):
- Firstly, considering for the setting wherein reported neighbour set R′i and its reported quantity q′i are fixed, whereas, v′i ̸= vi . In this case, the utility of the vendor i
is defined by ui (θ ) =

v∗−{i+1,w∗ } −v∗−i
−i

|C−1|

×q′i , which is not related to its reported valuation
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v′i . In this context, i could either be a local winner for vendor pi or could be within
the feasible global neighbours, i.e., i ∈ N ∗ . In this regard, if i is a local winner and
not within the feasible global neighbours, then changing its valuation v′i would not
make any difference and allocation would be same. Thus, no matter what the valuation is, its utility remains the same. Further, if vendor i is within the global feasible
vendor, and if it reports lower valuation to become the winner i.e., v′i > vi . Then, by
doing this, its utility decreases, s.t u′i (θ ) = ((v∗−i + γi )) × q′i − vi × q′i < γi × q′i Since,
from Equation 5.7, for i ∈ C \ w, vi > v∗−i , but the reward γi remains the same for
both the cases.
-Secondly, considering for the setting wherein the reported valuation v′i and the reported quantity q′i are fixed, whereas R′i ̸= Ri , then there are following two cases:

– Case 1 : If the vendor i ∈ C is still the feasible global neighbours and req pi > qi
or reqb > qi . Then the vendor i is bound to consume the resources of its
neighbours, in order to participate in the procurement. Therefore, the vendor
would naturally diffuse the information to maximum possible neighbours, so
as to locally procure the resources at a minimum possible valuation based on
VCG mechanism.
– Case 2: If vendor i ∈ C is still the feasible global neighbours and req pi ≤ qi
(i.e., vendor has enough resources). In this case, its utility ui = γi × q′i =
v∗−{i+1,w∗ } −v∗−i

× q′i . Thus, if R′i ̸= Ri , then evidently R′i ⊆ Ri , so i would loose
some neighbours. Then, one can say that N−(i+1)′ ⊆ N−(i+1) where (i + 1)′
is the (i + 1)th vendor in the new critical vendors set C′ of the lowest bidding vendor. Thus, the utility of vendor i may decrease since v∗−{(i+1)′ ,w∗ } ≥
−i
v∗−((i+1)∪w∗ ) .
−i

|C−1|

−i

Thus for any on-path vendor i, diffusing the information to all its neighbours maximises its utility.
• For the winning vendor i = w in Group (2):
- Firstly, consider for the setting wherein reported neighbour set R′i and reported
quantity q′i are fixed, the utility of vendor i is defined by ui (θ ) = (v∗−i + γi ) × q′i −
(vi × q′i ), which is not related to its reported valuation v′w . In this regard, if the allocation is not changed, then the reported value v′i of the vendor w would not change
its utility. Further, if it reports higher to become critical vendor for its neighbours
and not the winner, its utility will be u′w = γw × q′w < uw , since v∗−w ̸= 0.
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-Then, consider for the setting wherein reported valuation v′i and reported quantity
q′i are fixed, whereas R′i ̸= Ri :

– If it is the winner and req pi > qi or req p > qi , again the vendor is naturally
bound to invite neighbours to share their resources at minimum possible valuation. Therefore, vendor would naturally diffuse the information to its neighbours as local winner elicitation is based on VCG mechanism.
– If it is the winner and req pi ≤ qi , still the winner and its utility does not change
(v∗−i +

v∗−{w,w∗ ) −(v∗−i )

−i
as its utility ui (θ ) =
) × q′i − vi × q′i does not depends on
|C−1|
its neighbours. Therefore, allocation would not change, no matter what neighbourhood it reports, its utility remains the same.

Thus for the winning vendor w, the utility is not affected by the neighbours it reports.
• For local winner i = lww of the winner w ∈ C in Group (3):
- For the setting wherein reported neighbour set R′i and reported quantity q′i are
fixed, then the utility of the vendor i, where w ∈ C is the winner. In this context,
the utility is defined by ui (a) = v′i × q′i − vi × q′i , which is not related to its reported
valuation v′i since i ∈
/ Pbw . Therefore, if the allocation is unchanged, no matter what
it reports, its utility remains the same.
- If the reported valuation v′i and reported quantity q′i are fixed and R′i ̸= Ri . The
utility of vendor i is not related to its neighbours. Since, removing some neighbours
cannot change the allocation and cannot decrease the number of vendors sharing the
reward, misreporting neighbours will not increase the utility.
• For any other vendor i in Group (4):
- For the setting wherein reported neighbour set R′i and reported quantity q′i are
fixed, then the utility of vendor i is zero based on Equation 5.7. If i is within
the feasible global neighbours, then the only way it can increase the utility is by
reporting lesser valuation to become the winner. However, if it reports v′i < v∗N < vi ,
then its revenue will equal to the actual winner, which is lower than its truthful
valuation. If i is not within the feasible global neighbours, then no matter what
valuation it reports, the allocation will not be changed.
- If the reported valuation v′i and reported quantity q′i are fixed and R′i ̸= Ri , removing
some neighbours will not change the allocation.
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Theorem 6. The buyer’s payment under dual-bid procurement mechanism is always at
least as good as costing under VCG mechanism.
Proof. Given a feasible type profile a ∈ F(θ ), the buyer’s payment in DBPA mechanism
payDBPA is the sum of all the payment received by each vendor in critical path C as shown
in Equation 5.13. To simplify the notation let Vi = v′i × q′i and Γi = γi × q′i . Also, let
′
∗ = v∗
VN∗∗ \i = V−i
N ∗ \i × qi and |C| = n. In this regard, payment paid by buyer b in DBPA
mechanism is computed as follows:

payDBPA =

payi
i∈C
∗
l
= V−w
+Vlw
w + Γw +

∑

∑

Γi

i∈−{w}
∗
l
= V−w
+Vlw
w + Γw +

∑

Γi

i∈−{w}
∗
l
= V−w
+Vlw
w+

∗
V−{w+1,w
∗

−w })

∗
−V−w

|C − 1|

+

1
∗
∗
V−{i+1,w
∗ } −V−i
∑
−i
|C − 1| i∈−{w}

∗
l
= V−w
+Vlw
w+

1
∗
∗
∗
∗
(V−{w+1,w
V−{i+1,w
∗ } −V−i )
∗ }) −V−w +
∑
−w
−i
|C − 1|
i∈−{lww ,w}

∗
l
= V−w
+Vlw
w+

1
∗
(V ∗ −V−1
)
|C − 1| −n
(5.13)

On the other hand, the payment in DBPA mechanism with classical VCG mechanism is
compared. In this regard, for social welfare SW , payment is computed as follows:

′

l
′
′
payVCG = Vlw
w + ∑ (SWN ∗ (aN ∗ ) − (SWN ∗ (a ) −Vi ))
−i
−i

i∈C

l
= Vlw
w+

∑

∗
∗
(V−i
−VN∗∗ ) + (V−w
− 0)

i∈C\w
∗
l
= V−w
+Vlw
w+

∑

(5.14)

∗
(V−i
−VN∗∗ )

i∈C\w
∗ −
Now , since VN∗∗ is the least valuation in the whole economic network, therefore V−i
∗ −V ∗ ) ≥ 1 in Equation 5.14. On the other hand,
VN∗∗ ≥ 0. Owing to this, ∑i∈C\w (V−i
N∗
1
∗ − V ∗ ) < 1. Then,
it is trivial to show that the component in Equation 5.13, |C−1|
(V−n
−1
1
∗
∗
∗
∗
DBPA <
|C−1| (V−n −V−1 ) < ∑i∈C\w (V−i −VN ∗ ). Therefore, from Equation 5.13 and 5.14, pay
payVCG . In this regard, this proved that buyer’s payment in classical VCG mechanism is
more as compared to its payment in DBPA mechanism

In this regard, proved that DBPA mechanism exhibits IC, IR and also the buyer’s pay-
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ment is less as compared to VCG mechanism.

5.5

Summary

This chapter presents a novel information diffusion-based mechanism DBPA for procurement auctions through open economic networks. The objective of this mechanism is
to procure multiple units of homogeneous resources from this open economic network
at the minimum possible price. In this regard, DBPA mechanism determines a winning
path from the buyer to a set of winning vendors. Then, all the winning vendors receive
an optimal payment based on the truthful payment rule. Besides, all the vendors in the
winning path get rewards for diffusing the information. Also, this chapter showed that
these rewards do not overburden the buyer with additional procurement costs and total
procurement cost payment in DBPA is at least as good as payment in VCG mechanism.
In addition, this chapter confirmed that the DBPA mechanism guarantees truthfulness by
incentivising all the vendors to disclose their true values. Also, the novel diffusion mechanism encourages them to diffuse the procurement information to their neighbours.

Chapter 6
Diffusion Mechanism Driven
Heterogeneous Resource Allocation
This chapter extends the DMMP mechanism to procure multiple units of heterogeneous
resources in open economic networks. In this regard, the objective is to design a mechanism that minimises the procurement costs for the buyer. In a general market setting,
buyers submit their resource requests to a limited number of vendors. This constraint over
the limited availability of vendors leads to higher prices or scarcity of resources. In this
regard, this chapter presents yet another diffusion-based mechanism for the procurement
of multiple units of heterogeneous resources. It helps the buyer to procure the required
amount of resources at the minimum possible price. Similar to the previous mechanism,
this novel mechanism proved to be incentive compatible and individual rational. Towards
this end, based on the simulation results, it is proven that DMMP mechanism has the least
procurement cost in comparison with VCG mechanism.

6.1

Introduction

Procurement of multiple units of heterogeneous resources is a complicated problem as
compared to the multi-units of homogeneous resources. Specifically, multi-unit multitype (MUMI) resource markets implement a combinatorial auction paradigm to request
a bundle of resources. Thus it is difficult to design allocation policy considering all the
constraints related to availability of each and every type of resource. Also, formulating
an optimal composite price for the requested bundle of different resources is challenging.
In general, designing a mechanism has two main challenges. The first is modelling an
optimal allocation and pricing policy, and the other is maintaining market stability. To
begin with, to address these challenges, several auction-based mechanisms [153, 146] are
largely adopted in such multi-party market settings. The primary focus is to maximise
the profit of the auction owner. In this case buyer is the owner of the auction. In this
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regard, conventional auction based mechanism attempts to address the first challenge.
However, since there is limited knowledge of the participants in the market, it creates a
monolithic market, leading to shortage of resources and instability in the market because
a trade-off between resource requests and resource availability is crucial to maintain the
market stability [132]. Therefore, the conventional mechanisms fail to address the second
challenge efficiently.
Therefore, similar to Chapter 3, this chapter introduces another diffusion aided combinatorial reserve auction-based mechanism. In this context, several diffusion-based mechanisms [161, 66] have been proposed in the literature. However, the existing mechanism
was designed either for single units of resources [63] or multi-units single-unit demand
resource allocation [50, 91]. Although such mechanisms have the potential to address
both the challenges, they cannot be used directly in their current form. For instance,
existing mechanisms are vendor-centric, but procurement auctions are buyer-centric. Besides, existing mechanisms are suitable for single-unit resources or unit-demand auctions,
with no budget constraints. Briefly, to the best of the understanding, no known diffusionbased mechanisms exist for procurement of MUMI resource setting. In this regard, this
research focuses on designing a diffusion-based collaborative mechanism for such market
setting. Also it ensures that the mechanism is incentive compatible, individually rational
and has optimal payment policy. In this regard, this mechanism attempts to keep a check
on uncontrolled competition by encouraging cooperative behaviour because uncontrolled
competition also leads to instability in the market and a drop in participation. Finally,
there are various real-world applications where such mechanisms could be helpful, such
as procurement of vehicles [106], crops, milk [137, 98], etc.
To summarise, the contributions of this research are as follows:
• A novel diffusion mechanism for MUMI resource allocation in open economic networks.
• A practical information diffusion strategy to protect the privacy of the participating
vendors.
• A novel contest function based strategy for decentralised iterative auction-based
group determination strategy.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: the market modelling and different key
definitions related proposed mechanism is discussed in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents
the proposed (DMMP) mechanism. In Section 6.4, properties of the novel DMMP is presented. Section 6.5 discusses the experimental results. Finally, the chapter is summarised
in Section 6.6.
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Figure 6.1: Local Economic Networks
with Multi-Item
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Figure 6.2: Global Economic Networks with Three Local Networks

The Model

This chapter considers an open economic network with a single buyer b having multiunit resource requests. The requested resource is called as a package denoted as Qb =
{qb,1 , qb,2 , . . . , qb,k }, for k types of resource in set K. This procurement request is submitted through diffusion to set N of n independent vendors denoted as N = {s1 , . . . , sn }.
In this regard, the open economic network is represented as directed acyclic graph G ≡
(V, E), where V = N ∪ {b} = {s1 , . . . , sn } ∪ b representing the set of all the nodes, and
buyer b as root node, whereas E represents the set of edges between these nodes representing the neighbourhood relationship. Such that, for a pair of node i, j ∈ V (i ̸= j),
ei j = 1, else ei j = 0, ei j ∈ E. Further, for all the nodes i ∈ V , its set of immediate children is termed as neighbours and denoted as Ri ⊆ V , s.t., for j ∈ Ri there exists an edge
ei j ∈ E between node i and j. Also, a set of direct successor for node i ∈ G is termed as
neighbours denoted as Ri , whereas direct predecessor is termed as parent node denoted
as Pi . In this regard, if there is a path between two nodes i, j ∈ V (i ̸= j), the distance
between i, j is denoted as dist(i, j), and if no path exists, then dist(i, j) = ∞. Set of all the
all
predecessors is represented as Ngall
i , s.t. Ngi = { j ∈ V : 0 < dist(i, j) < ∞}. Similarly,
set of all the predecessors Piall = { j ∈ V : 0 < dist( j, i) < ∞}. Also let di > 0, represent
the depth for node ∀i ∈ N, representing the shortest path from buyer b to vendor i. In our
setting, initially, buyer b has no prior information about all the vendors in the market.
Figure 6.1 depicts an economic network. In this regard, upon receiving a resource
request from the buyer b, b’s immediate neighbours along with their local economic networks are combined to form an economic network as depicted in Figure 6.2.
In such a market setting, it would be ideal for the buyer to be reachable to the maximum possible vendors to get the resources at the minimum possible price. However,
initially, buyer b can only submit its procurement request to its neighbour nodes j ∈ Rb .
Also, submitting its procurement request to distant potential vendors through a broker
would incur extra costs on the buyer’s budget. Therefore, to avoid this extra cost, this
chapter introduces a diffusion-based mechanism. It encourages each vendor to invite
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their respective neighbours to participate in the procurement. In specific, firstly, buyer
b submit its procurement request to a set of neighbours in Rb . Then, all the vendors
j ∈ Rb would diffuse the information to their respective neighbour set R j . The sub-graph
formed with root node j is termed as local economic network of the node j ∈ V denoted
as G j ≡ (V j , E j ) ≡ (R j , E j ). In this regard, independent local economic networks are connected to form a complete economic network denoted as G = G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gk . This whole
economic network G resembles a rooted tree, wherein the buyer b is the root node and a
set N of potential vendors as leaf nodes.
In this regard, note that the resource package request Qb from buyer b denotes the
minimum resource demand such that buyer b aims to procure at least Qb package of
resources from a single or group of vendors in an economic network. So, the objective
of the buyer is to procure at-least Qb at minimum possible price from least number of
vendors because the increase in number of vendors, leads to an increase in transaction
overhead, also referred as chaining cost in communication domain [51]. In this context,
each vendor i ∈ N has two private values, i.e., per-unit valuation of the resource (biddensity) vi ≥ 0 and the maximum quantity of resource the vendor is available for selling
denoted as a i = {ai,1 , ai,2 , . . . , ai,k }. Also, ∀ j ∈ N, let set of all the vendors except vendor
j denoted as N− j , s.t., N− j ≡ N \ j. For example, in Figure 6.2, for the vendor s1 , Rs1 ≡
{s4 , s5 }, and Ngall
s1 = {s4 , s5 , s8 , s9 , s11 , s13 , s14 }.
Furthermore, this mechanism is implemented in a combinatorial auction [108] paradigm.
In this regard, vendors submit their bids for the bundle or resources in a combined valuation. In addition to that, to avoid resource wastage, each vendor aims to sell its maximum
possible resources. Therefore, vendors give discounted prices over bulk procurement.
In this regard, the novel mechanism considers two types of vendor’s valuations, namely
valuation for bulk purchases and single item purchases. So, ∀i ∈ N, its truthful type is represented as θi = (bvi , svi , a i , Ri ) and θi = (svi , svi , a i , Ri ), where bvi , svi , a i and Ri are the
per unit valuation for bulk purchase (i.e, all the offered resources), the per unit valuation
for single item purchase, offered quantity of resource and set of neighbours, respectively.
Further, the type profile of all the vendors is denoted as θ = (θ1 , . . . , θn ). Let θ −i be the
type profile for vendors except i, s.t θ = (θθ −i , θi ). Also, let Θi be the type space for vendor
i, s.t., Θ = (Θi , . . . , Θn ) = (Θ−i , Θ) be the the type profile space for all vendors. Also, we
consider a strategic setting, wherein vendors might not report their true type to maximise
their utility, this reported type of the vendor i ∈ N is denoted as θi′ ≡ (bv′i , sv′i , a ′i , R′i ) and
θi′ ≡ (sv′i , sv′i , a′i , R′i ) , where bv′i , sv′i , a′i and R′i are the reported per unit valuation for bulk
purchase, the per unit valuation for single item purchase, offered quantity of resource and
set of neighbours, respectively. Also, let 0/ be the default reported type, when i ∈ N had
not received the information I pi ≡ (Qi , b) from its parent vendor or vendor i ∈ N do not
want to participate in the procurement, where Qi denotes the minimum resource package
requested by vendor i, whereas b resembles the procurement information from buyer b.
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In this context, it is assumed that, if a vendor i ∈ N is not invited, then the mechanism will
not observe any action from that vendor, called feasible type profile denoted as F(θθ ′ ),
s.t. F(θθ ′ ) ⊆ θ ′ . Further, the diffusion mechanism for feasible type profile is defined as
follows:
Definition 6.2.1. A diffusion mechanism M in the economic network is denoted by an
allocation policy π = (π1 , π2 , . . . , πn ) and a payment policy pay ≡ (pay1 , pay2 , . . . , payn ),
where πi : θ → {0, 1}, π : θ → R and payi denotes the payment received by the vendor
i ∈ N from buyer b.
′ ) ∈ F(θ ′ ), the payment policy p a y (θ
θ ′) ≡
Given the type profile θ ′ = (θ1′ , . . . , θ(n)
(pay1 (θθ ′ ), . . . , pay(n) (θθ ′ )) represents the amount of money each vendor would be given
at the end of the resource procurement. For vendor i ∈ N, if payi (θθ ′ ) ≥ 0, then it receives
payi (θθ ′ ) from the buyer and if payi (θθ ′ ) ≤ 0, then it will pay to the buyer. In this regard,
the allocation policy π(θθ ′ ) = (π1 (θθ ′ ), . . . , πn (θθ ′ )) represents the resource allocation. We
have, πi = 1 if vendor i is among the winning vendor, else πi = 0.
In this context, for the diffusion mechanism M = (π, p a y ), it assumes that there is
no cost for a vendor to spread the procurement information to its neighbours. Thus, for
vendor i ∈ N of type profile θi′ , given a feasible type profile θ ′ ∈ F(θ ) of all vendors, then
the utility of vendor i’s is defined as the payment received minus the expected payment
based on its true valuation. In this context, a diffusion mechanism is individually rational
if the utility of every vendor involved is non-negative as long as it performs its actions
truthfully and does not depend on the number of neighbours it invites or the number of
resources it is willing to sell (Theorem 7). Therefore, the mechanism does not force the
vendor to invite others and sell all its resources to guarantee a non-negative gain. Then if
all the vendors are willing to report their valuations truthfully for the reported quantities
of resource, it satisfies incentive compatibility. However, in this mechanism, vendors also
need to invite their neighbours. Thus, incentives should be given to report its truthful
bids and also to invite all its neighbours, as defined in Theorem 8. The following section
introduces a novel diffusion mechanism for multi-unit heterogeneous resource allocation.

6.3

Diffusion based Multi-Unit Multi-Item Procurement

This section introduces a novel decentralised procurement mechanism for MUMI markets.
The proposed mechanism Diffusion-based Multi-Unit Multi-Item Procurement (DMMP)
implements the information diffusion technique. In specific, DMMP mechanism adopts
a reverse-auction paradigm [55], wherein buyers submit MUMI of resource requests to
their neighbours sequentially. In this context, a set of a vendor i ∈ N and their respective
neighbours Ri is called local economic network.
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Firstly, buyer b submits its minimum package of resource request Qb to all the vendors
in set Rb . Then, vendor ∀ j ∈ Rb are encouraged through incentives to diffuse this information within their respective local economic network. Finally, package Qb gets allocated to
a single or group of vendors, and its corresponding payment gets computed. Besides, all
the intermediate vendors between the buyer and the winner get incentives for information
diffusion. In specific, in this novel DMMP mechanism, two independent procurement are
carried out, namely local procurement and global procurement. The local procurement
takes place within the local economic networks, whereas global procurement takes place
between vendors and the buyer. In this regard, once the vendor agrees to become part of
the global network by reporting its type θ ′ , then the DMMP mechanism computes diffusion information for that vendor. In addition, the mechanism computes bids for local
and global procurement sequentially on behalf of the vendors. In this context, the set
of neighbours remains the same throughout local and global procurement. Also, in this
market setting, any vendor can participate in the global procurement , only if participates
in local procurement.
Briefly, the whole mechanism virtually a has three steps, as follows: (1) information
propagation, (2) group determination, and (3) winner determination, discussed in the following subsections.

6.3.1

Information Propagation

This subsection introduces the information diffusion stage in the DMMP mechanism.
At this stage, upon receiving Qb ≡ {qb,1 , qb,2 , . . . , qb,k } from b, all the vendors i ∈ Rb
diffuse the information message Ii = (rr e q i , b) to their neighbours Ri , wherein, r e q i =
{reqi,1 , reqi,2 , . . . , reqi,k } is minimum local package request for Ri . It is the minimum
quantity required by its neighbours to participate in the local procurement, computed using Equation 6.1 ∀k ∈ K.

reqi,k =




q ,

 i,k

if i = b.

req pi ,k − a′i,k , if req pi ,k > a′i,k .



0,
if q pi ≤ q′i .

(6.1)

In this way, the mechanism would model the diffusion information Ii for all the vendors
sequentially based on their reported type θi′ ∀i ∈ N. Note that, from Equation 6.1, diffusion information reveals only the difference of the resource request for each of the vendors. This difference mechanism preserves the privacy of the vendors. Also, it promotes
the participation of the vendors and maintains the competition in the overall procurement
process. Also, it is unrealistic to assume that a vendor would reveal its complete resource
requirements because any greedy vendor would be interested in selling its resources first
a stages

are interdependent and run simultaneously
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and then inviting other vendors. Therefore, this difference mechanism portrays the rational behaviour of the vendors. Further, to avoid information diffusion for infinitely larger
economic networks, the diffusion phase will continue until enough resources are available
in the market.
So information propagation would continue until maximum resource amax or maximum
time-step Tmax time is reached. The value is a max is computed as a max = Qb × δ , where, δ
represents the maximum resource factor. This value is decided such that, there should be
enough resources available in the global economic network to maintain the competition.
Also, too much availability of the resource would lead to wastage of resources as well as
bidder drop problem [11]. Therefore δ should be chosen such that it maintains the tradeoff between supply and demand in the global economic market. For example, when k = 3,
then for Qb ≡ (q1,b , q2,b , q3,b ) ≡ (5, 7, 8), then for δ = 2 a max ≡ Qb × δ ≡ (5, 7, 8) × 2 ≡
(10, 14, 16). In addition to that, to restrict the infinite information diffusion, a maximum
time-step Tmax is set, to stop the algorithm if a max is never reached. This maximum time
step is fixed at the beginning of the mechanism. So once the algorithm has a max or Tmax
is reached, the mechanism moves to the next stage, i.e, group determination discussed in
the next subsection.
Algorithm 8 gives the full pseudocode for the information propagation stage. It takes
buyer b’s information i.e., location and request Qb along with whole network information
G ≡ (V, E), δ and Tmax as input. Also, it maintains a temporary (arbitrary) neighbour list,
which is a queue used for traversing the neighbour list. After that, the algorithm en-ques
the neighbours of the buyer list. Then the algorithm runs until maximum Tmax or a max
volume of resources available, and deques the top element from the arbitrary neighbour
list and diffuses the information to its neighbours. Finally, it sequentially en-queues all
its neighbours to the neighbour list and arbitrary list and updates the value of the level of
each vendor and computes maximum depth dmax . The following subsection presents the
second stage of the DMMP mechanism, i.e., Group Formation.

6.3.2

Group Determination

This subsection introduces the group determination stage of the DMMP mechanism. After receiving the information messages Ii from node pi , the mechanism starts to fill the
requested package r e qi . In this regard, this mechanism adopts an iterative auction mechanism to sequentially collect resources from all the local networks in the bottom to top
fashion to form groups.
+
In specific, all the vendor at depth d submit their bids bidi1 ≡ (bv+
i , svi , Qi ) to their
+
parent node p j , where bv+
i , svi updated valuations, Qi combined available resources,
and j ∈ N|d j = d. Then, after receiving reported type bidi1 , ∀ j ∈ Ri , set of local winners
Li is elected by performing iterative auction. In this regard, the winning vendor in each
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Algorithm 8: Information Propagation
Input: G ≡ (V, E), Qb , δ , Tmax
Result: dmax
1 a max ← Qb × δ ;
2 sd ← b /* seed node */ ;
3 a total , hmax ← 0 ;
4 reqsd,k ← qb,k ; ∀k ∈ K ;
5 r e q sd ≡ {reqsd,k : ∀k ∈ K} ;
r e qsd ; 0)
6 Isd ≡ (r
/ ;
7 neighbour list[b][][∅]; ;
8 neighbour list arbitrary[b][] ← Rb ;
9 while t = Tmax or atotal ≥ a max do
10
for neighbour list arbitrary[sd] ̸= ∅ do
11
node ← DEQUEUE(neighbour list arbitrary[sd])
diffuse

12

node ⇐=== Isd ≡ (Qsd ; b) ;

13

15

vendor list ← node;
vendor list arbitrary ← node ;
end

16

/* changing the seed node */ ;

14

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

sd ← DEQUEUE(vendor list arbitrary) compute r e q sd using Equation 6.1
*/ ;
atotal + = Qsd ;
if Rsd ̸= 0/ then
if sd ∈
/ neighbour list then
dmax + = 1
end
neighbour list[sd]; ;
neighbour list arbitrary[sd] ← Rsd ;
t ++ ;
end
end

iteration is decided based on the customised contest success function (CSF) [123], using
Equation 6.2.
cs fi =

(qi,k )σ ∗ v′i
∑ N
σ ′
k∈K ∑ j̸=i (q j,k ) xv j

(6.2)

where, 0 < σ ≤ 1 represents the noise parameter in the contest, interpreted as the
marginal increase in probability with the increase in valuation [119]. Intuitively, CSF
estimates each vendors probability of winning the local auction in terms of other vendors’
bidding package. In specific, based on CSF, a local winner lw in each iteration is determined for every node i ∈ N, such that lw ∈ Ri is elected as lw ≡ min(cs f j ), ∀ j ∈ Ri . Then
vendor i would update its total available resources Qi using Equation 6.3 ∀k ∈ K
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(6.3)

l∈Li

In this regard, small groups are formed in each local network. Now, all the vendors
can submit their bids directly to buyer b. Also, since any greedy vendor would prefer to
sell its resource before selling resources from its neighbours the vendor would consume
the resources from its neighbours only when its available resource is insufficient such
that, if a′i,r < req pi ,r , then the mechanism would aid the vendor i to collaborate with its
neighbour(s) and then submit the bid for the combined resource in the local procurement
denoted as bidi1 . Similarly, if a′i,k < qb,k , then the mechanism would reveal the combined
resources, in its submitted bid bidi2 .
The mechanism conducts an iterative auction-based matching for all the seed nodes
belonging to the same depth d sequentially. In each round of auction for seed node i ∈ N,
the mechanism elicits a single winner. The iteration continues until minimum package
Qi is filled or maximum waiting time wd has been reached, where d denotes the depth
of the seed node. In addition, in each iteration XOR bids [62] are submitted, i.e. each
local vendor can win only once. This will reduce the complexity of the iterative auction
by reducing the number of combinations in each iteration. Further, at the end of each
iteration for local auction for seed node i ∈ N, the mechanism computes the per unit
valuation for each of the winning vendors in Li using Equation 6.4 at which each of the
local winner j ∈ Li would get its payment if vendor i is the winner in the procurement.



min(v′ j )∀ j ∈ R′i \ l, if Ri ̸= {null}.


vl = max(v′i , v′j ),
if |Ri | = 1.



0,
otherwise.

(6.4)

where, v′j = bv′j , if all the resources in the offered package Q j is allocated, else v′j = sv′j .
Intuitively the above equation depicts that, if there are more than one neighbours, i.e.,
|Ri | > 1, then the valuation of the local winner is computed based on the VCG mechanism
[55]. However, if there is only one local neighbour, i.e., |Rk | = 1, then the valuation is the
maximum valuation among vendor i and j ∈ Ri ; otherwise its set to be zero. Similarly, the
valuation for the seed vendor is updated based on the valuation of the local winner using
Equation 6.5.

v′ ,
if Ri = {null}.
i
vi = v′ ×(q′ −∑∀l∈L q′ )+vl∈L ×∑∀l∈L q′
i l,k
i l,k
 i i,k
, otherwise.
qi,k

(6.5)

Then, after end of the iterative auction at depth d, mechanism moves upward at depth
d − 1. In specific, at depth d, ∀i ∈ N, where di = d, vendor i submits their bids to parent
pi ∈ N. In this way, local groups are formed within the local economic networks in a
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decentralised manner. In this regard, maximum time-step wd for which iterative auction
will continue at depth h is computed as wd = ((dmax −h)+1)∗(Tmax /h), where dmax is the
height of the economic network. Finally, after completion of auctions in local networks, a
new global economic network with updated valuation and available resources is formed,
represented as G′ ⊆ G.
The following subsection presents the third and the final stage of the DMMP mechanism, i.e., winner determination and payment distribution.

6.3.3

Winner Determination

This subsection presents winner determination stage, wherein, payment of the winning
vendor(s) is computed. In addition to that, rewards for all the vendors who have contributed by information diffusion are computed. Specifically, the mechanism determines
a single winner w which can fill all the requested resources in the package Qb , s.t. w ≡
min(cs f i ), ∀i ∈ G′ , whereas cs fi is computed using Equation 6.2. Also, all the vendors in the path pathbw from buyer b to the winning vendor w, get rewards for diffusing the information. This path pathbw is called as winning path and represented as
pathbw ≡ {b, . . . , w}. Let, v∗D = mini∈D v′i be the minimum reported valuation in the subset
D ⊆ N and the corresponding vendor is represented as w∗D , and then v′w = v∗∗N whereas
w = w∗N . Similarly, v∗D\i denotes the minimum valuation and w∗D\i when vendor i ∈ D does
not participate. Also to simplify the notations, let v∗N ∗ \i = v∗−i .
Definition 6.3.1. feasible global neighbours (N∗) is a set of all vendors for buyer b having
reqb ≤ q′k , s.t., k ∈ N and N∗ ⊆ N.
Definition 6.3.2. A critical vendor set (C), is a set of all the vendors in winning path
pathbw including the local winner of the winning vendor, i.e., C ≡ {c1 , . . . , cw , Lcw }, where
i ∈ pathbw , w = w∗N . This critical vendor C set is an ordered set, s.t., dc1 ⊃ dc2 ⊃, . . . , ⊃
dcw ⊃ dLcw , where dci denotes the depth of the node ci from buyer b.
In this regard, the allocation policy for diffusing mechanism DMMP is computed using
Equation 6.6.

1 if i ∈ C, v′ = v∗
i
−(i+1) .
πi (θ ) =
0, if i ∈
/ C.

(6.6)

Intuitively, in DMMP mechanism, the first critical vendor who has the least per unit
valuation when critical vendor i + 1 is removed from the economic network is the winner.
Then the bid density bdi ∀i ∈ C which is computed using Equation 6.7., represents the
value at which payment for a vendor will be calculated
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bd i =




v∗−i + εi




ε ,

if i = w.
if i ∈ C−w .

i



v′Li ,




0,

(6.7)

if i = Lw .
Otherwise.

where, εi represents the reward factor for vendor i ∈ C for diffusing the information to
its neighbours, which is computed using Equation 6.8
εi =

v∗−(αi+1 ,w∗ ) − v∗−αi
αi

|C − 1|

(6.8)

where, αi = 1, if i ∈ C and i ∈ N ∗ , else αi = 1 if i ∈ C and i ∈
/ N ∗ and Pi ∈ N ∗ , representing the closest ancestor node in N ∗ if i ∈
/ N∗
According to above bid density calculation policy, winning vendor’s bid density is sum
of VCG payment v∗−w , i.e., winner is paid the second lowest per unit valuation. In addition, winning vendor is rewarded γw for diffusing the information to its neighbour. On
the other hand, all the other critical vendors are rewarded γi for information diffusion.
Intuitively, reward is the decrease in payment for buyer b for vendor i ∈ C diffusion action. In particular, it is change in payment for buyer b when vendor i + 1 along with the
vendor w∗−i (when vendor i do not participate) does not participate and when vendor i ∈ C
does not participate in the procurement. Finally, bid density of local winner is same as
computed during its local procurement based on VCG mechanism.
To the end, based on the valuation computed using Equation 6.7 and 6.8, payment payi
is computed for all the critical vendors in set C.

bd × (q′ − q′ ), if L ̸= null and i ∈ C.
i
i
i
Li
payi =
bd × q′ ,
otherwise.
i
i

(6.9)

Further, the total payment given by the buyer b to all the vendors in winning path pathbw
is computed as pay = ∑i∈C payi . In this way, winners and their respective payment are
computed. Also rewards for all the vendors in winning path is computed for information
diffusion.
Table 6.1 summarises all the symbols used in this mechanism.

6.4

Properties of DMMP

This section prove that hat DMMP mechanism is individual rational (IR) (Theorem 7) and
also incentive compatible (IC) (Theorem 8).
Theorem 7. The DMMP is individually rational.
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Table 6.1: List of Symbols in DMMP Mechanism

# Symbol
b
K ≡ {1, . . . , k}
Qb {qb,1 , . . . , qb,k }
G ≡ (V, E)
ei, j
Ri
all
Ngi ; Piall
a i = {ai,1 , ai,2 , . . . , ai,k }
θi ; θi′
(svi , svi , a i , Ri )
(bvi , svi , a i , Ri )
θ = (θ1 , . . . , θn )
M ≡ (π, p a y )
Ii = (rr e q i , b)
r e qi = {reqi,1 , reqi,2 , . . . , reqi,k }
a max ; Tmax ; δ
cs fi
σ
Li
w
bd
εi

# Definition
the buyer or procurer
k types of resource
package of resources requested by buyer b
G:open economic network; V: buyer/vendor; E: edges
edge between node i and j
set of neighbours of node i ∈ V
set of all successor and predecessor of node i ∈ V
set of available resources with node i
true and reported type of vendor i
(single item valuation, offered resources, set of neighbour)
(bulk item valuation, offered resources, set of neighbour)
set of all the vendors’ type
M: mechanism (allocation policy, pricing policy)
Ii : Information Message; (local package request, buyer b)
set of local package request
maximum resource availability; maximum time-step; resource factor
contest success function
noise parameter in the contest
set of local winners
winning vendor
bid density
the reward factor

Proof. After executing the DMMP mechanism in an economic network, only the set of
critical vendors C may have non-zero utilities. In this context, there are three different
categories of critical vendors, namely non-winning critical vendors, winning vendors, and
local winners of winning vendors. In this regard, this proof would prove that the utility
ui ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ C as follows:
• Firstly, for critical vendors i ∈ C−w , wherein w is the winning vendor. In this context, vendor i ∈ V ’s expected payment is zero, based on Equation 6.6, so only payment it receives is the reward εi (Equation 6.8. So, its utility would be ui (θ ′ ) =
v∗−{(i+1),w∗ −v∗−i

× q′i . Since, v∗−i would be the lowest valuation, if vendor i does not
participate in the auction, and v∗−{(i+1),w∗ } would be at most as low as v∗−i . There−i
fore ui (θ ) = εi × q′i ≥ 0, for |C − 1| ̸= 0.
−i}

|C−1|

• Secondly, for winning vendor w ∈ C, since it is the winner, its expected payment for
the reported available resources exp revw = vw × (q′w − q′lww ), if lww = null, then
q′lww = 0. In this context, its utility is computed as uw (a) = payw − πw × exp revw =
bdw × (q′w − q′lww ) − vw × (q′w + q′lww ). Now from Equation 6.7, bdw ≥ vw , therefore
uw = bdw × (q′w − q′lww ) − vw × (q′w + q′lww ) ≥ 0
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• Finally, for local winner of winning vendor i = lww , where w ∈ C is the winner, utility is computed as uw = v′lww ∗ (q′lww ). Since, from Equation 6.4 v′lww ≥ 0, therefore
uw ≥ 0
Towards this end, based on allocation policy in Equation 6.6, payment for all the other
vendors is zero. Therefore, in the DMMP mechanism utility of all the vendors is nonnegative. Thus, DMMP mechanism is individually rational.

Theorem 8 proves that in DMMP mechanism all the vendors are incentivised to report their type truthfully to buyer b. They are also incentivised to report their local bid
truthfully to their respective parent vendors, whereas the reported quantity is kept fixed.
Theorem 8. The DMMP mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. According to the definition of incentive compatibility, this proof would prove that,
for all the vendors in the economic network, reporting their truthful valuations for the
reported resources and diffusing the procurement information to all their neighbours is the
dominant strategy. In this context, the vendors on the economic network can be classified
into four different categories in DMMP as follow:
1. the non-winner critical vendors, i.e., i ∈ C \ w
2. the winner w ∈ C, who serves the item.
3. local winner lww and its respective winner if any, for the winner w.
4. all the other vendors who are not in category (1), (2) and (3).
• For any critical vendors i in category (1):
- Firstly, we consider for the setting wherein reported neighbour set R′i and its reported quantity q′i are fixed, whereas, v′i ̸= vi . In this case, the utility of the vendor i
v∗−{i+1,w∗ } −v∗−i

−i
×q′i , which is not related to its reported valuation
is defined by ui (θ ) =
|C−1|
v′i . In this context, i could either be a local winner for vendor pi or could be within
the feasible global neighbours, i.e., i ∈ N ∗ . In this regard, if i is a local winner and
not within the feasible global neighbours, then changing its valuation v′i would not
make any difference and allocation would be same. Thus, no matter what the valuation is, its utility remains the same. Further, if vendor i is within the global feasible
vendor, and if it reports lower valuation to become the winner i.e., v′i > vi . Then, by
doing this, its utility decreases, s.t u′i (θ ) = ((v∗−i + εi )) × q′i − vi × q′i < εi × q′i Since,
from Equation 6.6, for i ∈ C \ w, vi > v∗−i , but the reward εi remains the same for
both the cases.
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-Secondly, we consider for the setting wherein the reported valuation v′i and the reported quantity q′i are fixed, whereas R′i ̸= Ri , then we have following two cases:

– Case 1 : If the vendor i ∈ C is still the feasible global neighbour and req pi > qi
or reqb > qi . Then the vendor i is bound to consume the resources of its
neighbours, in order to participate in the procurement. Therefore, the vendor
would naturally diffuse the information to maximum possible neighbours, so
as to locally procure the resources at a minimum possible valuation based on
VCG mechanism.
– Case 2: If vendor i ∈ C is still the feasible global neighbour and req pi ≤ qi
(i.e., vendor has enough resources). In this case, its utility ui = εi × q′i =
v∗−{i+1,w∗ } −v∗−i

× q′i . Thus, if R′i ̸= Ri , then evidently R′i ⊆ Ri , so i would loose
some neighbours. Then, we can say that N−(i+1)′ ⊆ N−(i+1) where (i + 1)′
is the (i + 1)th vendor in the new critical vendors set C′ of the lowest bidding vendor. Thus, the utility of vendor i may decrease since v∗−{(i+1)′ ,w∗ } ≥
−i
v∗−((i+1)∪w∗ ) .
−i

|C−1|

−i

Thus for any on-path vendor i, diffusing the information to all its neighbours maximises its utility.
• For the winning vendor i = w in Group (2):
- Firstly, we consider for the setting wherein reported neighbour set R′i and reported
quantity q′i are fixed, the utility of vendor i is defined by ui (θ ) = (v∗−i + εi ) × q′i −
(vi × q′i ), which is not related to its reported valuation v′w . In this regard, if the allocation is not changed, then the reported value v′i of the vendor w would not change
its utility. Further, if it reports higher to become critical vendor for its neighbours
and not the winner, its utility will be u′w = εw × q′w < uw , since v∗−w ̸= 0.
-Then, we consider for the setting wherein reported valuation v′i and reported quantity q′i are fixed, whereas R′i ̸= Ri :

– If it is the winner and req pi > qi or req p > qi , again the vendor is naturally
bound to invite neighbours to share their resources at minimum possible valuation. Therefore, vendor would naturally diffuse the information to its neighbours as local winner elicitation is based on VCG mechanism.
– If it is the winner and req pi ≤ qi , still the winner and its utility does not change
as its utility ui (θ ) = (v∗−i +

v∗−{w,w∗ ) −(v∗−i )
−i

|C−1|

) × q′i − vi × q′i does not depends on
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its neighbours. Therefore, allocation would not change, no matter what neighbourhood it reports, its utility remains the same.
Thus for the winning vendor w, the utility is not affected by the neighbours it reports.
• For local winner i = lww of the winner w ∈ C in Group (3):
- For the setting wherein reported neighbour set R′i and reported quantity q′i are
fixed, then the utility of the vendor i, where w ∈ C is the winner. In this context,
the utility is defined by ui (a) = v′i × q′i − vi × q′i , which is not related to its reported
/ Pbw . Therefore, if the allocation is unchanged, no matter
valuation v′i . Since i ∈
what it reports, its utility remains the same.
- If the reported valuation v′i and reported quantity q′i are fixed and R′i ̸= Ri . The utility of vendor i is not related to its neighbours. Removing some neighbours does not
affect allocations and the shareholders of the reward, so misreporting neighbours
will not increase its utility.
• For any other vendor i in Group (4):
- For the setting wherein reported neighbour set Ng′i and reported quantity q′i are
fixed, then the utility of vendor i is zero-based on Equation 6.6. If i is within
the feasible global neighbours, then the only way it can increase the utility is by
reporting lesser valuation to become the winner. However, if it reports v′i < v∗N < vi ,
then its revenue will be equal to the actual winner, which is lower than its truthful
valuation. If i is not within the feasible global neighbours, then no matter what
valuation it reports, the allocation will not change.
- If the reported valuation v′i and reported quantity q′i are fixed and R′i ̸= Ri , removing
some neighbours will not change the allocation.

Therefore, DMMP mechanism exhibits IC and IR properties.

6.5

Experimental Results

This section presents the experimental results performed to evaluate the performance of
the novel DMMP mechanism. In this regard, the performance of the following three
mechanisms is compared.
• Simple Procurement: This is the classical procurement setting. In this setting,
buyers can only procure from their neighbours through iterative first price reverse
auctions.
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• Fixed Reward: In this mechanism, vendors receive a fixed reward ω for the diffusion of information, and the second price auction mechanism is adopted.
• DMMP: In this mechanism, the buyer is not aware of all the vendors in the economic network until its neighbour directly or indirectly diffuses the procurement
information; whereas, payment and rewards are computed using DMMP.
The experimental setting considers the procurement of five different types of resources,
i.e., k = 5. In this regard, an open economic network is generated randomly with V ,
such that 0 < |Ri | ≤ 4, ∀i ∈ V . This condition ensures that the buyer has at least four
immediate vendors to collectively fill the requested package Qb , i.e., Qb ⊆ {Ai : ∀i ∈ Rb }.
Further, values for Qb and Ai ∀i ∈ N, for all the five types of resources are also sampled
from a random generator which takes values [200, 1000] units. Then, both the per unit
valuations, i.e., svi and bvi ∀i ∈ N is also drawn from a random generator which takes
values [20, 50] s.t. svi > bvi . Then for the fixed reward-based mechanism, the value of ω
for a particular node is calculated as the square root of its per-unit valuation.
In the above setting, an experiment is performed to examine the performance of all the
mechanisms. In specific, the results are evaluated to show the merits of adopting DMMP
mechanism based on the cost of the procurement for the buyer. This experiment also
aims to analyse the impact of the value of δ on the cost of procurement. In this regard,
six experimental settings were designed concerning the different values of δ , such as,
δ = (1, 6). This simulation setting is repeated 100 times for all the mechanisms to reduce
the experimental setting. Finally, all the mechanism are implemented in Python 3 and the
experiments are performed on Intel Xeon 3.6GHz 6 core processor with 32 GB RAM.
From Figure 6.3, it is seen that the procurement cost is minimum for DMMP mechanism as compared to the other two mechanisms. An interesting observation here is,
initially, procurement cost decreases with the increase in value of δ . However, later the
procurement cost rises with the rise in the value of δ . For instance, at δ = 3, procurement
cost is the least, but at δ = 5 procurement cost rises. It is possibly because of the increase
in the number of nodes in the winning path, which leads to an increase in the total rewards
distributed. Overall, the experimental results highlight that the novel DMMP mechanism
outperforms the other two mechanisms and demonstrate its efficiency for procurement of
MUMI through economic networks.

6.6

Summary

This chapter introduced a novel information diffusion based resource allocation mechanism in open economic networks. In this network, a single buyer submits its MUMI
resource request directly or indirectly to many independent vendors. Then, the proposed
mechanism aims to aid the buyer to procure the resources from a group of distant vendors
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Figure 6.3: Impact of δ on Total Procurement Cost

with the minimum possible price. Also, the set of vendors can share their available resources amongst each other. In this regard, resource requests from the buyer get allocated
by a group of winning vendors. Finally, all the vendors in the path from the winning
vendors and the buyer get rewarded for information diffusion.
The DMMP mechanism guarantees that every vendor gets an incentive to reveal their
truthful type and invite all their neighbouring vendors to participate in the procurement.
Most importantly, those rewards do not increase the buyer’s payment. The payment is
even improved as compared to VCG mechanism. Towards the end, based on the experimental results, novel DMMP is also proved to have the least procurement cost.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1

Conclusion

Designing an optimal and efficient resource allocation mechanism is a complex problem,
especially for dynamically changing open market settings, wherein arrival and departure
of the participants is very uncertain. In this regard, an optimal mechanism must tune its
policies as per the changing resource availability and the resource requirements in the
market. In specific, the adopted allocation and pricing policies should be sensitive to the
dynamics of the market. Further, an optimal mechanism should be rational and protect
the preferences of all the participants. Finally, it must have the potential to control the
growing competition and encourage collaborative behaviour in the market. In addition,
a mechanism must possess qualitative aspects of resource allocation, such as efficient
resource utilisation, minimal allocation delay, an improved participation rate, enhanced
quality of services, etc. Towards this end, to ensure equilibrium in the market, a mechanism must qualify the following properties:
• strategy-proofness: the adopted policies should ensure truthful behaviour of the
strategic participants so that strategic participants are incentivised to behave truthfully in the market.
• Participation Fairness: the adopted policies should encourage fair participation opportunities to all the participants to improve the participation rate and resource utilisation in the market.
To address these existing challenges in open market settings, this dissertation presents
a series of resource allocation mechanisms.
Chapter 3 presents a real-time resource allocation (RTRA) mechanism, which implements a novel learning-based pricing policy to suit the dynamics of the open cloud markets. This mechanism implements a multi-agent paradigm, wherein agents bid optimised
selling prices of the resources on behalf of the potential cloud vendors. These agents
113
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optimise the selling price for their corresponding vendor using novel RL-based real-time
pricing (RTP) algorithm. Also, to boost the learning capability of this algorithm, participants are catalogued using a novel profiling scheme. Additionally, to minimise the
participant drop problem in the market, a priority-based fairness mechanism is adopted.
On the other hand, the allocation policy implements a novel multi-preference based winner determination policy. Towards this end, based on the simulation, it is proved that the
performance of all the participants improved in RTRA mechanism.
Chapter 4 presents a monotonic policy for online resource allocation (MP-ORA) mechanism. It implements a custom-designed proximal policy optimisation (PPO) RL technique
for online open cloud markets. Similar to the previous RTRA mechanism, MP-ORA is also
an adaptive mechanism. In addition to that, MP-ORA guarantees strategy-proofness based
on implemented monotonic allocation and critical value pricing policy. In this regard, the
novel mechanism incentivises every dynamically arriving buyer to behave truthfully and
maximise the social welfare of the vendor. Towards the end, based on series of experiments, social welfare and allocation efficiency in the MP-ORA mechanism were comparatively higher.
Chapter 5 focuses on encouraging collaboration in the competitive market through resource sharing. This chapter presents a novel information diffusion-based mechanism for
procurement auctions (DBPA) through open economic networks. In this setting, a single
buyer attempts to procure a multi-unit of resources by inviting distant vendors. Specifically, DBPA mechanism determines a winning path from the buyer to a set of winning
vendors. Then, all the winning vendors receive an optimal payment based on the truthful
payment policy. Besides, all the vendors in the winning path also get rewarded for diffusing the information. Later, it is proved empirically that total procurement cost payment in
DBPA is at least as good as payment in VCG mechanism. So the rewards in DBPA mechanism did not overburden the buyer with additional procurement costs. In addition, the
DBPA mechanism guarantees that every vendor gets an incentive to reveal their truthful
type and to invite all their neighbouring vendors to participate in the procurement.
Chapter 6 is the direct extension of the DBPA mechanism for procurement of the multiunits of heterogeneous resources. The MUMI resource allocation problem is comparatively complex. This chapter presents a diffusion mechanism for multi-unit multi-item
procurement (DMMP). Similar to the previous mechanism, DMMP also guarantees that
every vendor gets an incentive to reveal their truthful type and to invite all their neighbouring vendors. DMMP is also proven to be economically as good as VCG mechanism in the
open economic network. Towards the end, based on the experimental results, it is proven
that DMMP has the least cost of procurement as compared to the VCG mechanism.
Briefly, in every chapter, the aim is to achieve different objectives of the dissertation
and their respective issues.

7.2. FUTURE WORK

7.2

115

Future Work

Several issues in the dissertation are yet to be covered, which could be the possible future
directions for aspiring researchers. This section summarises the possible future work
concerning each chapter, as follows.
In Chapter 3 the RTRA mechanism is designed for independent vendors and buyers.
In this setting, neither the vendors nor the buyers share their resources. This sharing
mechanism would enhance the overall social welfare, as well as resource utilisation in the
market. Similarly, in Chapter 4 there is a need for a mechanism to facilitate the group resource allocation. It would improve resource availability in the market. Also, this would
reduce the execution time as the number of online buyers increases. Besides, a selective bidding strategy would be very attractive for such a market setting. In this strategy,
bidders would be allowed to bid conservatively, considering the quality and social preferences of the participants. Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6, it would be very interesting to
design a diffusion mechanism for the market with multiple buyers. In specific it would be
interesting to focus on the multi-buyer market setting.
In conclusion, this dissertation compiles a series of resource allocation mechanisms
that are conceptually concise and are data-driven. In this regard, these mechanisms address different objectives and their associated challenges. Firstly, learning-based optimal
pricing and fair allocation mechanism for open cloud markets (Chapter 3). Then, designing the mechanism for the impatient buyers in online markets with uncertain demands
(Chapter 4). Further, information diffusion-based mechanisms has been introduced to
encourage collaborative behaviour (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6 ) in the competitive market.
Towards this end, all the experimental results presented could be easily reproduced. Also,
the evaluations are verifiable in real-world resource allocation problems.
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